1992


Karen Dean Benson. “Education as Developing Self: The Importance of Feeling and Intuition.” Diss. U of California-Berkeley, 1992: 499. UMI no. AAC 9304857. DAI, 53.10 (1993). Print. The author states in her abstract: “Drawing upon Jung, Langer, Bergson, and Noddings, the feeling and intuiting components as educationally neglected aspects of the self are investigated within the formulation of a self that is at once universalistic in nature but also admits of a variety of cultural and individual elements” (p. 3470).

Henri Bergson, *Lettere a Xavier Léon e ad altri*. Ed. Renzo Ragghianti. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1992, 187. (Instituto Italiano per Gli Studi Filosofici, Serie Testi, 12) This consists of heretofore unpublished letters by Bergson to the editor of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (Xavier Léon). Letters to the Marchesa Arconati-Visconti, Lionel Dauriac, Henri Delacroix, Flori Delattre, Maurice Guyot, Elie Halévy, Émile Meyerson, Victor Monod, Desiré Roustan, and Lev Sestov are also included. All letters are cited separately in the text of this bibliography in the section By Bergson. The editor provides both an introduction to this correspondence and explanatory footnotes to the letters. All letters by Bergson in this item appear independently in the section of this bibliography titled *By Bergson*.


presents the historical background of vitalism, beginning with the enlightenment. Part 2 explores vitalism in the twentieth-century philosophy and science. Part 3 explores vitalism in twentieth-century literature and aesthetics. In their introduction (pp. 1-12) the editors situate Bergson in relation to vitalism and to modern philosophy more generally. They conclude: “Bergson, so vehemently cast out, has returned as an element in human thought. In what senses? Why?” (p. 11). Essays in this book concerned with Bergson are presented separately in this bibliography (1992).


Paul Douglass. “Deleuze and the Endurance of Bergson.” Thought, 66.264 (Mar. 1992): 47-61. Print. The author explores the extent to which G. Deleuze has both taken over and used distinctions found in Bergson and given us a “new” Bergson, based on Bergson’s psychological and evolutionary thought but excluding his later ethical and religious reflections. (By contrast, Charles Hartshorne acclaims Bergson’s later thought, categorically dismisses his earlier psychological and evolutionary ideas. Ed.) For Deleuze Bergson is the creator of a new method which avoids false problems and takes “difference,” “multiplicity,” “temporality” seriously. Bergson is a decisive precursor of today’s “post-structural turn.” For the author’s abstract of this article see Philosopher’s Index, 26.4 (1992): 106. Print.


Jeffrey Jay Gaines. “The Habitual Body – Subject: A Study in Descartes and the Biran-Bergson-Merleau-Ponty Lineage.” Diss. State U of New York, 1992: 349. UMI no. AAC 9310010. DAI, 53.12 (1993): 4350. The author states in his abstract: “Descartes also developed a sense of mind-body unity, of the fusion of mental and physical habits, and of a continuous, cumulative and progressive time. These ‘minor’ themes of Descartes’s philosophy were taken up and progressively enriched by Maine de Biran, Henri Bergson, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty... These later thinkers conceived of a ‘body-subject’ that, by virtue of the personal and social habits it acquires and modifies, is able to responsibly engage in traditions it continues, renews, and overturns.”


Lenn E. Goodman. “Time, Creation, and the Mirror of Narcissus.” Philosophy East and West, 42.1 (Jan. 1992): 69-112. Print. “The mutual referentiality Bergson found among temporal moments does not, as Hartshorne insisted, entail a frozen, mechanistic world, but acknowledges continuity in change. Developing Bergson’s analysis of time, I understand the present objectively, as the duration of events: Now, like here, is context-relative, perhaps centuries-long, as historical co-projectors achieve their work. Creation, then, pace Hartshorne, is compatible with Bergsonian creativity. Process neoscinianism may not be: Even while making the suffering god a scapegoat, it eagerly grasps the ‘anthropic principle’ to set in his place an inflated image of ourselves, boding a closed society and closed future.” Philosopher’s Index, 26.3 (fall 1992): 98. Print.


Jack H. Haeger. “Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Romantic Background to Bergson” in The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy. Eds. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1992: 98-108. Print. The author examines S. T. Coleridge’s thought as having played a part in forming the background of Bergson’s thought. Where Coleridge in the end returned to “traditional rationalistic hierarchy” and away from the life of the universe, Bergson was wholeheartedly to embrace intuitive knowledge. Thus he was able “to pose against both empiricism and rationalism a vitalism that could remain non-hierarchical…” (p. 107).


Sonja Russell Haney. “Time and Knowledge in William Faulkner’s ‘Absalom, Absalom!’.” Diss. U of Tennessee, 1992: 198. UMI no. AAC 9306638. DAI, 53.11 (1993): 3918. Abstract: This study attempts to examine Absalom, Absalom! In terms of Henri Bergson’s metaphysical arguments concerning time and reality. Faulkner’s insistence on keeping all knowledge of the Sutpen material relative to the individual narrative points of view reflects Bergson’s distinction between metaphysical, or absolute, knowledge and mental, or partial, knowledge. The failure of the narrators to account for the truth behind the whole duration of events is then shown to be the result of the same intellectual errors which Bergson has pointed out in the failed attempts of philosophers to account for the real nature of time, its whole and continuous mobility, or duration, which brings about change. A summary of major philosophical efforts, from Aristotle to modern-day, analyzing the nature of time elucidates Bergson’s argument that the problems which have plagued philosophers results from the confusion of time with the mental concepts of math, space, and language. Bergson’s insistence that time, as well as all objects of reality, are distorted by the intellect’s attempt to freeze the mobility of reality by representing the absolute, unique “thinking itself” in terms of repeatable, conceptual expressions is emphasized to explain the repetitive nature of the narrative accounts of the Sutpen material, as well as the failure of the individual characters who appear doomed to repeat their experiences. Studies in cognition and thinking disorders similar to Bergson’s argument concerning the faulty intellectual attempt to identify the real object in terms of partial expressions, or conceptual attributes, are also used to explain the cognitive processes of Absalom’s characters. The relevance of Bergson’s major points is extended to As I Lay Dying, Light in August, The Sound and the Fury and The Bear in the conclusion of this study.
Charles Hartshorne. “Some Under- and Some Over-rated Great Philosophers.” Process Studies, 21.3 (fall 1992): 166-74. Print. The two most under-rated philosophers, the author states, are Plato and Bergson; the two most over-rated are Aristotle and Kant. Plato and Bergson have a great deal in common, in both what they oppose (materialism, atomism, unqualified contingentism) and what they affirm (the reality of mind, and of religious experience). Bergson’s two most important contributions are his interpretation of dreams and his demonstration of the relativity of “nothingness.” His great failure lies in his anti-intellectualism and consequent inability to understand continuity and discontinuity.


Michel Jouhaud. “Bergson et la création de soi par soi.” Etudes philosophiques, 2 (Apr.-June 1992): 195-215. Print. Two conceptions of self-creation vie for ascendancy in Bergson: self-creativity as emergence and as choice. In Time and Free Will emergence is central, in Matter and Memory and later works, choice. The necessity of choosing from the many possible personalities we might have become (a fundamental Bergsonian idea) overcomes the dilemma of self-creation as choice or as emergence. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion Bergson, however, confronts a new dilemma. If man is, in the last analysis, free only by recourse to God, can he be truly self-creative? (On this question see M. Morkovsky, 1977, 1981. Ed.) Eng. trans. “Bergson and the Creation of the Self by the Self.”


Mary Dumaine Leche. “Second Language.” Diss. U of Southwestern Louisiana, 1992: 108. UMI no. AAC 9229554. DAI, 53.5 (1992): 1518. Abstract: For Whitman the present moment coexists with the past and helps to qualify and to create the future. My aesthetic also reflects my study of the work of a number of other writers who explore the nature of circular as opposed to chronological, sequential time, among them the philosopher Henri Bergson and the poets Jorge Luis Borges, T. S. Eliot, Octavio Paz and William Matthews. . . . The above-mentioned writers explore Bergson’s metaphysical theories in their work either by rupturing narrative time or, as in Borges’ case, by writing stories and poems which are more direct speculations on the nature of time (p. 1518). Much of this dissertation is taken up with the author’s poetry and imaginative prose.

Richard Lehan. “Bergson and the Discourse of the Moderns” in The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1992: 306-29. Print. The author argues that by combating both Enlightenment rationalism and Darwinism, Bergson was absolutely essential to the development of twentieth century literary modernism. This essay includes sections on S. Butler and G. B. Shaw as predecessors of Bergson and of D.H. Lawrence, V. Woolf, and J. Joyce as having been influenced by Bergson. See also abstract. Philosopher’s Index, 27.2 (1993): 163. This essay also compares Bergson and Heidegger and Bergson and the systems biology of Bertalanffy and Laszlo.

Ruth Lorand. “Bergson’s Concept of Order.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 30.4 (Oct. 1992): 579-95. Print. “The traditional concept of order recognizes only one type of order. In this type of order laws external to the ordered set, dictate the position of each element in the set. Bergson discerns two types of order: 1. The geometrical, or intellectual, order is a pragmatic order and corresponds to the traditional concept. 2. The vital, or intuitive, order reflects true experience. It is highly unpredictable, sensitive and governed by internal necessity. Bergson concludes that disorder does not exist, since in the absence of one type of order there is always another type. Although I agree with Bergson’s distinction, I argue against his claim that there is no disorder.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 27.2 (1993): 164. Print.


Renz Ragghianti, ed. *Letter to Xavier Léon and others* (by Henri Bergson). Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1992: 187. Instituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, Seric Testi, 12. Print. This consists of a series of letters by Bergson to Xavier Léon, founder of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. Also included are letters by Bergson to the Marhesa Arconati-Visconti, Lionel Dauriac, Henri Delacroix, Floris Delattre, Maurice Guyo, Elie Halévy, Emile Meyerson, Victor Monod, Désiré Roustan, and Lev Sestov. The author prefaces this collection with a long introduction (pp. 9-53) and provides explanatory and identifying footnotes to Bergson’s letters. Each of these letters is cited separately in the present bibliography under the section “By Bergson.”


Sanford Schwartz. “Bergson and the Politics of Vitalism” in The Crisis of Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy. Eds. Frederick and Paul Douglass. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1992: 277-305. Print. This is a very clear analysis of the development of Bergson’s thought from Time and Free Will through The Two Sources. Throughout, the author examines the constituencies in Bergson’s following and the way in which developments in his thought affected these constituencies. The author concludes that Bergson “shifted from what appeared to be a well-defined vitalism of the Right and entered into a kind of ideological no-man’s land, which lost him the solid allegiance of his original constituency and gained him only mixed and ephemeral support from an opposing constituency, both of which resisted his effort to overcome the conflict between them” (p. 304).


Modern consciousness is defined here as an acute awareness of time and space. Modern consciousness began as an intellectual revolt against scientific positivism, sometimes referred to as determinism, one of the most pervasive concepts of the late nineteenth century, and was aided and abetted by the technological advances in communications and transportation that seemed to make the world move more rapidly and become smaller.
The focus here begins with a brief historiographic review of the cultural history of France (mostly of Paris) and North America (mostly the northeastern United States) for the spawning grounds of James and Bergson. James’s and Bergson’s individual intellectual development are discussed as a prelude to a review of their particular philosophic contributions to a modern consciousness of time and space.

Why and how James’s and Bergson’s ideas were so well received in contemporary society is discussed as well as the reactions of both their admirers and their critics. It is asserted that traces of James’s ideas involving the exertion of individual mental and physical participation in the new world of flux, and Bergson’s explanations of biological science and the creative abilities of individual human beings are found all through the early twentieth century, and still endure today. In brief, William James and Henri Bergson were process philosophers who sought to define being in an age of becoming.


Raphael Berro Uriz. “El Espíritu en Bergson.” Diss. U de Navarra (Spain), 1992: 328. DAI, 54.4 (1993): 992. Print. The author distinguishes levels of Reality (of duration), from matter through various intermediate beings up to God. The author’s abstract concludes: “Hence, in the world, there is not a ‘principle of life’ separated from the physical and chemical, neither is there in man’s most spiritual level pure spirit. Whilst he does not distance himself from Western theistic metaphysics, and although he accepts that the mystic knows more about God than the philosopher, he believes that the dogmatic and ritual content of all religion is relative” (p. 992).


María de Issekutz Wolsky and Sleander A. Wolsky. “Bergson’s Vitalism in the Light of Modern Biology” in The Crisis of Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy. Eds. Frederick and Paul Douglass. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1992:153-70. Print. This is a re-evaluation of Bergson’s biology. Though many of Bergson’s objections to neo-Darwinism are dated, his critical approach to evolutionary theory seems very modern. This includes his criticisms of
Lamarckianism, and his approach to neo-Darwinism in terms of the alternative gradualism/saltationism. (Bergson’s resolution of this dilemma is very close to the present “punctuated equilibrium” theory.) The problem of explaining the evolution of the eye also remains a lively topic. The authors reinterpret Bergson’s vital impetus in terms of modern molecular biology: “The information for logical genetic action signifies the appearance of a force which is simultaneously the product and producer of life” (p. 168).


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Asbjørn Aarnes and Hans Kolstad. *Den Skapende Varighet: En Essaysamlung Om Henri Bergson*. Oslo: Aschehoug, 1993, 282. An English translation of the title of this item is: *Creative Duration: An Essay on Henri Bergson*. The essays in this item are presented separately in this section of the present bibliography. The authors relate Bergson’s thought to Twentieth Century Scandinavian literature and literary criticism.


author elucidates the impact of Bergson on Modernism in Europe, especially in terms of theories of organic form.


Ila Leslie Berman. “From Grid to Matrix: (Im) Material Events and the Emergence of Smooth Space at the Limits of Contemporary Architecture.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1993, 411. (Dissertation Abstracts International, Vol. 54/ 11-A, p. 3903. The author’s abstract states: “The GRID and the MATRIX are provisionally advanced as synthetic models and analytic tools to map this transformation and theorize the various dynamic operative in the evolution of recent architecture. Elaborated primarily through the philosophical writings of Gilles Deleuze (in collaboration with Felix Guattari) and Henri Bergson…”

Timothy Blake Bergstrom. “The Phenomenon of Expression: A Study in its Significance as a Foundation for the Philosophy of Culture.” PhD Dissertation, Emory University, 1993, 297. (UMI order number A459A45199) The author states in the final paragraph of his abstract: “Here (Ch.4) the analysis focuses on the debate over the primacy of Life over Spirit. The views of Bergson, Simmel, Scheler and Heidegger are contrasted with Cassirer’s view.” Dissertation Abstracts International, A54, No.9, 1993, p.297


Ricardo Cardoso. *O conceito de metafisica no persasamiento de Henri Bergson.* Braga: Publicações de Faculdade de filosofia, Universidad Católica Portuguesa, 1993, 291. (Coleção Pensamento filosófico) An English translation of the title of this item is: *Concerning the Concept of Metaphysics in the Thought of Henri Bergson.*


Henri Gouhier. *Etienne Gilson. Trois essais : Bergson, la Philosophie chrétienne, l’Art*. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1993, 95. (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie, Nouvelle série) Cf. “Premier Essai, Gilson et Bergson”, 13-36. Bergson’s philosophy had a powerful impact on the young E. Gilson, who felt he had been set on the right track by Bergson’s ideas. But when Bergson dealt with religion in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* he was, for Gilson, involved in a field to which he remained in important respects an outsider. Gilson’s reflections on the functions of the intellect and the nature of the purpose in Bergson are still of interest.

André Grappe. “Bergson et Pradines : correspondance présentée par André Grappe.” *Études philosophiques*, No. 4, October-December, 1993, 1-446. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Bergson and Pradines: Correspondence Presented by André Grappe.” In general the author stresses the differences between Maurice Pradines and Bergson, arguing that Pradines was an original thinker. These letters are presented in this bibliography in the section “On Bergson” and the section “By Bergson”.

Nicolas Grimaldi. *Ontologie du temps. L’attente et la rupture*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993, 221. (Questions) Bergson is the most cited author in this study of the nature of temporality (becoming). Becoming is the substance of things and “attente” (waiting, looking forward) is the very essence of consciousness. His basic criticism of Bergson concerns Bergson’s concept of matter and with it his treatment of negation (Cf. pp. 175-182). The problems are two: the presumed primary and the absolute nature of duration and the merely derivative nature of matter. Duration is only possible, the author asserts, if it is confronted with opposition. This opposition is provided, according to Bergson, by matter. One cannot understand, however, how if duration is an absolute principle, it can give rise to its opposite (matter). The author concludes that matter and negativity must be treated as fundamentally real: “Time is thus reality itself, but it is the reality of a mediation.” “Le temps est donc la réalité même, mais c’est la réalité d’une médiation.” p. 182.


M.A.R. Habib. “Bergson resartus’ and T.S. Eliot’s Manuscript.” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 54.2, April, 1993, 255-276. The author examines an essay written by T.S. Eliot in 1910 on Bergson’s philosophy. Eliot was skeptical of Bergson’s philosophy from the beginning, and argued that Bergson was wrong to hold 1. That consciousness and matter are radically different 2. That time has priority over space, and 3. That philosophy should attempt to avoid both realism and idealism. Perhaps paradoxically, however, Bergson’s ideas find their way into Eliot’s poetry and literary criticism. Bergson’s concepts of language, poetic creativity, the self, and the “integrative nature” of thought found their way into Eliot’s writing. Possibly, even his notion of the “objective correlative” is derived from Bergson.

Michael Hardt. *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, 139. The author treats Deleuze as one of those who, seeking a post-structuralist foundation for philosophy above all attacks the Hegelian tradition, with its valorization of negation as fundamental and its merely formal dialect. In Chapter one (“Bergsonian Ontology: The Positive Movement of Being”) the author explores Deleuze’ portrayal of Bergson noting that Bergson is used by Deleuze as a means of attacking Plato and mechanism, but above all, Hegel. For Bergson the movement of positive existence is real per se, requiring no negative self definition. The author sees Deleuze as not finding adequate concepts of univocity, convergence, organization, and sociability in Bergson, and as searching for them in Nietzsche and Spinoza. For similarities between Bergson and Nietzsche, Cf. pp. 47-48. For similarities between Bergson and Spinoza, Cf. pp. 60-63, 112-113.

Charles Hartshorne. “Hartshorne’s Response.” *Process Studies*, 22.3, Fall, 1993, 172. This is a response to “Hartshorne’s Process Theism and Big Bang Cosmology” by David Haugen and L. Bryant Keeling in the same number if *Process Studies* (pp. 163-171). The author’s point out that on the basis of the big bang cosmology the universe must in the future (whether or not this should be followed by a period of contraction and the reconstitution of matter) exhibit the loss of form and commensurate transformation into a sea of radiation broken by a few particles. This is inconsistent with Hartshorne’s notion of divine memory. (If the mind of God is to the material universe as human memory is to the body, the decay of the body, the decay of the material universe must result in the death of God’s memory. Hartshorne can only save God’s memory by abandoning his notion of God’s relation to the world.) Hartshorne responds that he agrees with Bergson that the primary function of the animal brain is forgetting—the filtering-out of unneeded memories. Since God has total recall with no need to forget, his relation to the physical world might be different in many respects to the human relation to the body.

Lawrence W. Howe. “Bergson’s Finitism and the Creation Hypothesis.” *Modern Schoolman*, 71.1, 1993, 47-57." This essay addresses aspects of Bergson’s cosmogony, particularly his view on entropy and its implications for the origin of the universe. His discussion of the genesis of matter may clarify his account of the past and provide a focus for grasping his theological position. I will try
to show that the real issue for Bergson is not the pedestrian one of creationism versus evolutionism; nor is it that of creationism versus externalism. The real issue is whether the past is finite or infinite.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 28.2, 1994, p. 141.

Lawrence W. Howe. “Unmasking Bergson’s Idealism.” *Southwest Philosophical Studies*, 15, Spring, 1993, 43-50. “This paper discusses interpretations of Bergson’s metaphysics. Some have argued that Bergson’s metaphysics is a vitalism, others that he was a pioneer of process philosophy. While each of these interpretations are in certain respects plausible, they ultimately fail to detect a confusion of terms in Bergson’s metaphysics that sponsors a very different interpretation of his position. Reasons are presented for interpretation Bergson as an idealist holding that there is a primitive mind operative in each stratum of existence and that the virtual impetus and duration are confused modes of mental activity.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 27.3, Fall, 1993, p. 147.


Edmund Husserl. “Letter to Henri Gouhier. November 15, 1928.” in *Edmund Husserl: Briefwechsel. Band VI. Philosophenbriefe.* Ed. Karl Schuman with Elizabeth Schuman. Dordrecht: Klumer Academic Publishers, 1993, p. I55. In this letter Husserl responds (in German) to Gouhier’s request for an article to be included in a volume celebrating Bergson’s 70th birthday. (The volume was never to be published.) Husserl states both that though he would be glad to pay homage to Bergson’s genius, and that though such a book would, since it would present the best of both nations, be a blessing to mankind, he has undertaken so many obligations at the present time that it will be impossible to write a new essay.


Peder Christian Kjerschour. *Tekningen som deltagelse: musikken som utfordring for tenkningens selvfortæelse.* Oslo: Solum, 1993, 123. An English translation of the title of this item is” “Thinking as Participation: Music as a Challenge for Thought’s Understanding of Itself.”


Donald Stewart Langford. “The Primacy of Place in Gary Snyder’s Ecological Vision.” Ph.D. Dissertation: Ohio State University, 1989, 233. (UMI order number AAC 9325535) The author states in his abstract: “By contrasting the views of Hulme and Bergson on the one hand and Pound and Fenollosa on the other, I try to indicate some of the ways in which juxtaposed images are used differently in Snyder’s poetry, emphasizing the structural evidence of a way of being within the poems.” (Dissertation Abstracts International. A54, No. 7, 1994, p. 2580)


Keith Edward Locke. “Wallace Stevens: The Art of Impermanence.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1993, 447. UMI order number AAC 9323251) The author states in his abstract: Although Stevens credited Bergson and James as the philosophers fundamental to his ‘view of philosophy’, I believe that Stevens agreed primarily with Santayana that the individual must create imaginative fictions- beliefs- which serve the necessary expediency of daily human

Ottavio Marzocca. “Tempo e molteplicità: la durata Bergsoniana fra relatività e irreversibilità,” Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana, 72nd Year, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1993, 271-203. An English translation of the title of this essay is: “Time and Multiplicity: Bergsonian Duration Between Relativity and Irreversibility.” The author’s abstract in Philosophical Index, 28.2, 1994, p.156, runs as follows: “In questo tèsto viene esaminato il confront fra Bergson e Einstein, verificatosi nel 1922, in occasione del qualsr il filosofo, contrappose unaconcezione montistica del tempo al pluralism relativistico. L’analisi individual nella posizione bergsoniana unaprova esemplare del radicalmento della vision universalistica del tempo nella cultura moderna, radicalmente che appareconfirmato anche della riattualizzazione del Bergsonismo compiuta da Prigogine. Nel testo si evidenzia; tuttavia, come il pensiero bergsoniano abbiainspirato anche autori (come Deleuze e Serres) che superano l’universalismo temporale attraversola valorizzazione del concetto di molteplicità presente sia in Bergson che in Riemann, precursore di Einstein.” Philosopher’s Index, 28.2, 1994, p.156. An English translation of this abstract is: “This essay will compare Bergson and Einstein in 1922, when the philosopher compares a monistic concept of time to relativistic pluralism. The analysis finds in Bergson’s position an exemplary debate concerning the radicalization of the universalistic vision of time in modern culture, a radicalization which appears confirmed also from the reactualization of Bergson accomplished by Prigogine. Bergson’s thought has inspired authors (like Deleuze and Serres) who have surpassed temporal universalism through the reanimation of the concept of multiplicity, which is present in Bergson and Riemann, precursors of Einstein.”

Matt Keoki Matsuda. “The Memory of the Modern.” Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1993, 609. (Dissertation Abstracts International, Vol. 54/07-A, 2696.) The author’s abstract states: “My work is an investigation of the history and historiography of ‘memory’ in late nineteenth-century France. Much of this work has been inspired by the grand project on French historical memory Les Lieux de Mémoire (7 volumes) under the direction of Pierre Nora, as well as by the work of other French scholars including Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Miuchel Foucault, and Mark Auge.”


Maurice Pradines. “Lettre à Henri Bergson: 23 mars 1932.” Études philosophiques, No. 4, October, 1993, 440-441. In this letter Pradines congratulates Bergson for his achievement in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, which he describes as the natural culmination of Bergson’s
thought. Bergson restores a “veritable human truth” which more radical views (e.g., those of L. Lévy-Bruhl) are far less able to explain.

Maurice Pradines. “Lettre à Henri Bergson. 1 juillet 1934.” *Etudes philosophiques*, No. 4, October-December, 1993, 442-444. In this letter Pradines thanks Bergson for a copy of *La pensée et le mouvant* (*The Creative Mind*). He discusses especially the new *Introductions*, written especially for this volume. Bergson has written with remarkable clarity on the nature of duration, the “difficulty” of history, the points of view of science and metaphysics, and of the theoretical and the practical. Even for those who remain rationalists (like Pradines) Bergson has made it clear that to go from knowledge of the work (“œuvre”) to that of the worker requires a *change of method*. (L. Brunschvicg, for example, has seen this.)


Jiseok Ryu. “Sur une lettre de Bergson à H. M. Kallen (1915).” *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger*, 183.4, 1993, 785-788. This brief article concerns a letter from Bergson to Horace Meyer Kallen first published in *The Journal of Philosophy* (October, 1915), correcting certain interpretations of his philosophy in Kallen’s *William James and Henri Bergson* (1914). The author notes that two different versions of this letter are available in French publications: *Mélanges* (1972) and *Ecrits et paroles* (1959). The first paragraph of Bergson’s letter, as given in *Ecrits et paroles* differs from the first paragraph of the original letter, as presented in *The Journal of Philosophy and Mélanges*. In particular, the name “Plato” has been substituted for “Plotinus”.

Clive Scott. *Reading the Rhythm: The Poetics of French Free Verse 1910-1930*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 290. The author describes Bergson’s philosophy as being of profound importance in the development of “free verse”. Among the poets utilizing Bergson’s ideas in this twenty year period are St. John Perse (pp. 25-26, 42) and Blaise Cendrars (pp. 79, 88, 142, 148).

T.L.S. Sprigge. *James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality*. Chicago: Open Court, 1993, 630. This is an interpretation and criticism of philosophies of William James and Frances Herbert Bradley. The author takes James and Bergson to be closely similar on many points, and indicates the extent to which they differ with Bradley. (Cf. esp. pp. 186-191 for comparisons of Bergson and Bradley and pp. 214-224 for comparisons of Bergson’s and James’ concepts of experienced time.) The author ignores Bergson’s concept of “rhythms” of duration and hence certain “discontinuist” aspects of his thought.

followed Bergson and Aldous Huxley in considering the brain and nervous system as filters that help us make manageable the potential influx of information from “Mind at Large”.


Nicholas Dominick Tirone. “The Question of an Extra-Linguistic Reality: Between Derrida and Bergson.” PhD Dissertation, Fordham University, 1993, 297. (UMI Order Number AAC 9313771) Abstract: ‘The question of an extra-linguistic reality: Between Derrida and Bergson’ is an exposition of the ‘between’ which is necessarily omitted from differential linguistic structures. An examination of Derrida’s notion of difference, taking into account the ‘inhabit/inhibit’ structure of differentiation, is hermeneutically employed in a reading of Bergson’s crucial dualisms to reveal the ‘between’ which is there yet not represented by linguistic oppositions. The dissertation opens with an exposition of Derrida’s difference, first noting the ramifications of the letter ‘A’, and then moving into a study of the differ/defer activity of differentiation. With this framework established, the reader begins a study of Bergson’s Time and Free Will. Here, the duration/space and heterogeneity/homogeneity dichotomies are explored according to the Derridean analysis; parallels between Derrida and Bergson and emphasized, especially regarding temporality. The reading of Bergson moves into an analysis of Creative Evolution where plant/animal and instinct/intellect dichotomies are given similar account designed to reveal the ‘between’ which permeates the differends. Again, certain parallels between Derrida and Bergson are noted. Finally, both are shown to be philosophers of the ‘between’ of that reality which remains unrepresented by the narrow parameters of linguistic opposition structures. The dissertation commands importance on several levels. Regarding the history of philosophy, it suggests a connection between Bergson and Derrida, perhaps the two most profound French-language philosophers of this century. Philosophically, regarding Bergonianism itself, it refutes the opinion that Bergson is a dualist by showing that Bergson is aware of the illusionary nature of linguistic constructions. Furthermore, it provides insight into Bergson’s philosophy of language which is significant to the field as a whole. Moreover, regarding Derrida, it adds a new dimension to an understanding of difference, not only by placing that understanding within a French historical context, but also by suggesting how certain interpretations of Derrida, such as those which suggest an entrapment within a language, are misguided. Finally, the dissertation is to be seen as an opening, engendering further consideration of the relationship between Bergson and Derrida. (Dissertation Abstracts International, A54, No.1, 1993, p. 205)
Pierre Trotignon. “Bergson et Spinoza.” in *Spinoza au XXe siècle*. Ed. Olivier Bloch. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993, 3-12. This is a careful analysis of Bergson’s view of Spinoza, which deals with all of Bergson’s mentions of this philosopher. Through Bergson found in Spinoza intuitions internal to consciousness which “crack the moulds” or ordinary thought, he was inevitably radically opposed to Spinoza’s extreme rationalism and Eleaticism.


Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. “Etudes critiques : Bergson, professeur de khâgne.” *Etudes philosophiques*, No. 1, January-March, 1993, 87-92. This is an examination of Bergson’s lectures as a lycée teacher in the years prior to 1896 (Cours II. Leçons d’esthétique. Leçons de morale, psychologie et métaphysique. Eds. H. Hude and J.-L. Dumas. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, 490pp.) The reviewer argues that Bergson’s lectures show that there was no sharp break in thought between Bergson’s first two books. Also, Bergson’s concept of morality was tied to his reflections, and he had an excellent knowledge of the line of thought running from the Scottish common sense philosophers through J.S. Mill to H. Spencer, while his panpsychism evidently stemmed from a reading (unacknowledged) of Schelling.


1994


Lido Chiusano. *Croce e Bergson*. Gaeta: Bibliotheca, 1994, 83. (Filosofie, 2) This is an analysis and comparision of the philosophies of Benedetto Croce and Henri Bergson.


book consists of two parts. The first part is a new second edition; the second part is the original first edition. An English translation of the title of this item is: The Philosophy of Henri Bergson.


Christine Faquette. “Pour une approche systémique du comique. Exemples molièresques et cinématographiques d’illusion comique.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Université Laval (Canada), 1994, 194. (UMI order number AAC NN 98048) Eng. trans. “For a Systemic Approach to the Comic: Molièresque and Cinematographic Examples if the Comic Illusion.” The author proposes a new approach to the comic. She particularly notes the value of Bergson’s and Bakhtine’s ideas. Bakhtine alone has discovered the key to what is proper to the comic: “The comic is a metacommunication which proposes a commentary on the weaknesses of the social system.” (Dissertation Abstracts International, 56A, No. 8, 1996, p. 2940)

James W. Felt, S.J. Making Sense of Your Freedom: Philosophy for the Perplexed. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994, 110. This is an excellent defense of “free will”, written for the general reader and utilizing Bergson’s concepts of duration, creativity, novelty and self-determination. The central problem for defenders of free will is to present a concept of causality which avoids the determinist’s dilemma (either and event is caused and hence predetermined, or it is a matter of mere “chance” and irrational). The crux of the problem is to show that there is a third sort of causality which renders our acts possible without necessitating their final outcomes. This can be found in psychological duration, the author argues, which combines past actuality with present creative agency to produce a newly definite future. This agency, with its settled past and future being determined, constitutes an indivisible whole.


Leslie Grove. “Experiental Time in the Works of Johan Borgen.” PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 1994, 223. (UMI order number AAC 9523690) The author’s abstract contains the following: “… the first chapter explores the contrast between the time philosophy of Marcel Proust and that of Henri Bergson, and how this contrast, which is central to the problem of time in Borgen’s work, is reflected in his texts.” In Borgen’s L’illelord Trilogy Bogen moves away from the notion of time as movement toward the Bergsonian idea of time as ‘dureé’.” (Dissertation Abstracts International, A55, No. 4, 1995, p. 1375)

Marjatta Mirjami Hautola. “Tule Siske, Mika Olet: Eric Ahlmanin Ihmiskasitysesta kasvatas jatteluun.” D. Ed. Dissertation, Oulun Yliopisto (Finland), 1994, 196. Eng. trans. “Become Just What You Are: From Erik Ahlman’s Notion of Man to his Philosophy of Education.” Through Ahlman did not develop a philosophy of education his work remains relevant to such a philosophy: “Ahlman regards the will as the metaphysical basis of the world, suggesting that the latter is composed of values and instruments created by Schopenhauer, Bergson and depth psychology.” (Dissertation Abstracts International, C56, No. 1, 1995 p. 13)


Petre Horák. “On the Anniversary of the First World War.” Filozóicky Casopis, 42.4, 1994, 609-621. “The Great War 1914-1918 and the philosophers: for Hermann Cohen (an address to the German Kant Society October 14, 1914) the war was the expression of the German nation’s will to defend the highest, i.e., the German culture, against its enemies—the British and the French in the first place. Henri Bergson expressed the view (An address to the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, December 12, 1914) that this war was a legitimate defense against Prussian militarism and barbarism. Three brief letters by Ludwig Wittgenstein to Bertarand Russell and John Maynard Keynes, from the battlefield (1914 and 1915) demonstrate Wittgenstein’s resolution to continue his philosophical work and his relationship with British friends in spite if the war which separated them.” Philosopher’s Index, 29.4, 1995, 145.


Kirk Rising Ireland. “Anglers, Satyr-Gods, and ‘Divine Lizards’: Comedy in Excess.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1994, 125. (UMI order number AAC 9501292) The author states, in his abstract: “The introduction delineates comedy’s easy relationship with the malicious with its amorality or unaccountability. It further delineates how a selected number of theorists (Bergson, Sypher, Bakhtin, and others) have dealt with the problem of comedy and how they have endeavored the account for what comedy in its immense variety might mean.” (Dissertation Abstracts International, A57, No. 7, 1995, p. 1941)

consists of four items, “Deux philosophes de la vie: Bergson, Guayau,” 13-62 (originally published 1924); “Bergsonisme et biologie”, 64-76 (originally published 1929); “Henri Bergson”, 79-81 (originally published 1951); “‘N’écoutez pas ce qu’ils disent, regardez ce qu’ils font,’” 82-84 (originally published 1959); “Quelle est la valeur de la pensée bergsonienne ?”, 85-87 (originally published 1959); “Hommage solennel à Henri Bergson”, 88-96 (originally published 1960). Letters from Bergson to Jankelévitch (5/12/24, 5/27/29, 5/29/29, 2/10/38, 3/9/38, 9/10/39, appear in this bibliography in the section “By Bergson”.

Vladimir Jankelévitch. “Les thèmes mystiques dans la pensée russe contemporaine.” in Premières et dernières pages. Vladimir Jankelévitch. Paris: Seuil, 1994, 101-130. This item was originally published in 1925. It contains reflections on the reception and influence of Bergson’s philosophy in Russia, where he was known less through his own writings than through the writings of German thinkers inspired by Bergson. Eng. trans. “Mystical Themes in Contemporary Russian Thought.”

George M. Johnson. “‘The Spirit of the Age’: Virginia Woolf’s Response to Second Wave Psychology.” Twentieth Century Literature, 40.2, Summer, 1994, 139-164.


R. Lechat. “Henri Bergson, ou la réalité du devenir.” L’Enseignement philosophique, 45.1, 1994, 21-34. An English translation of the title of this item is:”Henri Bergson or the Reality of Becoming.”


Georges Marnellos. *La connaissance mystique d’après H. Bergson à la lumière de la théologie mystique de l’Église orthodoxe*. Aghios Nikolaos, Crete: Centre d’études de la culture orthodoxe, 1994, 125. An English translation of the title of this item is: *Mystical Knowledge According to H. Bergson in the Light of the Mystical Theology of the Orthodox Church*.


Paul Miquel. “Animalité et humanité dans *L’Evolution créatrice de Bergson.*” in *L’animalité. Hommes et animaux dans la littérature française*. Ed. Alain Niderst. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1994, 201-211. The author explores what Bergson means by “organization”; a term which in Bergson’s hands leads to an anti-Aristotelian understanding of the relations between men and animals. These relations, however, remain paradoxical as Bergson describes them, for Bergson is led to attribute contradictory tendencies to instinct and to intelligence. The last part of this article concerns Bergson’s description of evolution, which leads, he believes, to an untenable dualism of intuition and materiality.


Cyrille Morvan. *La philosophie du droit dans Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion.* Paris: Published by the Author, 1994, 422. An English translation of the title of this item is: *Legal Philosophy in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.*

John Mullarkey. “Duplicity in the Flesh: Bergson and Current Philosophy of the Body.” *Philosophy Today,* 38.4, Winter, 1994, 339-355. “This essay examines the conflict between the ‘modernist’ and ‘postmodernist’ conceptions of the body. The former privileges the body as a constant in a world of flux; the latter views it as the epitome of flux. My purpose is to see if this division might not be overcome by looking at Bergson and the influence his philosophy has had on Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, the two thinkers who can be regarded as especially paradigmatic of the modern and postmodern interpretations of the body. In Bergson’s conception of corporeality one can see both Merleau-Ponty’s ‘lived body’ and Deleuze’s ‘body without organs’. The difference, however, is that in their nascent, Bergsonian form, these conceptions of carnality coexist to the extent that each is actually the other’s condition of possibility.” *Philosopher’s Index,* 29.2, Summer, 1995, 194.


“Obligations and Heroes.” *Religion and Society Report,* 2.1, 1994, 1-3. This is a general account of Bergson’s *The Two Sources,* with special reference to contemporary world problems.


Annie Petit. “La Relation du corps à l’esprit selon Henri Bergson.” in *Entre le corps et l’esprit. Approche interdisciplinaire du Mind Body Problem.* Eds. Bernard Feltz and Dominique Lambert. Paris: Mardaga, 1994, 55-77. An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Relation of Mind and Body in Bergson.” This essay consists of two parts: “Eloge du corps et du cerveau” in which the author points out the very important and positive role which Bergson gives to the body and brain; “Le Dualisme bergsonien : irréductibilités et solidarités” in which the author describes the many transitions between and unifications of the terms of Bergson’s dualisms. Criticisms of Bergson’s “mind-body” theory by Merleau-Ponty and others are stated on pages 67-68 and in extensive footnotes. This is a successful attempt to correct many fundamental misunderstandings of Bergson’s *Matter and Memory.*

Alexis Philonenko. *Bergson ou de la philosophie comme science rigoureuse.* Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1994, 400. An English translation of the title of this item is: *Bergson or Philosophy as a Rigorous Science.*


Yasuchi Takahashi. “Les expériences mystiques et leurs expressions dans la philosophie de Bergson.” Cartesiana (Osaka), No. 12, 1994, 27. This is a résumé in French, of an article in Japanese. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Mystical Experiences and their Expressions in Bergson’s Philosophy.”

Pierre Trotignon. “Bergson et la Propagande de guerre.” in La réception de la philosophie allemande en France aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Ed. Jean Quillien. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1994, 207-215. This is a study of Bergson’s anti-German propaganda during the First World War. The author concludes: “Je ne reproche à Bergson ni son patriotisme, ni ses missions officielles, qui lui furent confiées, en Espagne et aux Etats-Unis. Il ne faisait là que remplir ses devoirs de citoyen. Mais, je remarque qu’il nous révèle à quel point les intellectuels français se jetèrent de leur plein gré dans une propagande anti-allemande dont les thèmes caricaturaux sont fort navrants sous la plume d’un homme tel que Bergson. Et surtout le plus grave est le lien des thèmes de cette
propagande avec certains de ses concepts philosophiques.” (p.215) The author reproaches Bergson neither for his patriotism nor his diplomatic missions. But Bergson’s war propaganda reveals the point at which French intellectuals knowingly entered into caricatures of the Germans. Still worse is the tie between certain of these caricatural schemes and elements of Bergson’s philosophy.


Marina Cleo Volankis. The Time of Their Life: Anti-Modern Conceptions of Time in Rilke, Bergson, and Nietzsche. 1994, 89 leaves. A copy of this item may be found in the Harvard Archives, HU92.94.

Jaan Valsiner. “Irreversibility of Time and the Construction of Historical Developmental Psychology.” Mind, Culture, and Activity, 1.1-2, Winter-Spring, 1994, 25-42. This paper was originally presented at the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, July, 1993. The author states: Bergson’s thinking was the major source of intellectual influence upon the major developmental scientists of this century (e.g. J. Piaget, L. Vygotsky, H. Wallon)…9P.25) His ideas are worth careful consideration in any number of domains: concept of time, the role of semiotic meditation in regulating the stream of consciousness, constructive focus on development.


Jean Wahl. Du rôle de l’idée de l’instant dans la philosophie de Descartes. Pref. Frédéric Worms. Paris: Descartes et Cie, 1994, 136. (Essais) This work was originally published in 1920. An English translation of the title of this item is: The Role of the Concept of the Instant in Descartes’ Philosophy.


Work”. The author explores the place of space in Bergson’s thought from the earlier and incomplete standpoints of Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory through resolutions of basic problems in Creative Evolution. The three “dimensions” of space to which the author refers are theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and psychology. Not until the theory of the genesis of matter, spaciality, and the human intellect in Creative Evolution is Bergson able to say to what extent space is “real”, and not only a necessary element of human psychology and a precondition of intuition. With his latter standpoint Bergson is able to explain the extent that spatial relations depict material reality to distinguish geometrical from experienced space, and to show how space “mediates” between us and space, us and ourselves. This is a magisterial analysis of Bergson’s argument.


1995


David F. Allen and Jaques Postel. “Eugeniusz Minkowski ou une vision de la schizophrénie (suivi de sept lettres de H. Bergson à E. Minkowski).” L’Evolution Psychiatrique, 60.4, 1995, 961-80. The authors describe Eugene Minkowski’s life and basic ideas, arguing that he used the terminology of E. Bleuler to introduce the ideas of Bergson into French psychotherapy. Letters from Bergson to Minkowski (from 1934 through 1939) are cited in the section of this bibliography titled By Bergson.


(Dissertation Abstracts International, Vol. 57/03-A, p. 1125) The author’s abstract states, “I compare Mallarmé’s idea that the real operation of the theater occurs within the mind of the spectator to Henri Bergson’s theory of time as an internal continuity. I also introduce Bergson’s idea of simultaneity to show how his philosophy participates in and influences both symbolist and Futurist aesthetics.”


Roland Breuer. “De Dodendans en de Pianola.” Tidschrift voor Filosofie, 57.2, June, 1995, 221-49. “This article attempts to frame Proust’s treatment of the ‘mémoire involontaire’ within a general concept of human being that prevails throughout the Recherche, and which is characterized by non-coincidence. Proust always portrays the vicissitudes of a subject that never falls together with the world, the other or itself. ‘Mémoire involontaire’ is itself, following Proust’s description of love, jealousy and art, the pre-eminent experience of this non-coincidence. Finally, the general concept of human being allows us to approach and to put into question the classic parallel with Bergson’s conception of memory.” Philosopher’s Index, 29.4, 1995, 120. An English translation of the title of this item is “The Dance of Death and the Pianola: On Memory in Bergson and Proust.”

Richard L. Brougham. “Reality and Appearance in Bergson and Whitehead.” Process Studies, 24, 1995, 39-43. This is an extremely hasty comparison of Bergson and Whitehead on the question of individuals. The author claims that for Whitehead individuals are the ultimate reality while for Bergson individuals are swallowed up in the “whole” of evolution.


Jack White Corvin, Jr. “Merleau-Ponty’s Solution to the Problem of Time.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Georgia, 1995, 138. (UMI Order Number AAC 9537755) In this dissertation I examine the central features of Merleau-Ponty’s disquisition on time and show how his descriptive approach to the phenomena of experience affords him the means of overcoming many of the problems associated with the issue of time. In time, I present, in Chapters II through V, an account of previous theories of time which have, in some way, been influential in the development of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. For this purpose, I have selected the theories of Aristotle, Augustine, Kant and Bergson both because they are mentioned either implicitly or explicitly in *Phenomenology of Perception* and because they provide a useful context within which to frame Merleau-Ponty’s own remarks concerning the nature of time. In Chapter VI, I explicate Merleau-Ponty’s theory of time as it appears in *Phenomenology of Perception*, showing how the fundamental ambiguity which he discovers at the level of perceptual experience permits him to identify time with the structure of subjectivity. Finally, in Chapter VII, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s acceptance of the ambiguity of human experience enables him to put forth a theory of time which, because it allows us to account for most, if not all, of the phenomena associated with time, is superior to other theories. (From *Dissertation Abstracts International*, A56, No. 8, 1996, p. 3154)

W.J. Fosati. “Ambivalence and Admiration: Jacques Maritain Toward Henri Bergson.” *Contemporary Philosophy*, 17.2, March-April, 1995, 22-30. “Maritain hailed Bergson as a champion of spiritualism against scientism and rejoiced in the metaphysical aspect of Bergsonian philosophy over and against the idealism of Immanuel Kant. For Maritain, Bergson had performed a great service to modern thought by reintroducing cosmic philosophy, and this created important possibilities for a moral philosophy based on absolute reality.” (Abstract, p. 1) This abstract also appears in *The Philosopher’s Index*, 30.1, Spring, 1996, p. 148.


Pete A.Y. Gunter. “Bergson’s Philosophy of Education.” *Educational Theory*, 45.3, Summer, 1995, 379-94. It is argued here that Bergson’s philosophy, with its insistence on the reality of duration (process) and the interaction (dialectic) of intuition and intelligence, has important implications for contemporary philosophy of education. Passages from Bergson’s three brief essays on education, which have never before been translated into English, are presented here, along with an analysis of their implications for the teaching of the classics, history, mathematics, language, and manual training. Like Alfred North Whitehead, Bergson protests the transmission of ‘dead ideas’. Education should never sacrifice the vitality and reflectiveness of intuition.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 30.1, Spring, 1996, 156.

Lawrence W. Howe. “Ravaisson’s Legacy to Bergson.” *Southwest Philosophy Review*, 11.2, July, 1995, 120-130. “Very few scholars have explicitly treated the philosophical stream of ideas from Ravaisson to Bergson. Of those who have addressed this line of influence, very little has been devoted to the theory of habit that Ravaisson proposed in his doctoral dissertation of 1838. This paper discusses Ravaisson’s account of habit and its influence on the development of Bergson’s philosophy. Further, emphasis is placed on the Role of Ravaisson in the French spiritualist tradition of the nineteenth century.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 30.1, Spring, 1996, 162.


Werner Konitzer. Sprachkrise und Verbildlichung. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1995, 269. (Epistemata. Reihe Philosophie; Ed. 177) This item was originally presented as the author’s doctoral thesis at the Freie Universität, Berlin, 1994. An English translation of this item is Crisis of Language and Symbolization. The author deals with the philosophy of language in Husserl, von Hofmannsthal, and Bergson.

Jean Ladrière. “Bergson et les neurosciences.” Ensemble, September, 1995, 159-65. This talk, published in the journal of l’Université Catholique de Lille, recounts the proceedings of a conference on Bergson and the neurosciences held at Lille May 3-4, 1995. The author concludes by raising questions concerning the relations between philosophy and the sciences. The proceedings of this conference have been published in Bergson et les neurosciences, 1977.


Catharine Lumby. “Sickness Benefits.” World Art, Part 1, 1995, 14-16. This is an interview with the performance artist Bob Flanagan. The reviewer emphasizes the place of the body in Flanagan’s work and situates it via the art of Marcel Duchamp and the Philosophy of Henri Bergson.


Joyce Medina. *Cézanne and Modernism: The Poetics of Painting*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, 250. (Margins of Literature) The author interprets the painter Paul Cézanne (1839 – 1906) as a founder of modernism, and argues that his great contribution lay in his creation of “radically new types of images.” These images, of which there are four fundamental types, replace images involved in the mimetic approach to nature with images having symbolist, plastic, contemplative and visionary motivations. Such images are found together in all great modernist masters. The author examines Bergson’s treatment of the image as a “hermeneutical parallel” of Cézanne’s pictorial theory and practice. The author concludes her discussion of the “Bergsonian synthesis” as follows: “… modernism itself can not be understood, except as a mass of confused and contradictory ideological and stylistic positions, without a basic understanding of the systematic unity of the diverse types of images established simultaneously by Bergson and Cézanne.” p. 55. The author, however, refuses on principle to deal with Bergson’s influence on specific artists and art movements.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *La Nature. Notes de Cours du Collège de France. Suivi des résumés de Cours correspondants de Maurice Merleau-Ponty*. Ed. and Annotated by Dominique Ségard. Publié avec le concours du Centre national du livre. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995, 381. This consists of a series of notes taken in Merleau-Ponty’s course at the Collège de France, 1956-1957, 1957-1958, 1959-1960. Here, Merleau-Ponty’s thought takes a significant turn from his earlier existential-phenomenological studies towards the philosophy of nature: not at the time, he asserts, a popular field, but one which can not be neglected without offering a “fantastic” image of man. (p. 355) In this context the author provides several discussions of Bergson’s philosophy: in its relations to the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and in its implications for relativity physics. Bergson’s and Schelling’s philosophy of nature (pp. 63, 78 – 102, 362 – 367) agree (1) in rejecting both mechanism and finalism (pp. 63, 81) (2) in asserting the existence of a fundamental ground of nature, describable as unified (3) in posing problems in terms of time, not of being (4) in viewing philosophy “empirically”, as the experience of the “Absolute”. On pp. 362-367 the author again explores the relations between Bergson and Schelling, noting Bergson’s inadvertent discovery and use of the dialectic (of nature, and of human thought). Cf. also “La Nature comme aséité de la chose.” (“Nature as the Aseity of the Thing”), pp. 81-86 and pp. 142-52 for commentary on Bergson and relativity physics.

Carlo Migliaccio. “Bergson pour maître.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 333, June, 1995, 36-38. This is an account of Bergson’s relations with and influence on the writer and essayist Vladimir Jankélévitch. Jankélévitch appreciated Bergson’s willingness to deal with temporality, his emphasis on methodology and consequent call for new modes of thinking. Though Jankélévitch philosophy is both an existentialism and a “philosophy of the instant”, Jankélévitch can still find his place within the context of Bergson. The author publishes a letter here from Bergson to Jankélévitch (1/28/31). An English translation of the title of this item is: “Bergson as a Master.”


John C. Mullarkey. “Bergson’s Method of Multiplicity.” *Metaphilosophy*, 26.3, July, 1995, 230-59. “It is Bergson’s contention that philosophical confusion most often ensues whenever we oversimplify the ontological economy of any problematic in the face of a true, though unpalatable, multiplicity. What I term his ‘method of multiplicity’ responds by dissolving such confusion through a restoration of those original multiplicities. The essay examines Bergson’s own use of this methodological principle in his treatment of mathematics, movement, spatiality, and perception. It also shows the method’s fruitfulness as a general philosophical resource by integrating it into
Bergson’s broader philosophy, in particular, the critique of nothingness which provides the grounds for Bergson’s libertarian metaphysics.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 30.1, Spring, 1996, 183.

Frances Nethercott. *Une rencontre philosophique. Bergson en Russie, 1907-1917*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995, 346. (Philosophie en commun) An English translation of the title of this item is: *A Philosophical Encounter: Bergson in Russia, 1907-1917*. This is a classic study of Bergson’s influence on Russia in the years immediately preceding the Russian Revolution. It is detailed and presents an extensive bibliography, not all parts of which are cited in the present bibliography.


Maria do Céu Patrão Neves. “A critica de Maurice Blondel ao conceito bergsoniano de intuição.” *Philosophica*, 5, 1995, 85-101. Eng. trans. “Maurice Blondel’s Criticism of Bergson’s Concept of Intuition.” “Henri Bergson and Maurice Blondel, contemporary philosophers who share a common influence of ‘spiritual positivism’, show effective conditions for an eventual approximation. Nevertheless, the relative philosophic attitude of each of them is fundamentally marked by divergences which come to light in the particular case of the concept of ‘intuition’. With a common general definition, ‘intuition’ gains precise specificities in each author due to appearance in different phases of the course of both philosophies, aroused by different motivations and bearing distinct function and consequences.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 30.4, Winter, 1996, 228.


Maurice Schumann. *Bergson ou le retour de dieu*. Paris: Flammarion, 1995, 141. The author—member of the Académie française, long-time associate of Charles de Gaulle, and former minister in the French government—proclaims that the banishment of Bergson from French philosophy is at an end. Thanks to Bergson it is possible to reconcile modern science with both human liberty and with faith as well. The author examines Bergson’s philosophy of the natural sciences and of mathematics, arguing that these are consistent with advances in twentieth century scientific thought. The author’s reflections on Bergson’s philosophy of religion include essays on Bergson and Simone Weil, Jean Guitton, and Charles de Gaulle.
Ahmet Soysal. “Immanence et animalité (Bergson, Scheler, Heidegger).” *Alter*, No. 3, 1995, 151-65. An English translation of the title of this item is “Immanence and Animality (Bergson, Scheler, Heidegger).”


Christopher Douglas Vaughen. “Pure Reflection: Self-Knowledge and Moral Understanding in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1995, 195. (UMI order number AAC 9531507) This study examines the concept of pure reflection in the early Sartre. The author argues that Bergson’s ‘intuition’ and Jasper’s ‘understanding’ had a powerful and often overlooked influence on Sartre’s pure reflection. The understanding of this influence helps us to answer criticisms of Sartre’s ethical theory involving his notions of authenticity and moral judgement. (*Dissertation Abstracts International*, A56, No. 1, 1995, p. 2272)


Frédéric Worms. “Le paralogisme du parallélisme: ‘Le Cerveau et la Pensée’ de Bergson (1904) et sa portée philosophique.” *Cahiers philosophiques*, No. 65, 1995, 143 – 169. English translation: “The Paralogism of Parallelism: ‘The Brain and the Thought’ of Bergson (1904) and its Philosophical Scope.” The author argues that three sorts of arguments are involved in Bergson’s denial that the brain is the locus of thought: empirical, metaphysical and logical. The third sort of argument becomes increasingly important in his later thinking, specifically in his “The Brain and Thought” (1904). The author notes similarities between Bergson’s views and those of Daniel Dennett. (pp. 164-166)

Harada Yoko. “La relation entre la sensation et l’art selon Bergson.” Bigaku; The Japanese Journal of Aesthetics, 48.2, Autumn, 1995, 12-21. An English translation of the title of this item is “Bergson’s Concept of the Relation Between Sensation and Art.” The author’s abstract states: “selon Bergson, l’esprit diffère de la matière en ce qu’il est mémoire. Cependant, du point de la durée, il n’y aurait qu’une différence de rythme entre l’esprit et la matière. Bergson admet dans le monde de la matière une succession analogue à notre conscience. La matière, en tant que mouvement, nous est donnée sous forme de perception inconsciente et existe de façon immanente à travers nos sensations. D’autre part, c’est la mémoire qui par contraction solidifie en qualités sensibles les successions de la matière. Quand le mouvement de la matière immanent à nos sensations, et la mémoire se joignent à un certain degré de la durée, se réalise une nouvelle perception qui nous est donnée à travers les œuvres d’art. Et grâce à ces deux mouvements, c’est-à-dire grâce au mouvement de la matière et à la contraction de la mémoire, il nous est possible d’avoir une vision des choses qui est en même temps mienne et non mienne.” Eng. trans. “… And thanks to these two movements, that is, thanks to the movement of matter and the contraction [effected by] memory, it is possible for us to have a vision of things which is at the same time mine and not mine.” Philosopher’s Index, 30.2, 1996, 240.


1996

Mark Antliff. “Organicism against itself: Cubism, Duchamp-Villon and the Contradictions of Modernism.” Work and Image, 12.1, July-September 1996, 1-24. The sculptor Raymond Duchamp-Villon, a member of the Puteaux Cubist circle shared “organicist” Bergsonian assumptions with other members of this circle (Gleizes and Metzinger). These assumptions supported both his art and his art-criticism. It has been argued (notably by Rosalind Krauss) that metaphors of organic closure impelled aesthetic cubism in the direction of political fascism. The author states: “… The Bergsonian assumptions shared by the cubists served to destabilize any fixed notion of aesthetic closure, and resulted in conflicting views of what constituted organic closure.” (p. 2) G. Deleuze, M. Krieger and F. Kermode have understood that Bergson’s philosophy transcends the limitations of organicism.


Peter A. Bien and Darren J.N. Middleton. God’s Struggler: Religion in the Writings of Nikos Kazantzakis. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1996, 200. The interdisciplinary essays that make up this study analyze Nikos Kazantzakis’ understanding of God, particularly in relation to his understanding of Bergson, Buddhism, and Nietzsche.
Bernard Bilan. “L’œil de la coquille Saint-Jacques. Bergson et les faits scientifiques.” *Raison présente*, 119, 1996, 87-106. An English translation of the title of this item: “The Eye of the Scallop: Bergson and His Scientific Facts.” This is a careful analysis of the fundamental differences between the eye of the pectin (a shellfish) and the vertebrates. Evidence not available in Bergson’s time shows that the two have very different structures. Hence, Bergson’s argument that an explanation of such an evolutionary convergence requires a metaphysical ground is invalid. (There are, it is important to note, other strong cases of evolutionary convergence. Ed.)

Constantin V. Boundas. “Deleuze – Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual.” in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*. Ed. Paul Patton. London: Routledge, 1996, 81 – 106. The author argues that the centrality of Bergson’s thought (though shared with Spinoza and Nietzsche) has been largely overlooked by Deleuze’s readers. He explores the place of Bergson in Deleuze, amplifying a lack of a concept of the future in Bergson by his appropriating the notion of the eternal recurrence from Nietzsche.

Roland Breeur. “Bergson, Duration, and Singularity.” *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 58.3, September, 1996, 439 – 460. “This article first attempts to reframe Bergson’s elaboration (in *Time and Free Will*) of time as duration within his general critique of Kant. It argues that the key to Bergson’s revision of the Kantian image of time is Kant’s schematism, and more precisely the scheme of the category of magnitude (*Grösse*). Instead of being a determination of time, as Kant thought, the scheme of magnitude (the number) is a determination of space. Thus what Kant thought to be time and the form of the inner sensibility is in fact space. Bergson will then develop the more basic image of the *Innerlichkeit* as duration. The second and last part of the article describes his image of duration in relation to the problem of identity and singularity, contrasting his view with that of Marcel Proust.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 31.1, Spring, 1997, p. 147.


André Claire. “Merleau-Ponty lecteur et critique de Bergson. Le statut bergsonien de l’intuition.” *Archives de Philosophie*, 59.2, April – July, 1996, 203 – 218. “In a friendly and critical reading of Bergson, Merleau-Ponty juxtaposes two conceptions of intuition: intuition as sympathy and coincidence (and therefore receptive), and intuition and comprehension as construction of meaning (and therefore as active). Rather than setting these two tendencies (as described by Bergson) in opposition, he behooves us to understand (that) the act of intuition, which is the practice of philosophy, requires a correlation between the two carried out in an elliptical movement around the two poles of effort and receptivity. This poses the further question of Bergson’s relationship to a philosophy of essences.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 30.4, Winter, 1996, 157.

Gregory A. Clark. “Mysticism, Logic and the Metaphysics of Time: Henri Bergson’s Method and Its Implications for Contemporary Philosophy.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago, 1996, 270. (*Dissertation Abstracts International*, Vol. 96/12 – A, p. 4802) The author studies G. Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson in terms of “difference” and concludes: “… Bergson’s method does not rest on a philosophy of difference; the claim that it does suppresses some of Bergson’s most central texts and remains open to fatal objections.” The author also examines B.
Russell’s attack on Bergson noting that it “accounts for the perception of Bergson in the English-speaking world.” p. 8.


Arnold I. Davidson. “The Philosophy of Vladimir Jankélévitch.” Critical Inquiry, 22.3, Spring, 1996, 545 – 548. The author introduces the philosophy of Vladimir Jankélévitch to an English-speaking audience, stressing the influence of Bergson’s thought on Jankélévitch. Jankélévitch took from Bergson not a set of doctrines but a conception of philosophy. This brief essay is followed by two translations of essays by Jankélévitch, “Do Not Listen to What They Say, Look at What They Do,” (a sentence from Bergson’s The Two Sources) and “Should We Pardon Them?” concerning Nazi War Crimes.

Jean-Claude Dumoncel. Le symbole d’Hécate. Philosophie deleuzienne et roman proustien. Paris: editions HYX, 1996, 118 (Resources). An English translation of the title of this item is: The Symbol of Hecate: Deleuzeian Philosophy and Proustian Novel. This is a remarkable study. The author uses Henri Bergson’s Theory of memory (especially his figure of a cone, with its insertion into the world at its tip and its wealth of virtual memories at its elevated base) to elucidate Proust’s similar theory, which, the author shows, is fundamental to his novel Remembrance of Things Past (À la recherche du temps perdu). He also uses it to explore and cast light on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze.


Miguel Espinoza. “Bergson, las matemáticas y el devenir.” Thémata: Revista de Filosofia, 17, 1996, 223 – 243. “Henri Bergson divides nature into two conflicting realms – life, the content of creative evolution, and that inert something which the intellect calls ‘matter’, the essence of things being their continuous duration which only intuition can grasp. On the other hand, mathematics, the structure of mechanical sciences, is made up of discrete symbols which reflect the categories Bergson links to space such as discontinuity, analysis, and homogeneity. This antagonism between the mathematical intellect and continuous duration explains why mathematical sciences are unable to provide a proper knowledge of the world. Bergson challenges the mathematician who wants to reduce the distance between the intuitive continuum and the mathematical one. The aim of this paper is to explain and evaluate Bergson’s assessment of the nature and interest of mathematics.” Philosopher’s Index, 44.1, 2010, 336 – 337. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Bergson, Mathematics and Becoming.”


Mary Ann Gillies. *Henri Bergson and British Modernism*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996, 212. This study does what its title proclaims: it provides a study of the impact of Bergson’s ideas on Modernism in Great Britain. The author deals with three basic themes at the intersection of Bergson and modernism: (1) “the problem of origins” in the rationalist, materialistic world of the early 20th century (2) the nature of the self (“problems of identity”) and (3) the problem of representation in art. The author deals with five major figures: T.S. Eliot, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, Dorothy Richardson, and Joseph Conrad.


Martha Hanna. *The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers During the Great War*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996, ix, 292. There are numerous references to Bergson’s wartime speeches and writings in this study, Cf. esp. 189-190, 197-198 for Bergson’s attitudes towards technology in warfare. Bergson, along with many of his colleagues, was deeply involved with many projects related to the war.

Ann Hobart and Vladimir Jankélévitch. “Should We Pardon Them?” *Critical Inquiry*, 22.3, Spring, 1996, 549-51. This is an essay on the Holocaust, which the author regards, strikingly, as a “metaphysical crime”: hence not so simple to forgive.


characters as involving a split in themselves: human vs. machine. West’s mocking of the mechanization of sex, religion, and work has Bergsonian origins.

Lawrence W. Howe. “Bergson Process Metaphysics: An Answer to Lacey on Bergson.” Modern Schoolman, 74.1, 1996, 43-54. The author argues that A.R. Lacey, in his Bergson (1989), poses a false dilemma: according to which either Bergson, with Heraclitus, must hold either a “radical flux doctrine” in which reality consists of a perpetually perishing present, or he must hold some form of the traditional Aristotelian doctrine that change is supported by unchanging primary substance. Bergson in fact holds neither position. He insists on the retention of the past in the present, and hence on the persistence of process, as much as on sheer flux. The author also critiques Lacey’s notion that it must be possible to translate a substance language into a process language. Cf. the author’s abstract, Philosophers Index, 31.2, Summer, 1997, 187.


Harro Maas. The Will, the Pendulum, and Human Choice: Jevons and Bergson on the Measurability of Human Feelings. Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute, 1996, 39 pp. (Discussion Paper/ Tinbergen Institute, TI96-72/8)

Matt K. Matsuda. The Memory of the Modern. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 255. This is a cultural history of the period 1870 -1914 in France, written with special reference to the creation and deconstruction of French national memory, with its reference to contemporary political struggles. The author’s approach is Bergsonian, stressing the dynamic function of memory in the fashioning of the present. (Cf. pp. 8-9, 95-98). Critical of the pretentions of French official “modernity”, the author offers interesting insights into Bergson and neurophysiology, film, and his influence in the France of his time.


F.C.T. Moore. *Bergson: Thinking Backwards*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, xx, 152. (Modern European Philosophy) “This book takes as its point of departure Henri Bergson’s insistence on precision in philosophy. It discusses a variety of topics including knowledge and representation, laughter and humor, the nature of time as experienced, how intelligence and language should be construed as a pragmatic product of evolution, and the antinomies of reason represented by magic and religion. The book is not a comprehensive scholarly exposition. It aims to show how Bergson should be of lively interest to philosophers from the analytic tradition, by showing how his approach would solve, or dissolve, certain salient philosophical problems.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 30.3, Fall, 1996, 215.

unpublished correspondence of G.H. Mead, the influence of Henri Bergson on Mead’s Thought is explored. Two principal lines of influence are stressed. First, the functional view of primary and secondary qualities that Mead developed, in part, through reflections on Bergson’s thought. This enabled him to construct a adequate conception of the relation between human perception and the world as envisioned by science. Second, insights from Bergson’s process though considered in the light of problems that Mead discovered in Minkowski’s interpretation of relativity were instrumental in the development of Mead’s perspectival view of reality.” Philosopher’s Index, 88.1, Fall, 1996, p. 215.


John C. Mullarkey. “Bergson: The Philosophy of Durée-Difference.” *Philosophy Today*, 40.3, Fall, 1996, 367-380. “Through close examinations of the Bergsonian critique of negativity, his concept of ‘dissociation’, and his devastating analyses of perception and presence, a divergent and challenging understanding of Bergson is presented in the hope of placing in full view those radical aspects of his thinking which fly in the face of its current domesticated image. With his notions of the irreducibility and ontological priority of difference, the impossibility of subtracting representation from presence, and the denial of a temporal present, some inkling may be gained of the revolutionary character of Bergsonian thought, and with that of the qualities which is gained it such notoriety in the first decades of this century.” Philosopher’s Index, 31.1, Spring, 1997, p. 215.


Rubens Murillio Trevisan. *Bergson e a educacao*. Piracicaba : Editoria UNIMEP, 1995, 192. An English translation of the title of this item is *Bergson and Education*.

An English translation of the title of this item is: “Russian Philosophy on the Eve of the First World War and the Reception of Bergson.”


Saleh Omar. “Philosophical Origins of the Arab Ba’th Party: The Work of Zaki Al-Arsusi.” Arab Studies Quarterly, 18.2, 1996, 23-37. Zaki al-Arsuzi is among the most important contributors to the philosophy of the Arab Ba’th Party. His thought, profoundly influenced by Henri Bergson, is based on the concept of the revival of national genius or spirit.


Hélio Rebello Cardoso Júmor. “The Origin of the Concept of Multiplicity in Gilles Deleuze.” (In Portuguese) Trans/Form/Ação, 19, 1996, 151 – 161. “Deleuze seeks for his own concept of multiplicity through the issue of multiplicity both in Riemann’s theory and in Bergson’s philosophy. The attempt states for Deleuze’s peculiar creation of concepts. In fact, he draws out from Riemannian and Bergsonian concepts of multiplicity new features for the notions of space and time. Hence, he is able to supply his own concept with an ontological spread.” Philosopher’s Index, 31.2, Summer, 1997, p. 152.


Lane Roth. “Bergsonian Comedy and Human Machines in ‘Star Wars.’” Database: Resources in Education, U.S. Department of Education, 1996, 13 pp. The characters C-3P0 and R2-D2 in
George Lucas’ “Star Wars” demonstrate Bergsonian comic principles primarily through reversal (a machine acting like a person) and sometimes through a double reversal, a machine acting like a person acting like a machine.


Daniel L. Schacter. Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past. New York: Basic Books, 1996, 398. The author, a prominent memory theorist, notes (p. 165) that as a young researcher he found it exciting to consider using scientific techniques to study the contention of Bergson, and others, that the past survives in two fundamentally different forms. He notes (pp. 169-170) that experimental psychologists were reluctant, nevertheless, to part with the “simpler and more parsimonious” axiom of a single memory system. Bergson’s ideas lead to a new approach in the study of memory and a new focus on memory and brain localization.


Jyrki Stukonen. “On Artistic Knowledge: Notes for a Minor Platonic Exercize.” Published by the Centre for the Study of Sculpture, Leeds, England, 1996, 8 pp. The author criticizes the positivistic theory of art, as exhibited by A.J. Ayer. In its place he proposes a concept of intuition which, he argues, is a kind of knowledge. The author examines intuition in G.W. Leibniz, B. Croce, and Bergson, which he finds the most satisfactory of the three. He ends with a discussion of the sculpture of Constantin Brancusi.


Lori Lynn Webb. “Contemplating Locke, Hume, and Bergson on the Topic of Free Will.” M.A. Thesis, University of Guelph (Canada), 1996, 70. Masters Abstracts, Vol. 35, 03, p. 665. The author concludes that Bergson’s treatment of free will, because it does not depend on treating the mental like the physical, provides a more complex, in-depth account of the issue.


Arne A. Wyller. The Planetary Mind. Aspen, Colorado: MacMurray and Beck, 1996, 268. The author argues that knowledge gained over the last fifty years in biology (especially molecular biology) makes it highly unlikely – perhaps impossible – that life has emerged and developed through chance alone. In place of chance as the “motor” of evolution the author proposes mind: a cosmic or planetary mind which is responsible for the emergence of increasingly elaborate and diverse life-forms on the Earth (and doubtless elsewhere). On pages 178-185 the author describes Bergson’s philosophy, characterizing it as strongly influenced by Plotinus. Pantheism, he argues, can only succeed if it is conceived as an extension of existing paradigms in the natural sciences, as is the case in Bergson’s philosophy. (The author notes that he will argue this point in chapter 11.) The elan vital is intended to enlarge our understanding of the evolutionary process. It must be considered “… a seed idea, incomplete in structure and form. We shall see in the last two chapters how this idea may be rearticulated in a new form – that of the Planetary Mind Field – and integrated into the natural sciences of our times.” (p. 183) Though the author—an astronomer and cosmologist—draws ideas from Aristotle, Plotinus, Spinoza, and Alfred North Whitehead, Bergson is the most quoted philosopher in this work. On page 99 he describes quantum physicists as having reached a view of the limitations of their subject which is similar to Bergson’s.


Gershom Zaniceck. “Editorial: Bergson and Medicine.” The Cancer Journal, 9, No. 6, 1996. The author argues that medicine has neglected the Wisdom of the Body, which depends on intuition for its understanding. Thus we move towards a truly patient-oriented medicine.

Renaud Barbaras. “Le Tournant de l’expérience : Merleau-Ponty et Bergson.” *Philosophie*, No. 54, June, 1997, 33-59. This is an excellent analysis of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s changing interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy. Merleau-Ponty’s view of Bergson shifted from a methodologically critical stance, based on Husserlian assumptions, to an increasing acceptance and utilization of Bergson’s ideas, as he moved away from the Husserlian notion of intentionality. Merleau-Ponty remains critical of Bergson’s notion of intuition as simple “coincidence” of the knower with the known. Coincidence remains only partial. The most profound aspect of Bergson for Merleau-Ponty is his taking of the “turn” from habitual perception to insight as the most profound meaning of human experience. (The author bases much of his argument on unpublished notes by Merleau-Ponty.)


Jean-Marie Breuvart. “Whitehead, critique de Bergson sur la spatialisation.” in *Bergson et les neurosciences*. Eds. Philippe Gallois et Gérard Forzy. Le Plessis-Robinson,: Institut Synthélabo, 1997, 29-64. This is a careful, thoroughgoing analysis and comparison of the theories of knowledge of Whitehead and Bergson. For Whitehead, spatialization does not stand in the way of our understanding the fluidity and changeableness of things, but, rather, helps us in achieving this understanding. For Bergson, spatialization stands in the way of intuition, and must be transcended if an intuition of duration is to be achieved. The author provides ample illustrations of this parting of the ways.


Paul M. Cohen. Freedom’s Moment: An Essay on the French Idea of Freedom from Rousseau to Foucault. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997, 229. The author describes a distinctly French concept of freedom, different from the English and the German concepts through its emphasis on the democratic “self-rule”, both of the individual and of the society as a whole. The eight “consecrated heretics” who the author describes as sustaining the French idea of reason are: Rousseau, Robespierre, Stendahl, Michelet, Bergson, Péguy, Sartre, and Foucault. Though the author may be viewed as exaggerating Bergson’s negative attitudes towards his contemporary French political surroundings, his treatment of Bergson is often apt and always suggestive. His comparisons of Bergson with Péguy, Sartre, and Foucault are extremely perceptive. For an interpretation of Bergson which places him within the English political tradition, Cf. E. Kennedy, 1980, 1987. (Ed.)

Jean Delacour. “Matière et mémoire, à la lumière des neurosciences contemporaines.” in Bergson et les neurosciences. Eds. Philippe Grallois et Gérard Forzy. Le Plessis-Robinson: Institute Synthélabo, 1997, 23-27. The author provides less an essay than the outlines of an argument. A virtue of Bergson’s mind-body theory is that, unlike those of most philosophers it is stated with such definiteness that it can be falsified. But Bergson’s theory, based as it is on the neurophysiology of its time, describes the brain as mechanical, constituted for the transmission of motion, has been largely falsified. The activity of the brain does not consist simply of connections; neuromodulators and hormones play an important role. The organization of connections is not “serial and local” but “parallel and distributed”. The brain has capacities for auto-organization. Most neurons in the brain have neither motor nor perceptual functions. Finally it is proved today that the brain has a representational capacity.


Christian Yves Dupont. “Receptions of Phenomenology in French Philosophy and Religious Thought 1889-1939.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1997, 499. The author cites the philosophies of Henri Bergson and Charles Blondel as having prepared for the reception of phenomenology in France. In Bergson’s case this influence was direct. (Cf. “Henri Bergson: Lived Duration and Intuition”, 48-80; Cf. also 128-33) In other respects it was indirect, stemming
from thinkers like E. LeRoy (257-77), Gaston Rabeau (352-54) and others (444-452). Cf. the author’s conclusion, 453-70.


Hilary Fink. “Andrei Bely and the Music of Bergsonian Duration.” Slavic and East European Journal, 41.2, 1997, 287-302. The author argues that Bely and Bergson share a common philosophical vision based on the intuition of a musical duration to grasp the essence of reality. For Bely as for Bergson symbols are the metaphysical embodiment of movement.


Philippe Gallois. “En quoi Bergson peut-il, aujourd’hui, intéresser le neurologue.” in Bergson et les neurosciences. Ed. Philippe Gallois et Gérard Forzy. Le Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthélabo, 1997, 11-22. The author suggests three respects in which Bergson’s Matter and Memory remains interesting to neurology. Bergson played an important part in the history of the theory of cerebral localization. His concept of “the two memories”, his concept of comprehension via the body, and his notions of the temporality of the brain are entirely contemporary. Even his more provocative ideas (the place of “true memory” outside the brain, the lack of image centers in the brain) can be argued for convincingly. The problem of holism and atomism (“le continu et le discontinu”) in the structure of the nervous system is capable of a Bergsonian interpretation.

Beatrix Garcia Moreno. “Arquitectura, experiencia e imagen: Explorando el camino de Bergson.” Estud. de Filo. 15-16, February-August, 1997, 9-19. “Contextualism is an interesting way of approaching architectonic work for its taking into account (the) human act of ‘inhabiting’. That view demands from the interpreter to consider not only the incidental and historical character of the work, but also its relation to the environment. In order to show how special this proposal employing visual and tactile typologies is, the author first compares it to those methods focused merely on formal or pre-existing parameters. She brings then into relief the ideas of Henri Bergson, because being a thinker of contextual thought, he makes possible, on the other hand, an analysis of (the) image as an element leading to new ideas and changes of meaning, and on the other (hand) to many paths to interpretation. Finally, two works by Oscar Niemeyer, architect, are studies through whose works the author distinguishes more concretely the sense of this proposal.” Philosopher’s Index, 35.2, 2001, 18. Eng. trans. “Architecture, Experience, and Images: Exploring Bergson’s Way.”


Pete A.Y. Gunter. “Bergson, les images et l’homme neuronal.” in *Bergson et les neurosciences*. Eds. Philippe Gallois et Gérard Forzy. Le Plessis-Robinson: Institute Synthélabo, 1997, 109-124. This is a critique of contemporary neurophysiological reductionism. Contemporary reductionists disagree among each other on the most fundamental issues concerning the nature of the brain. No neurophysiological “paradigm” exists. More specifically, the theories of Changeux, according to which the brain contains images, does not cohere with current knowledge of brain imagery, which shows images broken up into mosaics of image parts “located” in different parts of the brain. There is no theater in the brain where images are “shown”.


Matti Tappani Itkonen. “Itsayteni ja Toiseutesi-Opettajuutemme Jaljitety Maa: Esseistinen Montassi Kasvatusfilosofian Perusteiksi” Dr. Ed. Turun Yliopisto (Finland), 1997, 285. An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Quidditas of Self and Other: Our Teaching Leaves its Tracks in the Soil.” Using Bergson’s distinction between intuition and analysis the author develops an approach to education: “Intuition, for its part, ‘possesses’ its object; acts of intuition are brimful of real content. Intuition is a way of living at the focal point of an ever-changing world.” Intuition requires “montage”: collections of separate pictures leading to the fundamental reality. But intuition is one, requiring openness. For this, and for successful teaching, we must “step outside the enslaving manual of research procedure.” *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 58, 03-C, 1997, 768.


philosophy. For him education is not transmission but creation. Education is a matter of both liberation and knowledge. Bergson’s ideas on education are strikingly contemporary.


Krzystof Michalski. Logic and Time: An Essay on Husserl’s Theory of Meaning. Trans A. Czerniawski. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, 162. The author treats Husserl as having taken up the ideas on “inner time” of Brentano, Bergson and James but, seeing their inherent weakness, improved on them. His interpretation and analysis of Bergson’s and James’ notion of temporality is given on pages 115-137 and 140-141. Bergson and James failed to see that what is real about temporality is its form. Time, he concludes, is a general term for “the ways in which something can appear to us. (It is) the very structure of appearance; thus it is the condition of the world with which we concern ourselves, which can appear to us at all.” (p.141) The author’s entire analysis rests only on his reading of Time and Free Will, without reference to future works, in which Bergson’s views change. A similar view is worked out in K.A. Pearson, The Adventure of the Virtual (2003). (Ed.)


Jean-Noël Missa. “Une Critique positive du Chapitre II de Matière et mémoire de Bergson.” in Bergson et les neurosciences. Eds. Philippe Gallois and Gérard Forzy. Le Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthélabo, 1997, 65-83. This is a critique of Chapter 2 of Matter and Memory (“On the Recognition of Images. Memory and the Brain.”). For Bergson, the brain is simply an organ of action. But for contemporary neuroscientists it is an organ both of representation and action. Also, Bergson’s treatment of agnosia and sensory aphasia as based on disturbances of motor habits is entirely out of date. The author concludes his criticisms by pointing out that though Pierre Marie and Bergson agree that memories are not localized in the brain, Marie has a very different theory of the aphasias than Bergson—a point many of Bergson’s commentators have failed to note.


Krystyna Najder-Stefaniak. *Bergsona idea pickna i problem heurystiki.* Warzawa: Wydawn. SGGW (Wydawnidwa Szkoly Glownej Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego), 1997, 146. (Rozprawy naukowe i monografie; 212) An English translation of the title of this item is “The Idea of Beauty According to Bergson and the Problems of Heuristics.” The author argues that Bergson’s concept of beauty is interesting for at least three reasons: 1. It allows us to surmount the modernist schema (by renouncing the domination of actuality, the glorification of reason). 2. It de-subjectivizes beauty, which for him becomes a moment of being. 3. It emphasizes the “consecutive value” of beauty which becomes a way of liberating experience from language and practicality, making creative thought, action, and self-creation more efficacious.

Michel Narcy. “‘Le principe, c’est la représentation.’ Bergson traducteur d’Aristote.” *Philosophie,* No. 54, 1997, 14-32. The author comments here on Bergson’s translation of chapter 7 of book XI(A) of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics.* His remarks, which involve an analysis of Bergson’s philosophy of translation, concern not only Bergson’s text but his conception of classical Greek philosophy. Bergson considered Aristotle to be already in possession of the concepts later developed by neoplatonists. (Without Aristotle, Bergson appears to have thought, there would have been no neoplatonism.) The author concludes with reflections on Bergson’s failure to recognize any “intuition of movement” in Aristotle.


Vincent Peillon. “H. Bergson et le problème du commencement humain de la réflexion.” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale,* No. 3, July-September, 1997, 385, 403. The author states: “The actuality of Bergson’s thought is not due to any set of theorems, but to the urgency of an inquiry, whose radical nature he would have been the first to consider, and which remains pressing today. This inquiry brings to light the difficulty of a beginning of a reflection which is rightfully and solely human.” p. 385. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Bergson and the Problem of the Beginning of Human Reflection.”

“To Revivify Bergsonism: The Contemporary Paradoxes of a Genteel Philosophy.” The author (who dedicates his essay to Paul Ricoeur) explores Bergson’s philosophy, both its general structure and in its historical context. He ends by examining fundamental Bergsonian “paradoxes” concerning language, corporeality, movement and symbolism.


John S. Ransom. “Forget Vitalism: Foucault and Lebensphilosophie.” Philosophy and Social Criticism, 23.1, 1997, 33-47. “Recent interpretations of Michel Foucault’s work have leaned heavily on a reading that can be traced back to the ‘vitalist/mechanist’ debate in the philosophy of science from earlier in this century. Friends (Gilles Deleuze) and enemies (Jurgen Habermas) both read Foucault as a kind of vitalist, championing repressed and unrealized life-forces against burdensome facticity. This reading of Foucault, however, comes with a prohibitively high cost: the giving up of Foucault’s most trenchant insights regarding the nature of power. In fact, Foucault has a quite different relation to the history and philosophy of science than the one ascribed to him by critics.” Philosopher’s Index, 31.1, Spring, 1997, 230.


Bertrand Saint-Sernin. “L’Action à la lumière de Bergson.” Philosophie, No. 54, June, 1997, 60-72. Though many of Bergson’s concepts of the self and of evolutionary biology are clearly out of date, he still has a profound contribution to make to our notion of human, especially of social,
action. The author examines the dialect which Bergson describes between the individual and the social. This dialectic between the open and the closed is not only not outdated, it is fundamental to the problem of action which we face in the twenty-first century. All morality and all action are for Bergson “d’essence biologique”. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Action in the Light of Bergson.”


Philippe Soulez, complété par Frédéric Worms. Bergson. Biographie. Paris: Flammarion, 1997, 386. (Grandes Biographies) An English translation of the title of this item is: Bergson: Biography. It is the only biography of Bergson. Painstaking, detailed, well-written, it is a rich source of insights into Bergson’s life and ideas.


Jean-Marie Tréquier. “Merleau-Ponty et le ‘bergsonisme’.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, No. 3, September, 1997, 405-30. An English translation of the author’s ‘résumé’ runs as follows: “Taken from Heidegger and having become a method in the history of philosophy, the quest for a datum prior to human thought (impensé) is also what animates and characterizes the research of Merleau-Ponty. Applied to Bergson, such a method discloses a Bergson-in-the-making, richer and more complex than ‘bergsonism’ allows itself to believe; it also reveals essential aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s thought which a reference to phenomenology alone can only conceal. p. 405.


In this item the function and status of reason are studied in the thought of Bergson, G. Bachelard, and J.-P. Sartre.

Frédéric Worms. “La conception bergsonienne du temps.” *Philosophie*, No. 54, 1997, 73-91. The author shows how Bergson, starting from the notion of “passage” (simply: that things happen), persistently deepens this notion, arriving successively (and in each case surprisingly) at the concepts of inner duration, of dynamic memory, and of creativity, concepts which express the past, present, and future, respectively, as given in intuition. The author corrects several fundamental misunderstandings of Bergson. The intuition of duration (active) and the perception of duration (passive) are aspects of one fundamental experience, they are not two unrelated facts. This article was published in *deis puntos* (Brazil) 2004.

Frédéric Worms, *Introduction à Matière et mémoire de Bergson*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, 330. (Les grands livres de la philosophie) This is a careful, accurate step by step analysis of Bergson’s argument in *Matter and Memory*, with attention to those philosophers and psychologists whose views Bergson analyzed and discussed. It is fundamental to any serious study of Bergson’s theories of embodiment, perception, imagery, and the “mind-body problem”.

Frédéric Worms. “La Théorie bergsonienne des plans de conscience. Genèse, structure et signification de Matière et mémoire.” in *Bergson et les neurosciences*. Eds. Philippe Gallois and Gérard Forzy. Le Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthélabo, 1997, 85-108. The author explores a relatively ignored concept in Bergson’s thought, that of levels (planes) of consciousness, which the author characterizes as fundamental to other, better known Bergsonian theses (denial of brain localization of memories, theory of matter) and prior to them. The theory of planes of consciousness is a psychological theory, which serves as the basis for a theory of brain functioning: for Bergson the condition of any such theory, however complex. The author explores the concept of levels of consciousness in relation to associationism, “pure perception”, “degrees of reality”, “memory”, “unconscious”, “attention” and other basic Bergsonian ideas. This is an excellent analysis of, among other things, the fundamental structure of Bergson’s argument in *Matter and Memory*.


1998


B. Andrieu. “Le Cerveau hier et aujourd’hui. La réécriture de la neurologie par Bergson en 1896.” in *Cerveau et mémoire*. Eds. E. Jaffard, B. Claverie, B. Andrieu. Paris: editions Osiris, 1998, 55-76. An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Brain Yesterday and Today: Bergson’s Rewriting of Neurology in 1896.” This is a critique—highly ironic—of Bergson’s “rewriting” of the history of Neuropsychology in *Matter and Memory*. Bergson’s approach to neurophysiology is a priori; he is not really concerned with memory or with science.
Peder Anker. “Ecosophy: An Outline of its Metaethics.” The Trumpeter (1998), http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/content/v15.1/test.html. The author notes the impact of Bergson and Spinoza on Arne Naess’s environmental philosophy. Naess considered Bergson to be one of the most important harbingers of Naess’ “Deep Ecology.”


Jean Bardy. Bergson professeur au lycée Blaise Pascal de Clermont-Ferrand (1883-1888). Cours 1885-1886. Pref. Bruno Ingrao. Paris, Montréal: L’Harmattan, 1998, 218. This item is two things: an analysis of Bergson as a young professor of philosophy at Clermont-Ferrand, and the presentation of lecture notes taken from his classes taken during 1885-1886, on metaphysics, on the history of ancient philosophy, and on psychology. The author finds two striking characteristics in Bergson’s teaching: constant appeal to the history of philosophy and a concern with the sciences of his time. Bergson’s courses are cited in this bibliography in the section “By Bergson”.


Antoine Côté. “La question du néant en métaphysique : Henri Bergson et la critique de Jacques Maritain.” *Revue de Théologie et de philosophie*, 130.1, 1998, 21-36. The author’s abstract states: “Dans le contexte d’une métaphysique créationiste la question pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutôt que rien ? peut être considérée comme la question fondamentale de la métaphysique, question à laquelle une réponse possible consiste à invoquer la volonté d’un Dieu transcendant. Mais qu’en serait-il de cette interrogation si une analyse révélait que le concept de néant est un concept absurde ? Tel fut précisément le propos de Henri Bergson dans un texte célèbre de l’*Evolution créatrice*. L’A analyse ici les arguments de Bergson ainsi que ceux que lui a opposés J. Maritain, et en arrive à la conclusion que la légitimité de la question pourquoi il y a-t-il quelque chose plutôt que rien ?, loin de s’imposer à l’intelligence comme un fait d’évidence, reste à démontrer.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 32.4, 1998, 149. The author agrees with Bergson that the question “Why is there something instead of nothing?” (as a presumed prelude to a proof of God’s existence) is nowhere shown to be a valid question.


Angelo Genovesi. “Henri Bergson, Lettere a Albert Einstein.” *Filosofia* (Turin, Italy), 49.1, 1998, 3-41. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Henri Bergson: Letters to Albert Einstein.” It consists of four letter from Bergson, 1924-1925, concerning the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations. A brief note by Vittorio Matthieu concerning the historical and personal context and significance of this correspondence appears here on pages 3-5. Detailed historical notes are provided on pp. 5-22 by A. Genovesi: These letters are presented separately in this bibliography under the heading “By Bergson.”


Taylor Aitken Greer. *A Question of Balance: Charles Seeger’s Philosophy of Music*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, 278. Seeger, who inaugurated the music department at the University of California’s Berkeley Campus, was most influenced in his philosophy of music by Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, and Ralph Barton Perry. Seeger’s ideas were to influence subsequent ethnomusicology and systematic musicology.


Kelly Lynne Joslin. “Henri Bergson’s Influence on Henri Matisse’s Views on the Artist’s Nature and Perception.” M. Hum. Wright State University, 1998, v, 109. The author argues that Matisse found Bergson’s ideas on the nature of the artist and his perceptual abilities to be accurate, and that Matisse was familiar with Bergson’s views on these subjects prior to writing his first major theoretical statement “Notes of a Painter” (1908). Bergson had a direct influence on Matisse’s aesthetics.


Mark S. Muldoon. “Freud and Bergson: Configuring Freedom.” *Explorations*, 8, 1998, 7-32. The author explores the meaning of personal freedom in Freud and Bergson, arguing that for both freedom involves the capacity to “possess oneself” by being in possession of, not possessed by, one’s past.


Gaspari Mura. *Chi e per voi Gesu Christo?: ripostle della cultura contemporanea*. Roma: Città nuova, 1998, 90. (Fede: perché) An English translation of the title of this item is: *Who is Jesus Christ for you? : The Responses of Contemporary Culture*


Debora M. Pinto. “Espaco, Extensão e Número: Suas Relações e seu Significado na Filosofia Bergsoniana.” *Discurso, Revista do Departmento de Filosofia da USP*, 29, 1998, 133-173. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Space, Extension and Number: Their relations and Significance in Bergson’s Philosophy.” The author’s abstract states “Este artigo pretendo acompanhar, a análise bergsoniana da multiplicidade numérica e do tempo homogéneo conceituação do tempo operada, principalmente pela ciência; o objetivo desta análise é esclarecer o papel do espaço na formação do número e na apreensão conceitual da duração, explicando o procedimento geral da inteligência humana.” Eng. trans. “This article claims to accompany the Bergsonian analysis of numerical multiplicity and of homogeneous time conceived as utilized primarily in science; the object of this analysis is to clarify the role of space in the formation of number and in the conceptual apprehension of duration, thus explaining the procedure of human intelligence.”


Jacques Ricot. *Leçon sur «La perception du changement» de Bergson*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, 160. (Major) This contains the text of Bergson’s lectures on *The Perception of Change*, with explication and commentary consists of examinations of both lectures by Bergson, plus four “annexes” concerning the art of publishing and lecturing, the relations between the present and the past, Zeno’s paradoxes, and Bergson’s attitude towards science.

Aan Rioja. “Biologia, cosmologia y filosofia en Henri Bergson.” *Themata*, 20, 1998, 107-128 “This paper reviews Bergson’s ideas of living beings and the universe as systems closed by nature, thus quite other than material objects or systems artificially closed and isolated by science. From this standpoint, a peculiar vision of the relationship between philosophy and sciences arises, which
should be discussed paying due respect to some of the twentieth century’s scientific developments.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 43.3, 2009, 490.


Alicia Rodríguez Serón. “El papel de los ciencias en la filosofía de Bergson.” *Contrastes*, 3, 1998, 211-229. An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Role of Science in Bergson’s Philosophy.” The author’s abstract states: “Based upon the analysis and the interpretation of Bergson’s main writings, this paper endeavors to address Bergson’s attitude towards the sciences in order to clarify, as far as possible, the role they play in his philosophy. I argue that his interest in science and in scientific debates is not circumstantial. On the contrary, this interest aims to publicize scientific debates and conditions his whole philosophy.” *Philosophers Index*, 33.3, 1999, p. 244.


M. Carmen Sanchez Rey. “La vida como evolución creadora.” *Themata*, 20, 1998, 129-140. Eng. Trans. “Life as Creative Evolution.” “This paper deals with a topic central to Bergsonian thought: life. As it is an extensive matter, only those aspects Bergson himself considers most important will be emphasized. On the premise that life is evolution, the issue comes to dilucidating the nature and cause of evolutionary processes. Bearing science in mind, he reaches the conclusion that the driving force behind evolution is the tendency to change, an internal cause of a psychological nature. “L’élan vital”, the image of that tendency, ultimately turns into a metapsychological priniciple.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 43.3, 2009, 499.

Arno Sann. *Intuition und Expression: über einige Beziehungen der Philosophie Henri Bergson zu Kunsttheorie Paul Klees*. Giessen: Focus, 1998, 134 (Focus Kritische Universität) This work was originally presented as the author’s doctoral dissertation at Giessen University, 1997. An English translation of its title is *Intuition and Expression: Concerning Some Relationships of Bergson’s Philosophy to Paul Klee’s Theory of Art*.


Sean Watson. “The New Bergsonism: Discipline, Subjectivity and Freedom.” *Radical Philosophy: A Journal of Socialist and Feminist Philosophy*, 92, November-December, 1998, 6-16. The author uses Bergson’s thought, chiefly as developed in *Matter and Memory*, to develop a mind-body theory. He utilizes several contemporary thinkers to bolster his case (Henri Atlan, Ilya Prigogine, Gilles Deleuze, Fritof Capra) and draws interesting and unsuspected parallels between Bergson’s viewpoint and that of reductionist Daniel Dennett. In the end, the author’s views are mildly reductionist.

Clifford Williams. “A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time.” *Philosophy*, 73.285, July, 1998, 379-393. The author’s abstract states: “Debate between the A- and B-theories of time has rested on the supposition that there is a clear difference between A- and B-time. This supposition is mistaken for two reasons. (1) We cannot distinguish the two conceptions of time by means of Bergsonian intuition. (2) Unless we can do so, we cannot distinguish them at all. One (1) is true because none of the various ways of intuiting the two kinds of time works. Two (2) is true because the issue is an experiential one, unlike metaphysical issues that are less connected to experience. The inference from (1) and (2) is that no progress will be made in the debate between the two theories until it becomes clear what the difference is between the two kinds of time.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 32.4, 1998, 255.


Frédéric Worms. “Bergson, mémoire et vie.” in *Cerveau et mémoire*. Eds. E. Jaffard, B. Claverie, B. Andrieu. Paris: éditions Osiris, 1998, 43-54. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Bergson, memory, and life.” This essay is an exposition Bergson’s position in *Matter and Memory*. The author describes Bergson’s theory here as threefold: 1. Life is corporeal (fundamentally embodied) in a real world. 2. Life is temporal. 3. Memory and life are multiple: They exist on a scale of levels.


Theological Seminary; 1998, 260. The author shows how Indian Christian theologians attempted to create a Christology which would distinguish Christianity from all other religions in the Indian mind. Chenchiah relied on the concept of creative evolution, as developed by Henri Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin (Dissertation Abstracts International, 59.5A, 1998, p. 1632).


1999


Randall E. Auxier, Ed. “A Dialogue on Bergson.” *Process Studies*, 28.3-4, Fall-Winter, 1999, 339-345. This dialogue contains reflections on Bergson’s concepts of intellect, intuition, and mathematics by P. A. Y. Gunter, C. Hausman, T. Stark and R. Auxier. The editor urges the readers to note the changes in attitude by the dialogue participants between the time of the dialogue (1993) and their essays in this focus section, which have been substantially rewritten.


Randall E. Auxier. “Special Focus Introduction: Bergson and the Calculus of Intuition.” *Process Studies*, 28.3-4, Fall-Winter, 1999, p. 266. The author contends that the present “focus” section should put to rest many fundamental misunderstandings of Bergson’s philosophy.

Randall E. Auxier, Ed. “Special Focus: Bergson and Whitehead.” *Process Studies*, 28.3-4, Fall-Winter, 1999, 267-345. Items from this “focus” section will be listed separately in this bibliography.

Oliver Bakof. “‘The Double Well-Head’ – By Schiller and Bergson.” *Filozofia*, 54.8, 1999, 586-591. “The paper focuses on the analogy between ‘the double-headed’ in F.C.S. Schiller’s writings and Bergson’s “double-head” of religion and morals. The author’s suggestion is that there is an intrinsic relation between the material and formal instinct in Schiller’s conception and Bergson’s
static and dynamic religions. In his view there is a certain analogy between the Nietzschean Apollonian principle and Bergson’s “fabulatory function” of reason. His conclusion is that this analogy one of the reasons why Bergson explores the presence of nature in works of art and the necessity to search for it only there.” *Philosopher’s Index, 43.3, 2009, 286.*


Giovanna Borradori. “On the Presence of Bergson in Deleuze’s Nietzsche.” *Philosophy Today,* 43 (supplement) 1999, 140-145. “The paper shows how Deleuze’s influential reading of Nietzsche is profoundly indebted to Bergson’s metaphysics. Bergson’s model of explanation relies on the notion of “tendency” rather than cause, so that entities are discussed in terms of their tendencies to develop certain properties rather than the properties themselves. Borradori’s central argument in this short essay is that Bergson’s concept of tendency plays a crucial role in Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s notion of force and his characterization of forces as active and reactive.” *Philosopher’s Index, 35.1, First Quarter, 2001, p. 144.*

Giovanna Borradori. “Virtualidad, arquitectura, filosofia.” *Ideas Valores,* 110, August, 1999, 35-56. “The author contrasts a current representationalist definition of virtuality, according to which this concept "represents" the effects of communication and informational technology on our way of knowing and building the world, with an alternative concept according to which virtuality describes a constitutive component of experience, and, as such, resists all reduction to physical processes as well as quantification and formalization. The author suggests to rethinking virtuality in terms of the Nietzschean notion of perspectivism, which amounts to the assumption that experience contains a virtual dimension. This move calls into question a whole range of philosophical categorizations and architectural presuppositions, first and foremost the Cartesian notion of space. A new concept of virtual spatiality emerges which is articulated in Nietzschean as well as in Bergsonian terms.” *Philosopher’s Index, 34.1, 2000, p. 129. Eng. trans. “Virtuality, Architecture, Philosophy.”


Jure Ganter. “The Case of the Falling Man: Bergson and Chaos Theory.” *Mosaic*, 32.2, June 1, 1999, 43-57. The author’s abstract states: “Conceived as a reaction to 19th century scientific methods, Bergson’s *Le Rire* (1900) gained a new significance when these same methods were questioned by later scientists. Focusing on how Bergson anticipated some of the ideas of chaos theory, this essay draws parallels between his theory of laughter and the discourse of non-linear dynamics.” (p. 43)


Pete A. Y. Gunter. “Bergson, Mathematics, and Creativity.” *Process Studies*, 28.3-4, Fall-Winter, 1999, 268-288. Henri Bergson’s concept of intuition is modelled on the infinitesimal calculus. Not only does his intuition—analogously to the calculus—deal with modes of change, but his concept of a hierarchy of durations parallels the fundamental theorem of the calculus, which makes possible an ascent by integration to ‘higher’ levels and a descent by differentiation to ‘lower’ levels. Bergson’s universe consists of a “nested” series of durations, with the longest at the top, the briefest at the bottom. Intuition can integrate/differentiate at each level.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 34.4, 2000, 176.


Wayne John Hankey. “French Neoplatonism in the 20th Century”, *Animus*, 4, 1999. ([www.swge.mun.ca/animus](http://www.swge.mun.ca/animus)) The author states: “(Bergson) found in Plotinus not only a ‘schema dynamique’ which corresponded to his own notion of reality but also what comprised the most fundamental error of the metaphysical tradition, the misrepresentation of life and movement in
intellectual stability.” Ravaisson, Schelling, Blondel and others appear in this survey of Plotinian influence on recent French thought.

Carl R. Hausman. “Bergson, Peirce, and Reflective Intuition.” Process Studies, 289.3-4, Fall–Winter, 1999, 289-300. This is an excellent analysis of Bergson’s and Peirce’s concepts of intuition. Both treat intuition as the source of new concepts and a basis for our knowledge of things. Peirce’s intuitions are “thinner” than Bergson’s. Nothing better than this has been done on Bergson and Peirce.

Lawrence W. Howe. “Bergsonian Methodology: The Problem of Time.” Southwest Philosophy Review, 15.2, 1999, 39-55. “This study treats an often misunderstood aspect of Bergson’s philosophy: his method of analyzing concepts. In particular, attention is paid to his analysis of ‘spatialized time’ as a concept composed of two metaphysically distinct notions, i.e., duration and extensity. His thought on time is contrasted with the space-time models advanced by J.J.C. Smart and D.C. Williams and argues that Bergsonian duration overcomes problems concerned with irreversibility not handled by a space-time model.” Philosopher’s Index, 34.1, 2000, p. 160.


original distinction between two types of order, vital and geometrical order, is a fruitful, qualitative distinction that coheres with his dualism. However, by denying (1) a positive interaction between the two orders and (2) the effectiveness of the concept of disorder, Bergson takes his dualism to an unnecessary extreme and, thus, fails to account for the evaluative aspect of art. Art is not only qualitative, it is quantitative. The quantitative aspect of art is required for the understanding of aesthetic evaluation.” Philosopher’s Index, 34.1, 2000, p. 172.

Patrick McNamara. *Mind and Variability: Mental Darwinism, Memory, and Self*. London: Praeger, 1999, 163. In place of the prevailing “instructionist” theory of memory the author argues for “selectivist” theory according to which memory is based on (1) preexisting variation among components within the biological system (2) “polling” of the system’s components in its encounter with its environment and (3) differential amplification of those components of the system that meet a threshold criterion. The two thinkers most cited in this study are William James and Henri Bergson. Cf. esp. pp. 33-34, 42-43, 129-132, 34-38.


Evolution: An Ontology of Change,” 118-146. The author states “In many respects Deleuze-Bergson’s strict method of condemning false problems and struggle against illusion to discover differences in kind or articulation of the real carries out the program of Deleuze’s evocation of Nietzsche’s critical method.” p. 94. The author is remarkably insightful in her interpretation of Bergson’s “mind-body” theory and his cosmology, both of which she states, form a central basis for Deleuze’s philosophy.


Keith Ansell Pearson. Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze. New York: Routledge, 1999, xii, 270. The author states in his introduction: “I believe that the character of Deleuze’s ‘Bergsonism’ has been little understood, and yet I want to show that it plays the crucial in the unfolding of his philosophy as a philosophy of ‘germinal life’.“ p. 1. Cf. esp. Ch. 1 “The Difference of Bergson: Duration and Creative Evolution,” 20-76. Profoundly inspired by Bergson, Deleuze was to use central Bergsonian insights in order to go beyond Bergson.


Frédéric Worms. “James et Bergson : lectures croisées.” *Philosophie*, No. 64, 1999, 54-68. An English translation of the title of this item is: “James and Bergson: Intersecting Readings.”


Yonhiro Yamagata. “Cosmos and Life (According to Henry and Bergson).” *Continental Philosophy Review*, 32.3, 1999, 241-253. “In his essay on Kandinsky, *Voir l’invisible*, Henry assigns to cosmos another manner of existence than that of the visible world. The cosmos will no longer be more objective or exterior or visible: it will receive, as characteristics, the opposing qualifications of ‘subjective, internal and invisible’. To further this elucidation of Henry’s concept of cosmos, we will profit from the inherent connection that Bergson has indicated between life and matter in his magna opera, *Matière et mémoire* and *L’évolution créatrice.*” *Philosopher’s Index*, 34.1, 2000, 218.

2000

G.D. Adamson. “Bergson’s Spinozist Tendencies.” *Philosophy Today*. 44.1, 2000, 73-85. The author states: “The aim of what follows will be to read Bergson beside Spinoza, not only to reveal his indebtedness to Spinoza but, in accordance with the intricate nature of Spinoza’s ontology, to indicate a far greater complexity and coherence to Bergson’s thought than has been observed by most commentators thus far.” p.73

G. Dale Adamson. “Science and Philosophy: Two Sides of the Absolute.” *Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, 9, 2000, 53-86. This article concerns the relations between the thought of Bergson and of Bertrand Russell.

Mark Antliff. “The Fourth Dimension and Futurism: A Politicized Space.” *Art Bulletin*, 77.4, December, 2000, 720-733. This is an analysis of the futurist Umberto Boccioni’s appropriation of Bergson’s metaphysics and theory of knowledge to frame his own concept of art and to inspire his sculpture and painting. He also used Bergson to justify his own nationalist and imperialist philosophy. The impact of George Sorel’s philosophy on Italian politics is also examined here.

Ekaterina A. Babrynskaya. *Futurism*. Moscow: Galart, 2000, 192 pp. The text of this item is in Russian. On pp. 27-8 the author states: “The poetics of ‘dynamic sensations’ disseminated by the futurists not only for mechanistic movement or visible movement, but also for ‘movement’ of the psyche, internal dynamism, the turning of artists toward this theme is often linked with the influence of the philosophical works of Henri Bergson. The concept of ‘duration’ presented by Bergson and also supposing the constant changeability, the coming into being of different temporal layers, of the past, present, and future—gave a basis for futurist experiments. Not ‘the logic of hard bodies’ but the thinking, by a dynamic process, by current sensation lay the foundation for futurist
painting of ‘the conditions of the soul’ because, in the opinion of Bergson, particularly duration also comprises the essence of our internal lives.” Trans. Sheila D. Gunter


Krisian Bankov. *Intellectual Effort and Linguistic Work: Semiotic and Hermeneutic Aspects of the Philosophy of Bergson*. Acta Semiotica Fennica, 9, International Semiotic Institute at Imatra, 2000, 152. The author takes the concept of intellectual effort (even though it takes up a small part in his writings) to be central both to Bergson’s thought and to the understanding of his thought. The first part of this essay (pp 32-101) begins with an examination of the (wildly) divergent interpretations of Bergson’s philosophy, then moves on to explore the centrality of intellectual effort in Bergson. Intellectual effort is not an acceptance of tradition but its transcendence. It is effortful self-overcoming. Especially, it involves for Bergson a “complex and dynamic attitude towards language.” (p. 71) The author compares Bergson’s thought to that of F.de Saussure, P. Ricoeur, J. Caputo, H. Gadamer, helpfully bringing his discussion into the contemporary context. He also engages in a comparison between Bergson’s thought and that of C.S. Peirce (pp. 115-130), which he finds to be surprisingly similar. This is the best study of Bergson and Peirce since that of C. Hausman (1999). It is also a healthy and convincing refutation of any notion that Bergson is “an enemy of language.” (Ed.)

Renaud Barbaras. “Le problème de la perception.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, 46-47. Bergson rethinks the concept of perception from the roots up, denying three presumably classical verities: 1. that there is a reality “out there” unrelated to the possibility of being perceived, and known by representations 2. that representations are produced by this reality “for” a perceiving subject 3. that perception is contemplation, knowledge for its own sake, and hence is knowledge. Perception for Bergson is within reality, which it (perception) simplifies but does not create. (Cf. the author’s *Le désir et la distance*, Paris: Vrin, 1999.) Eng. trans. “The Problem of Perception.”

Julian Barbour. “Time, Instants, Duration and Philosophy.” in *Time and the Instant*. Ed. Robin Durie. Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000, 98-11. The author, basing his approach on recent interpretations of quantum cosmology, argues that Bergson’s (and Bachelard’s) ideas of temporality are false. Quantum Cosmology may now deal with reality without giving time an essential role. (However, Lee Smolin’s article on pp. 112-142 of this collection denies that the premises of quantum cosmology must be accepted as is.)

Bento Prado Jr. “Une philosophie vivante.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, 28-30. The author argues that Bergson’s reemergence into contemporary philosophy is occasioned by the fact that phenomenology, logical analysis, and theory of cognitive structures have reached their limits, where they encounter certain Bergsonian ideas. The effigy of Bergson appears on the horizon of “post-phenomenological, post-analytic, and post-computational philosophy.” Eng. trans. “A Philosophy that Lives.”


Deleuze’s career the antihegelian notion of temporalized difference was central to Deleuze’s thought: most surprisingly in his interpretation of Nietzsche.

Arnaud Bouaniche. “La pensée et le nouveau.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, 43-45. The author concurs with Gilles Deleuze that Bergson’s thought involves a profound paradigm shift. His philosophy is a protest against all those, ancient or modern, who fail to understand novelty and hence duration. Eng. trans. “Thought and the New.”


Yvette Conry. “L’Evolution créatrice” d’Henri Bergson. Pref. Françoise Dagognet. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000, 328. (Collection Epistémologies et philosophie des sciences) An English translation of the title of this item is: *Bergson’s Creative Evolution*. This study consists of materials left at the author’s death in 1992. It is a highly critical examination, first, of the reception of Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* understood especially with regard to the sciences of his time. Though in some respects the author affects a “hatchet job” on Bergson’s philosophy, she raises many interesting questions. Why, for example, does Bergson say so little about Mendelian genetics? The author concludes that *Creative Evolution* is an ontology hiding behind the mask of a philosophy of science. His vision and his utilization of knowledge are ideological. His philosophy is an ideology.

Robin Durie. “Splitting Time: Bergson’s Philosophical Legacy.” *Philosophy Today*, 44.2, Summer, 2000, 152-168. “Heidegger argues that Bergson’s theory of durée merely reverses the opposition between limit and continuity found in Aristotle’s treatise on time privileging continuity where Aristotle had privileged limit. Neither thinker, Heidegger claims, thinks time’s origin. This paper argues that if we concentrate on Bergson’s use of the Riemannian concept of the ‘multiplicity’ (Mannigfaltigkeit) it can be demonstrated that Bergson does indeed provide a profound meditation on time’s origin. Moreover, Bergson’s way of conceiving heterogeneous, virtual multiplicity, overcomes the operative schemas underpinning the paradoxes which bedevil Aristotle’s treatise, clearing the way for a genuinely new reflection on time’s nature.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 35, No. 1, First Quarter, 2001, 160-161.

Elie During. “Fantômes de problèmes.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, 39-42. The author stresses Bergson’s contention that a poorly stated problem is incapable of solution, and that a true philosopher will always attempt to avoid false problems by questioning their terms. Bergson’s is a “critical” philosophy. The author examines Bergson’s treatment of Zeno’s paradoxes, liberty, negation, and order. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Phantoms of Problems”.


Pete A.Y. Gunter. “Seeing in the Dark: Motor Space and the Status of Visual Imagery.” *Annales d’histoire et de philosophie du vivant*, 3, 2000, 155-163. The author examines the premotor theory of vision, which claims that there is more than one perceptual space, and that all such spaces have an essentially “motor” function: that it codes for bodily action. Experiments supporting this viewpoint are explored. The author relates this research program in neurophysiology to the ideas of Bergson and M. Merleau-Ponty.


Julia V. Iribarne. “Memoria y olvido en relación la identidad personal.” *Escritos de Filosofía*, 19.37-38, December, 2000, 195-213. “An interpretation of Husserl is first advanced in order to show that forgetting cannot be adequately dealt with if it is considered as a suppression of attention, and that the limited character of memory is related to the abandonment of the Cartesian way. Secondly, the article recalls Bergson’s convenient contrast between habitual memory and spontaneous memory, along with the thesis that forgetting has a positive function for life insofar as it inhibits what would otherwise be the omnipresence of memory. Finally an analysis is offered of Proust’s distinction between a voluntary, intelligent memory and involuntary memory that opens a lived past impregnated with love, fear, and grief. The article concludes by exploring how, in the three standpoints, memory is the condition for the development of personal identity.” *The Philosopher’s Index*, 36, No. 1, 2002, p. 210. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Memory and Forgetting in Relation to Personal Identity.”


Frédéric Keck. “Face aux sciences humaines.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, 58-61. The author describes Bergson’s relations with the “social sciences”: psychology, sociology, anthropology, ethnology. The real source Bergson’s insights into each of these fields depend on
the “vital”—his concept of Biology developed in *Creative Evolution*. The author suggests ways in which Bergson can “animate” the ideas of the social sciences vis à vis the development of technology and the emergence of new social structures. Eng. trans. “Confronting the Human Sciences.”


Peter Kemp. *Bergson*. Copenhagen: Rosinante, 2000, 233. (De store tankere)

Spyridon Koutroufinis. “Über die Affinität der Zeitphilosophie Henri Bergsons zum Ammonschen Verständnis von Zeiterleben.” *Dynamische Psychiatrie*, 33.180-181, 2000, 137-158. Eng. trans. “On the Affinity of Henri Bergson’s Time-Philosophy to Ammon’s Understanding of the Experience of Time.” “The author argues that Guenter Ammon’s ‘Dynamic Psychiatry’ displays a process-philosophically oriented image of man in a psychotherapeutic perspective. Ammon describes psychic-corporal health as a process of the creation and development of dimensions of experiencing the world and the self. One of these is the dimension of time and the experience of time. This and other positions of ‘Dynamic Psychiatry’ offer to be examined in the light of Henri Bergson’s process-ontology, because the source of his philosophy is the time theory which he gained from the analysis of time experience. Bergson’s work is suited as a starting point for this not just for philosophy-historical reasons, but because the essence of Ammon’s psychology shows remarkable affinities to Bergson’s understanding of time.” (Author’s abstract)


*Magazine littéraire*, no. 386, 2000. All items in this Bergson number of ML are reproduced in this bibliography (2000).

[http://eduardo.mahieu.free.fr/Cercle%20Ey/seminaire/MINKOWSKI.htm](http://eduardo.mahieu.free.fr/Cercle%20Ey/seminaire/MINKOWSKI.htm). This concerns the ideas of E. Minkowski.

Donald R. Maxwell. *Science or Literature?: The Divergent Cultures of Discovery and Creation*. New York: Peter Lang, 2000, 165. (Studies in the Humanities, Vol. 54) The author clearly distinguishes the language of science (clear, unambiguous) from that of literature (ambiguous, metaphorical). Science discovers what already exists while literature creates that which might never exist. The author explores this dualism via the writings of Bergson, M. Proust, and others. Cf. “Bergson’s and Pascal’s Two Paths to Truth,” 27-31; “Ruskin and Bergson,” 4-43; “Huxley, Barthes, Proust and Bergson,” 64-68; “Bergson’s Demon,” 146-149; and throughout.


Pierre Montebello. “Nietzsche et Bergson : deux philosophes de la vie.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, 52-54. Eng. trans. “Nietzsche and Bergson: Two Philosophers of Life.” The author argues that though these two philosophers appear radically different, their ideas develop in much the same way, due to the fact that both pay fundamental attention to life, accepting it, similarly, as the fundamental datum.

David Morris. “The Logic of the Body in Bergson’s Motor Schemes and Merleau-Ponty’s Body Schema.” *Philosophy Today*, 44 (Supplement), 2000, 60-69. “An analysis of Bergson’s motor schemes shows how there is logic within the body, one that informs the recognition of images, and thence perception and memory. But for Bergson, this logic of the body is entirely explicit, and is distinct from the implicit logic that we find in thinking. A contrast with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body schema shows how the temporality of the body is crucial to Bergson’s distinction between the logic of the body and the logic of thinking, and suggests how we might find a logic of the body—but one that informs thinking—via Merleau-Ponty and his concept of expression.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 35.4, 2001, 265.


Alberto Nave. *Libertà e responsabilità nell’antropologia crociana*. Bari: Lavante, 2000, 152. (Ethos, 18) An English translation of the title of this item is: *Liberty and Responsibility in Croce’s Anthropology*. The author compares Benedetto Croce’s ethical ideas to Bergson’s. Topics examined include responsibility, liberty, suffering, and political ethics.

Dorothea Olkowski. “The End of Phenomenology: Bergson’s Interval in Irigaray.” *Hypatia*, 15.3, Summer, 2000, 73-91. “Luce Irigaray is often cited as the principle feminist who adheres to phenomenology as a method of descriptive philosophy. A different approach to Irigaray might well open the way to not only an avoidance of phenomenology’s sexist tendencies, but the recognition that the breach between Irigaray’s ideas and those of phenomenology is complete. I argue that this occurs and that Irigaray’s work directly implicates a Bergsonian critique of the limits of phenomenology.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 35.1, 2001, 204.


Stephen E. Robbins. “Bergson, Perception and Gibson.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7.6, May, 2000, 23-45. “Bergson’s 1896 theory of perception/memory assumed a framework anticipating the quantum revolution in physics, the still unrealized implications of this framework contributing to the large neglect of Bergson today. The basics of this model are explored, including the physical concepts he advances before the crisis in classical physics, his concept of perception as ‘virtual action’ with its relativistic implications, and his unique explication of the subject/object relationship. All form the basis for his solution to the ‘hard’ problem. The relation between Bergson and Gibson is also explored. (edited)” Philosopher’s Index, 35.1, 2001, 216.


Pierre Rodrigo. “Le devenir de la philosophie.” Magazine littéraire, No. 386, April, 2000, 64-66. An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Becoming of Philosophy.” The author deals with Bergson’s philosophy of the history of philosophy, which seeks to go beyond the externals of the expression of the philosopher’s thought to the fundamental intuition on which it is based.


Ji-Seok Ryu. “Une Contribution à la recherche de la pensée d’Henri Bergson. Présentation, annotation et analyse historique et philosophique des documents inédits ou publiés hors les Mélanges (1888-1940).” Ph.D. Dissertation, Université Charles de Gaulle-Lille III, 2000, 360. This study is a presentation of items by or concerning Bergson, items either previously unpublished or published since the appearance of Mélanges (1972), along with commentary and annotation. The first volume consists of five parts. Of these, the first two contain a careful analysis of the relation between Bergson and French and foreign contemporaries with whom he had correspondence. The third explores the genesis and development of Bergson’s thought through careful accounts of his major publications. The fourth explores, in turn, Bergson’s involvement in the First World War,
his attitude towards German philosophy, his interview with Albert Beveridge (1915), the reception of his *The Meaning of War* in Germany and Sweden, his diplomatic missions, and his involvement in the translation of his works. An appendix contains a bibliography of works on Bergson, 1985-1999. The second volume is a collection of documents with annotations. The greater part of this volume is made up of Bergson’s correspondence, though in addition there are five interviews given at different periods of his life. Two concluding sections of the second volume provide an account of the sources and bibliography of documents written by Bergson and a “Bergson bibliography” (1889-1941) outlining the important dates in his life. In addition there is a list of books which he received in connection with his correspondence. This painstaking study is a remarkably rich source of information on Bergson: his context, his biography, and his thought. The present bibliography presents articles and letters from Ryu’s magisterial study.

Jorge Saltor. “Identidad y memoria: a proposito del monismo neutral.” *Escritos de Filosofía*, 19.37-38, 2000, 37-38. “The author attempts to investigate memory in neutral monism on the basis of B. Russell’s formulation of this standpoint. First, a number of Russell’s theses are discussed, especially his attempt to reject the notion of psychical subject. Secondly, the author examines his theory of meaning and the function it performs within the monist conception. Finally he argues that memory is for Russell a disturbing presence that undermines his antimephysical stance and brings him, in a strange manner, close to Bergson’s *Matter and Memory.*” *Philosopher’s Index*, 36.1, 2002, 280. Eng. trans. “Identity and Memory: Concerning Neutral Monism”.


Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. “La place de la religion.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, 61-64. The author argues that Bergson is in no sense (as was Nietzsche) a prophet. His work constitutes an *analysis* of the phenomenon of religion. Even so, he offers us not a dogma so much as an openness to “the things of the spirit”. He offers us neither an emotional bond nor a fusion with God as his final insight, but a spiritual intersubjectivity which sustains action. Eng. trans. “The Place of Religion.”


Frédéric Worms. “Bergson par ses livres.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, 31-32. This is an exposition of the basic contents of *Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution,* and *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.*


Frédéric Worms. “Dossier Bergson.” *Magazine littéraire*, No. 386, April, 2000, p. 16. The author ponders the question of what 20th century thought might have been without Bergson. It is hard to imagine.
Frédéric Worms. “Dossier. Chronologie.” Magazine littéraire, No. 386, April, 2000, 18-23. This consists of a series of brief chronologically ordered biographical sketches, ending with an account of Bergson’s “posterity”: those who accepted and utilized important aspects of his philosophy.


Frédéric Worms. Le vocabulaire de Bergson. Paris: Ellipses, 2000, 64. Eng. trans. The Bergsonian Vocabulary. The author, in his introduction (pp. 3-7) admits the difficulties involved in compiling a Bergson “dictionary.” Nonetheless, he argues, there are basic terms used throughout Bergson’s writings. In defining them it is necessary to pay careful attention to quality (textual context), critique (attention to change of meaning), and intensity (the extent to which a term is used). The author deals with thirty-five terms from “Action” to “Vie” and including images, intuition, memory, mysticism, and philosophy.

2001


Giovanna Borradori. “The Temporalization of Difference: Reflections on Deleuze’s Interpretation of Bergson.” Continental Philosophy Review, 34.1, March, 2001, 1-20. “This paper provides an in-depth analysis of Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson based on his largely ignored 1956 essay, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”. In this essay Deleuze first attacks the Hegelian tradition for misunderstanding the role of difference by reducing it to negation and then uses Bergson’s concept of duration—a flow of purely qualitative mental states—to formulate a notion of differences utterly ‘internal’ to itself, that is, irreducible to negation. The paper argues that the temporalization of difference represents a permanent feature of Deleuze’s philosophy—one particularly visible in his highly influential book on Nietzsche which, therefore, appears molded by a Bergsonian imprint.” Philosopher’s Index, 35.4, 2001, 184.

consciousness’. Pure consciousness is an impersonal transcendental field in which the self is produced in such a way that consciousness thereby disguises its ‘monstrous spontaneity’. I want to explore to what extent the ego is to be understood as a result of absolute consciousness. I also claim that the idea of the self Sartre has in mind is Bergson’s ‘moi profond’. Since this ‘deeper self’ has to be understood as a result of an impersonal transcendental field, it loses its central position in consciousness. Sartre claims that the ego is not transcendental, as Husserl had claimed, but transcendent to consciousness.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 36.1, 2002, 166.


Monique Castillo. “L’obligation morale : le débat de Bergson avec Kant.” *Les Etudes Philosophiques*, No. 4, 2001, 439-452. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Moral Obligation: Bergson’s Debate with Kant.” Author’s abstract (translated from French to English): “Kant’s is not a social morality, it is agreed to compare Bergson and Kant as the founders of the two equally “open” (Bergson’s term) moralities relating to the destiny of the human species, Kant’s “cosmic” philosophical perspective permits a double approach to questions of faith, mysticism, and myth.”


Laurent Fedi. “Bergson et Boutroux, la critique du modèle physicaliste.” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, No. 2, 2001, 97-118. Abstract. “The article offers an interpretation of the *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* that puts into light Boutroux’s intellectual debt toward Bergson regarding the specificity of psychological investigation and its related irreducibility to the sort of explanatory schema familiar in the natural sciences. The relationship between Bergson and Boutroux is set against the background of the general effort of the years 1870 to 1880 for granting autonomy to sciences of the mind. It is argued that Bergson makes use of the relativization of the law of the conservation of energy in order to challenge the equivalence of psychical causes and effects. And also that he thereby offers a devastating critique of the classical theories of liberty, but also initiates a new approach to the individual open to meaningfulness, similarly to Dilthey.”


Neoplatonic Reading of Fichte.” An English translation of the author’s abstract reads: “Basing himself on Bergson’s 1898 course on Fichte, the author discusses the mediating image through which, in *Creative Evolution*, the French philosopher expresses Fichte’s philosophical intuition. Bergson detects two philosophies in Fichte’s philosophy: an original philosophy, subjectivist and idealist, and an opposite philosophy, mystical but less original since it is common to the whole of Alexandrian thought. For Bergson these two philosophies are two faces of a single thought, whether in a contracted state or in a relaxed one. In this distinction between a relaxed and a contracted Alexandrianism the author suggests a principle that Bergson employed for interpreting the history of philosophy.”

Elizabeth Grosz. *Architecture From the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space*. Fore. Peter Eisenman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, xxi, 219. The author explores architecture from the “outside”: that is, from the vantage-point of philosophy. Using Bergson and several other philosophers (R. Callois, G. Deleuze, J. Derrida) she raises abstract but nonformalistic questions about space, inhabitation, and building. This is one of several recent works relating Bergson and architecture. Cf. B. Cache, 1995.


Sanford Kwinter. *Architectures of Time: Toward a Theory of the Event in Modernist Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, ill, 237. (Electronic reproduction. Boulder, CO.: Net Library, 2003) The author explains how the demise of the concept of absolute time and of the classical notion of space as a fixed background against which things occur led to a field theory and a physics of the “event”. He concludes by arguing that Franz Kafka’s work manifests a coherent cosmology which can only be related to the constant temporal flux which underlies it.


Jean-Michel Le Lannou. “L’anti-idéalisme de Bergson.” *Les études philosophiques*, No. 4, 2001, 419-437. An English translation of the title of this item is “Bergson’s Anti-Idealism”. The author explores the development of Bergson’s critique of idealism, which alienates us from both skepticism and formalism. Intuition rescues us from skepticism with regard to our experienced world and from abstract formalism.
Maël Lemoine. “Remarques sur la métaphore de l’organisme en politique. Les Principes de philosophie du droit et Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion.” Les Études philosophiques, No. 4, 2001, 479-497. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Remarks on the Metaphor of the Organism in Politics: Elements of the Philosophy of Right and The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.” The author’s abstract states: “Popper wrote that Hegel, as a thinker, is a forerunner of totalitarianism; on the one hand, one cannot but regard Bergson as a true democrat. Both, however, considered the body politic as an organism, a doctrine favored by the supporters of a totalitarian state. This assertion must not be underrated: neither thinker intended to use a metaphorical expression, hence a broad meaning of “organism”. As a matter of fact the organicity of a body of politic, far from threatening individual freedom, is the only form compatible with individuality. The important thing is to distinguish all-made ‘organized organization’ from self-making ‘organizing organization’: the former treats individuals as mechanical entities, while the latter is the result of the self-development of their freedom.”

Bernard Mabille. “Éloge de la fluidité : Hegel, Bergson et la parole.” Les Études Philosophiques, No. 4, 2001, 499-516. An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Celebration of Fluidity: Hegel, Bergson and Speech.” The author’s abstract states: “Between the apparent antinomy between a philosophy of intuition and a logic of concept, this article attempts to unveil, by Hegel and Bergson, two trends of thought that, though irreducible, acknowledge an essential tie between language and mediation, mistrust of the abstraction of analytical understanding and seek a philosophical word able to fluidly ‘rigid thoughts’ in order to express a true life to meaning.”


Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The Incarnate Subject : Malebranche, Biran, and Bergson on the Union of Body and Soul. Trans. Paul B. Milan. Eds. Andrew G. Bjelland Jr. and Patrick Burke. Pref. Jacques Taminiaux. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2001, 152. (Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences) In his introduction Jacques Taminiaux argues that the lectures which constitute this book were intended as preparation for a test (the “aggregation” in philosophy) for those who would have become “lycée” professors. No similar genre exists in German or English educational systems. Even though such lectures served a pedagogical and not a purely philosophical purpose, they do reflect Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental thinking at the time he gave them. They are thus doubly valuable.


Marcos José Müller. “Restituição do mundo de percepção e arqueologica de reflexão critica.” Kriterion (Brazil), 42.103, 2001, 29-57. “In this article I try to discuss how Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, Bergson’s theory of the perceptual field and Husserl’s later phenomenology take part in the Merleau-Pontyan project of bringing out of the perceptual world. In particular, I show how such a project may be understood as a radicalization of the critical reflection, which is dealt with by these authors.” Philosopher’s Index, 36.1, 2002, 238. Eng. trans. “The Restitution of the World of Perception and Archeology of Critical Reflection.”


Alain Panero. Intuition et espace selon Bergson : le concept d’espace comme principe d’univocité des intuitions. Lille: ANRT-Septentrion, 2001, 728. (Ouverture philosophique) Eng. trans. Intuition and Space According to Bergson: The Concept of Space as a Principle of the Univocity of Intuitions. The author argues that Bergson, who takes a rationalist perspective, must produce a principle of the univocity (oneness) of intuition. This principle of univocity is space.


Louis A. Sass. “Self and World in Schizophrenia: Three Classic Approaches.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 8.4, 2001, 251-270. The author discusses three phenomenological approaches to the understanding of schizophrenia: these of Eugene Minkowski, Wolfgang Blankenburg, and
Kimura Ben. His discussion of Minkowski includes an examination of Minkowski’s use of Bergson’s ideas and concludes with a critique of some of Minkowski’s conclusions.


Susana Trejos Marin. “La libertad en Bergson y en Jankélévitch.” *Revista de Filosofía* (Costa Rica), 39.97, 2001, 21-30. An English translation of the title of this article is: “Liberty in Bergson and Jankélévitch.” “This is a study of the notion of liberty in Henri Bergson’s philosophy. The theme is addressed from the perspective of the French thinker Vladimir Jankélévitch, who is, for the moment, the most profound scholar of Bergsonism. In his book, *Henri Bergson*, Jankélévitch studies the thought of the philosopher, using the same method of analysis as Bergson for the treatment of his themes. Jankélévitch legitimates the author from himself, and a reading, not only of his texts, but from his texts, of his intellectual itinerary.” *Philosopher's Index*, 36.2, 2002, 287.

Annick Urfer. “Phenomenology and Psychopathology of Schizophrenia: The Views of Eugene Minkowski.” *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology*, 8.4, 2001, 279-289. The author examines Bergson’s psychology as a prelude to exploring the psychopathology of Eugene Minkowski, who applied Bergson’s essential ideas to the study of mental illness, particularly schizophrenia. Minkowski’s work added significantly to the understanding of schizophrenia.

superstition on the one hand, and strength of moral progress and of love, on the other. Bergson’s interest in the spiritual surge of the mystics starts as early as the beginning of the century, not later than 1905. Bergson finds the exceptional characteristics of the mystical experience interesting because he sees in it a sign of spiritual worth. Both the creative emotion and philosophical reflection share with the mystical experience a moral energy which is neither a mere contemplation nor a mere speculation, but rather, enables humanity to move one step forward towards achieving its fate.” Philosopher’s Index, 36.3, 2002, 305.


Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. “Les paradoxes de l’éternité chez Hegel et Bergson.” Les Études Philosophiques, No. 4, 2001, 317-530. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Paradoxes of Eternity in Hegel and Bergson.” An English translation of the author’s abstract states: “Thinkers who deal with time, Hegel and Bergson, have nonetheless elaborated a paradoxical concept of eternity, in the sense that for them eternity is active, dynamic. An inversion of Platonism is at work here in that both wish to think of eternity in starting from time and not the inverse. For Hegel, eternity signifies systematic circularity on one side, the eternal presence of the Idea in the profundity of the present on the other. But Hegel resists an eternalizing logic which would make the spirit collapse into abstraction. For Bergson, duration is reality itself, and the opposition to Spinoza’s philosophy sub specie aternitatis is radical. Nonetheless, duration is expressed in a profound and divine creative joy, which is certainly not a return to the immutable Platonic eternity, but indicates another eternity. This is an eternity of life, or an absolute in which we live, move, and have our being.

Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. “Présentation.” Les Études Philosophiques, 4, 2001, 417-418. This is a brief introduction to a number of Les Études Philosophiques devoted to the relations between Bergson and German idealism. Similarities between Bergson, Fichte, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel are briefly cited.


Frédéric Worms. “Au-delà de l’histoire et du caractère : l’idée de philosophie française, le moment 1900.” Revue de métaphysique et de morale, No.3, 2001, 63-81. An English translation of the title of this article is “Beyond the History of the Character: The idea of the French philosophy, the First World War and the ‘Moment’ 1900.” (Abstract) “The purpose of the present paper is to study the privilege case of “French” philosophy at the beginning of the century, in order to understand how one goes from the history of philosophy to its national characterization. This in turn leads to two other orders of considerations, in order to understand how the national characterization of the philosophy implies the reverse philosophical characterization of nations; particularly in the period which finds its end with WWI; in order also to understand what other conception of the moments, problems and places of philosophy can be devised to articulate its individual, common, and
historical dimensions. One is thus lead to study a series of precise writings from French philosophy, particularly by Bergson, to a general and double appreciation of the “1900 moment”, and finally to more general perspectives on history of philosophy as such.”

Frédéric Worms. “L’intelligence gagnée par intuition ? La relation entre Bergson et Kant.” Les Études Philosophiques, No. 4, 2001, 453-464. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Intelligence Achieved by Intuition: the Relation between Bergson and Kant.” Author’s abstract: “The purpose of this paper is to show how Bergson’s reading of Kant, far from any expeditive fight word, implies at the same time some reappropriation, a precise critique, and a final objection that together lead to the heart of a profound relationship between two irreducible doctrines. The partial endorsing of Kant’s distinction between intelligence and intuition, and even between matter and the forms of intuition itself, must not be understood as only ironical homage. On the contrary, it helps us to understand the unity Bergson advocates against Kant, first between the matter and the form of intuition in the case of time, then between intuition and intelligence itself, after Creative Evolution. In its own turn, that unity helps us to understand why intelligence is separated from intuition in Bergson’s last great book. Intelligence or understanding is thus won in a double way: not only as surpassed, but also as penetrated by intuition, up to a last limit, which reveals a peculiar difference, at the heart of a common problem.”


2002


Renard Barbaras. “La phénoménologie de Bergson (Sur Bento Prado).” Annales bergsoniennes I. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002, 337-41. Eng. trans. “Bergson’s Phenomenology (Concerning Bento Prado).” The central thesis of Bento Prado’s study is that the philosophy of Bergson can be read as the creation of an “Ontology of Presence”. This viewpoint stems from Bento Prado’s reading of Bergson’s critique of negation in Creative Evolution. Bergson’s interpretation, however, raises some questions.


Richard Bilsker. On Bergson. Wadsworth, 2002, 77. (Wadsworth Philosophers Series) This item is, like the other numbers in this series, intended to give a clear general description of a philosopher’s views without entering into either details or the details of controversies. The author succeeds in attaining these goals. His analysis of Bergson’s theory of laughter is enlightening for its insights into laughter theorists influenced by Bergson.

Yvon Brès. “L’avenir du judéo-christianisme (suite en fin).” Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger, 1, January-March, 2002, 55-83. “The first part of this paper was studying, for this coming century, a new Judeo-Christianism compatible with contemporary atheism, since it would consist in some kind of theatrical practice. This new form of Judeo-Christianism would keep from tradition no longer the metaphysical and historical faith but the couple sin/redemption, lived as some kind of positive illusion. One now attempts to determine what maybe the part played in such a process by Kant, Bergson, Freud, Pope John Paul II and a few contemporary French philosophers (namely, Michel henry, Alain Juranville, Jean-Luc Marion).” Philosopher’s Index, 36.2, 2002, p. 178.


stretching towards philosophy on the one hand and towards practitioners’ lay theories on the other. We rely on Bergson’s ontology of creative evolution so as to build a ‘quad-motor’ theory explaining the process of development in organizations and to formulate propositions on the relationships between organizational development and the lay ontology of organizational members. Then we illustrate the links between philosophy and practice, and show how the analysis of a narrative by a practitioner (Michel Barthod, Chief Executive of Salomon, a high-growth company of the 1980’s) can elicit his lay ontology, thus making possible future empirical corroborations of the above propositions. This narrative is in line with Bergson’s of creative (dialectical) evolution, and also contains the concepts of an integrative framework explaining organizational development. In the third section, inspired by the philosopher Henri Bergson and by the practitioner Michel Barthod, we build such a framework in which becoming and relating are two central intertwined concepts.”


Milič Čapek. “Henri Bergson: On the Way to Real Time.” Trans. Jakub. Filosoficky Casopis, 50.2, 2002, 229-248. “This article attempts to present Bergson’s analysis of time. It begins by reconstructing his starting point, i.e. his criticism of the idea of homogeneous time. This negative procedure is followed by a positive discovery of real time, of ‘duration’. This article then explains the core of Bergson’s analysis, which consists of three propositions: the past in some way ‘survives’, the present is not a point without extension, and finally, the future is only an artificial reconstruction or absolute novelty.” Philosopher’s Index, 36.4, 2002, 170.

Milič Čapek. “Process and Personality in Bergson’s Thought.” in Personalism Revisited: Its Proponents and Critics. Ed. Thomas O. Buford. New York: Rodopi NY, 2002, 291-304. “This paper which was presented to the Personalist Discussion Group in 1969 was first published in The Philosophical Forum, 17 (1959-1960), 25-42. There are three persistent themes in Bergson’s thought: theoretical self-knowledge, time, and freedom. He rejected associationism and its notion of mental “states”. With James, Bergson rejected the notion of ‘the knife-edge present’ and the substantial fictitious ego. Bergson espoused a dynamic personalism which was influenced by William James. Later Bergson, in close contact with James, argued for the idea of a supra-personal or supra-individual life (‘cosmic-self’). Like Brightman and Whitehead, Bergson held to the view that God was not omnipotent and omniscient: the power attributes are less important than the moral qualities.” Philosopher’s Index, 36.4, 2002, 170.


Douglas L. Donkel. “Deleuze’s Challenge: Thinking International Difference.” Philosophy Today, 46.3, Fall, 2002, 323-329. “This essay seeks to clarify and supplement Deleuze’s efforts to introduce a conception of difference that is internal to and constitutive of identity and being thereby rendering it irreducible to the selfsame. With reference to Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and Spinoza, the analysis proceeds by focusing on a specific instance of qualitative or nonnumerical difference that is shown to internally constitute the very form of identity, while further establishing ontological consonance or the univocity of being.” Philosopher’s Index, 37.2, 2003, 196.


Robin Durie. “Creativity and Life.” Review of Metaphysics, 56.2, December, 2002, 367-389. “Complexity Theory challenges the reductionist hegemony of neo-Darwinism. This paper explores the similarities between the position developed by such thinkers as Kaufman and Goodwin and that of Bergson, in his critique of mechanist and finalist interpretations of neo-Darwinism. The ultimate aim is to ascertain whether Bergsonism could offer a metaphysics appropriate to complexity science. It is argued that this end may be achieved on the basis of a ‘relational ontology’ developed from Bergson’s theory of multiplicities. In conclusion, the question is posed whether such a relational ontology offers the means for sustaining Deleuze’s ‘differential’ interpretation of Bergsonism.” Philosopher’s Index, 37.2, 2003, 199.


Gregor Fitzi. “Société et morale sous l’angle de la philosophie de la vie. Une comparaison franco-allemande.” *Annales bergsoniennes I*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002, 243-264. Eng. trans. “Society and Morality From the Vantage-point of a Philosophy of Life. A Franco-German Comparison.” This is a comparison of the Lebensphilosophies of Bergson and Georg Simmel which, the author contends, while they derive from the same philosophical paradigm, are developed in very different fashions.


Jean-Christophe Goddard. “Exception mystique et santé moyenne de l’esprit dans *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion*.” *Annales bergsoniennes I*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002, 214-229. Eng. trans. “The Mystical Exception and Normal Mental Health in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*.” This is a remarkably perceptive reflection on the place of neurosis in ordinary human life from a Bergsonian standpoint. For Bergson neurosis is understood as a failure to remain attached to life (hence an inability to act, to pursue a “normal” life). Often the neuroses of a person or society are dealt with through a “fabulative function”, which creates myths. The mystic’s attachment to life, however, is more complete, more definitive than this. It involves a fundamental transcendence of the crowd, the social matrix.


Laura Hengehold. “Staging the Non Event: Material for Revolution in Kant and Foucault.” *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 28.3, 2002, 337-58. “This paper addresses the Kantian origin of the idea that ‘revolution’, however defined (or deferred) is the only plausible image for effective historical engagement capable of motivating spectators to action. Drawing on Foucault’s inquiries into conditions for the possibility of ‘heroizing’ the present, I examine two frameworks for understanding the ontological impact of historical models for ‘eventfulness’, those offered by Heidegger and Bergson.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 36.4, 2002, 206.


Christopher S. Jones. “A Lost Tradition: Nishida Kitarō, Henri Bergson and Intuition in Political Philosophy.” *Social Science Japan Journal*, 5, 2002, 55-70. The author argues against the widespread view that intuitive approaches to philosophy are either intellectually inferior or
inherently dangerous. This view, stemming as it does from a coopting of “intuition” by German and Japanese militarists, needs to be re-examined and rejected.


Stephan Linstead. “Organization as Reply: Henri Bergson and Causal Organization Theory.” Organization, 9, No. 1, 2002, 95-112. This paper introduces a symposium on Bergson’s creative evolution, arguing for the continuing relevance and vitality of Bergson’s work for organization studies: “It is argued that Bergson’s work would view organization as part of its object, a process that is changed by that engagement in a nondialectical conversation with it. Organizing, then, is a reply to the object, an act that creates its own possibility. Calculative and formalistic organization theory fails to take account of the importance of intuition as a form of knowing, responsive to the shifting nature of both its object and itself over time, which a causal organization theory, on Bergsonian lines, would do. However, there is no Bergsonian system or programme to be offered here—merely an introduction to some of the rich veins of ideas in his work, and an invitation to engage with them—an invitation which, like all invitations, invites reply.”

Brian Massumi. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002, viii, 328. The author protests against the models of the body in contemporary cultural theory, insisting that these have neglected the most significant characteristics of existence-movement, affect and sensation. He renews and reassesses Wm. James’ radical empiricism and Bergson’s theory of perception through the lenses of Deleuze, Gualtari, and Foucault.


Anthony O’Shea. “The (Revolution) of New Product Innovation.” *Organization*, 9.1, 2002, 133-125. The author states: “…management and engineering literatures on new product innovation conceive it as evolving by some form of biological evolutionary mechanism: punctuated equilibrium, neo-Lamarckian genetic transfer or neo-Darwinian natural selection. These accounts hold out the possibility of ‘best practice’ models based on particular views of time and progress that are too
limiting to adequately explain radical innovation in terms of a process rather than the ‘final’ product. I then turn to the works of Henri Bergson to consider the processual quality of innovation.”

Juan Padilla. “¿Puede dares por zanjada la controversia Bergson-Einstein acerca del tiempo?” Pensamiento, 58.222, 2002, 461-69. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Can We Take the Controversy Between Bergson and Einstein Concerning Temporality to Remain Open?”


André Robinet, Nelly Bruyère, Brigitte Sitbon-Peillon, Suzanne Stern-Gillet, eds. Correspondances de Henri Bergson. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002, 1472. This is a massive and detailed presentation of Bergson’s correspondence. It is the successor of Mélanges (1972). The contents of this work are not presented in this bibliography.

bringing together, editing, and publishing the remainder of Bergson’s letters and a multitude of other uncollected materials remains to be completed. This will require the creation of a whole research group dedicated to the task. (Note: The compiler of the present bibliography is entirely in agreement with Prof. Robinet. What remains to be done can not possibly be done by an individual, as regards either unpublished bergsoniana or Bergson’s bibliography. (Ed.))


M. Scott Ruse. “The Critique of Intellect: Henri Bergson’s Prologue to an Organic Epistemology.” Continental Philosophy Review, 35.3, 2002, 281-302. “Bergson never dared to entitle his own work in such a fashion. However, his philosophical working on the workings of intelligence deserves such a high title. This article seeks to elucidate Bergson’s contribution to philosophy in terms of his anticipation of several developments in human understanding. The article seeks to display how Bergson’s work is not only a precursor to constructivism but lays the foundation for a modified constructivism that can achieve a rigorous philosophical level. The proposed ground for the intellect is the organic. Such a foundational would ultimately justify an evolutionary epistemology, in that, the structuring of the organic is evolving and thus the structuring of intellect would likewise evolve. Clarifying such an epistemology may aid in developing Deleuze’s an-organic Bergsonism.” Philosopher's Index, 37.3, 2003, 292.


Steven G. Smith. “The Mind-Matter Inversions: Bergson’s Conception of Mental and Material Reality.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 40.2, 2002, 293-314. “The development of a metaphysics of actuality is reconstructed from Plato to Bergson to capitalize on Bergson’s suggestion that mind and matter can be understood as inversions of each other, or as respectively a centering and extending of terms. This view avoids the pitfalls of reductive monism and disjunctive dualism: it is dyadic (cognizant at once of mind-matter difference and of the unity of reality), symmetrical (not apt to close off prematurely our reckoning with complexity and change, on either side) and correlational (able to track relations of form, energy and sequence between mental and material terms).” Philosopher’s Index, 38.1, 2004, 325-26.


Patricia Verdeau. “La personnalité. Pour relire l’œuvre bergsonienne.” Diotima, 30, 2002, 54-71. “Bergsonian work: read sub specie durationis asks what we are and beyond the articulation between metaphysics and psychology. In the foundation of personality theory, Bergsonian philosophy questions thought based on space, which occults lived duration, as in the case of Spencerian evolutionism. Intelligence gives precedence to the metaphysical intuition of personality as creative continuity. Personality allows us to consider the being of duration and the being as duration. Great creative personalities, whose existence is an appeal, carry metaphysic truth, and involve a new thought about relations between the world, the ego, and God.” Philosopher’s Index, 37.4, 2003, 297.


Martin Wood. “Mind the Gap? A Processual Reconsideration of Organizational Knowledge.” Organization, 9.1, 2002, 151-171. The author states: “On Henri Bergson’s view, the flux of time is reality itself and the things we study are the things which flow. Unfortunately, popular literature on organizational knowledge is accustomed to seeing the moving by means of the immobile. They perceive knowledge as an already organized state that can be transferred between spatially distinct points. Drawing on Bergson’s theory of continual movement (Duration) and Deleuze’s concept of transversal communication, I challenge the ontological concern for knowledge production and use between the discrete parts of an organized system. Instead of seeing knowledge as the integration of derived points or positions, I advocate a threefold method of creative invocation in which production and use are considered as a living interpretation of foldings and movements that connect all ‘things’ at all places and times.”


Frédéric Worms. “Entre critique et métaphysique. La science chez Bergson et Brunschvicg.” Les philosophies et la science. Ed. Pierre Wagner. Paris: Gallimard, 2002. This item is translated into English by Robin MacKay in Angelaki, 10.2, August 2005, 39-57, as “Between Critique and Metaphysics”. The author’s abstract is as follows: This article discusses the role of science in the philosophies of Henri Bergson and Leon Brunschvicg. For them, science is a conquest and a subjective rupture in man. The different principles that establish a break between the endeavors of scientific thought and man’s knowledge and experience are examined.


2003

Arnaud François. “La volonté chez Bergson et Schopenhauer.” Methodos. Savoirs et textes, 4.4, 2003. (http://methodos.revues.org/document135.html.) An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Will in Bergson and Schopenhauer.” The author states: “One could find therefore, in the works of Bergson and Schopenhauer, two “ontologies of will”. But one must still specify what the two authors mean by the word “will”. Two major differences must be noted: for Schopenhauer, will is the thing in itself, while Bergson refuses the Kantian distinction between appearance and thing in itself. Second, for Schopenhauer the experience of will is suffering. Bergson, on the contrary, characterizes that experience as joy.”

José Maria Atencia Páez. “Ortega y Gasset, mediador de la técnica.” Argumentos de Razón Técnica, 6, 2003, 61-95. “This paper tries to establish the validity and present the Orteguian writings on technique, considered from a mainly anthropological point of view. It has taken us to assist to their relationship with reflections on related topics or time, present in the work of Bergson, Heidegger or Nietzsche. In another way, we try to show the continuity of the Orteguian reflection and the intimate connection of writings whose topics don’t seem at first sight to maintain relationship and whose production is very far away in time.” Philosopher's Index, 42.3, 2008, 318.


Moisés Barroso-Ramos. “La aventura de la immanencia en Bergson.” Laguna, 12, 2003, 115-126. “The immanantist élan contained in Bergsonism would be summarized in the word adventure. The adventure, however, is locked by spiritualist notions and especially by Bergson’s increasing theological preoccupation. In order both to perform the adventure of immanence and to defuse this preoccupation on the Bergsonian ontology we would need to embrace the virtual and the possible in a ‘circuit’. On that condition the future could receive a humanistic turn.” Philosopher’s Index, 40.4, 2006, 335. Eng. trans. “The Adventure of Immanence in Bergson.”


Henri Bergson. “Creative Evolution (1907): Analysis and Life. Ed. F.T.C. Moore.” in The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader’s Guide. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, 467-73. “This chapter sets Bergson’s book Creative Evolution in its historical context. There were contrasting reactions by William James and Bertrand Russell, with James praising it as a death-blow to ‘intellectualism’, and Russell attacking it for the limits it placed on ‘analysis’ as opposed to ‘intuition’. A summary account of the work indicates how it fits in with the rest of Bergson’s oeuvre, and shows that neither of these reactions was quite right, since Bergson practiced and respected ‘analysis’, and the work of the natural sciences, but considered that the intellect had evolved for pragmatic rather than Platonic purposes.” Philosopher’s Index, 37.2, 2003, 258.


Sophie Coeuré and Frédéric Worms, Musée Albert Kahn. Henri Bergson et Albert Kahn. Correspondance. Pref. Jeanne Beausoleil. Strasbourg: Musée departmental Albert Kahn, 2003, 155. An English translation of the title of this item is: Henri Bergson and Albert Kahn: Correspondence. It consists of a series of letters between Bergson and his former student Albert Kahn, from 1879 through 1893. Kahn, a visionary and highly successful businessman, founded the Société Autour du Monde, whose goal was to provide inter-national schooling for young students. All correspondence in this item is presented in this bibliography.

Eric Dickson. “Cassirer, Whitehead, and Bergson: Explaining the Development of the Symbol.” Process Studies, 32.1, Spring-Summer, 2003, 79-93. “The purpose of this paper is to explain the development of symbolic functioning in the work of Ernst Cassirer and then to enhance that work to provide a more complete account. In particular, I focus on the transition from the most basic level, expression, to the middle level, representation. Cassirer’s account lacks a metaphysical foundation, and I attempt to provide one by employing both Whitehead and Bergson. Ultimately I appeal to Bergson’s élan vital to explain how the transition is effected. More specifically, the increase in durational moments allows for the possibility of representation.” Philosopher’s Index, 38.3, 2004, 244.

José Ezcurdia. “Algunas consideraciones relativas a la forma de la intuición en la philosophia de Henri Bergson.” Topicos (Mexico), 24, 2003, 31-70. “This article deals with some of the most important notions that constitute the form of intuition in Bergson’s philosophy, in order to proceed to its reconstruction in such a way that makes clear its determination under the form of love as charity, and its expression in the life-man binomial as an origin of the Divine Identity amongst the notions of natura naturata and natura naturata on one side, and of procession and conversion on the other, is shown as the core which determines the fundamental structure of the binomial mentioned above.” Philosopher’s Index, 41.2, 2007, p. 347. Eng. trans. “Some Considerations Relative to the Form of Intuition in Bergson’s Philosophy.”

David S. Fitz Simmons. “I See, He Says, Perhaps, on Time: Vision, Voice, Hypothetical Narration, and Temporality in William Faulkner’s Fiction.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 2003, 272. This study, which deals with narrative techniques in Faulkner’s writings, concludes that the effect of Faulkner’s techniques suggests a temporal understanding similar to that of Henri Bergson.

Luis M. Agusto González. “Esbozo de un misticismo en Henri Bergson.” Paideia, 24.64, 2003, 185-206. Eng. trans. “Sketch of a Mysticism in Henri Bergson.” The author states: “Contrary to materialist reductionism on a biological basis, the Bergsonian idea of religion is articulated and makes full sense in the light of a dimorphic theory of the religious phenomenon: two qualitatively different ways of understanding religion or to religions of irreconcilable nature. The dimorphism found in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion is presented only for a philosophic analysis, not from an intuition integrating point of view. Our purpose is to offer an interpretation of one of these sources of religion: dynamic religion or mysticism, as well as trying to clarify, as such as possible, the origin of both sources of religion.” Philosopher’s Index, 38.1, 2003, 242.

Edward J. Grippe. “Evolution and Emergence and Scientific Perspective.” Contemporary Philosophy, 26.1-2, 2003, 48-59. “This considers the claim that science can offer an account of the world that is free from the subjective, the irrational and cultural bias. My question is what makes the scientific metaphor seem privileged and thus fruitful? I will use the medium of evolutionary emergence to highlight the debate between spiritual emergence advocates (Bergson and Naser) and their reductionist opponents (Dennet and Dawkins). Finding both sides unsatisfying, I look to Dewey’s pragmatism for a possible solution.” Philosopher’s Index, 39.4, 2005, 303.

Gregory Harmati. Le problème de la réduction : essai d’interprétation de la méthode de la réduction dans les travaux de Henri Bergson à l’aide de la phénoménoéologie d’Edmund Husserl. Ville neuve

Antoine Hatzenberger. “Open Society and Bolos: A Utopian Reading of Bergson’s ‘Final Remarks’.” Culture and Organization, 9.1, March, 2003, 43-58. “The Last chapter of Henri Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion can still today be read as a powerful incentive to reflect upon alternative models of social organization. This article compares Bergson’s ‘Final Remarks’ and P.M.’s Bolo’bolo in order to demonstrate how Bergson’s farseeing economic analysis and plea for peace can concur with more recent radical political criticism and potentially lay the ground for concrete projects, Bolo’bolo can in many ways be interpreted as a response to Bergson’s call for cultural change 50 years before. To advocate the implementation of a worldwide network of small communities or ‘bolos’ is to follow the inspiration of the ‘open society’ agenda, thus contributing to keeping the utopian spirit alive.” (Author’s Abstract)


Wahida Khandker. “Bergson, Kant, and the Evolution of Metaphysics.” Pli, 14, 2003, 103-124. The author provides a point-by-point analysis of Kant’s and Bergson’s theories of knowledge, paying special attention to their concepts of purpose (in relation to mechanistic causality). She concludes: “... the question remains as to whether Bergson’s alternative privileging of an image, rather than a concept, of a ‘vital principle’ in the examination of living processes, provides metaphysics with adequate means for describing ‘creative evolutionism’.


Leonard Lawler. “The Ontology of Memory: Bergson’s Reversal of Platonism.” Epopehe, 8.1, 2003, 69-102. “The question posed in this essay, following Heidegger, is: does Bergson manage not only to reverse Platonism but also twist free of it? The answer presented here is that Bergson does twist free, which explains Deleuze’s persistent appropriations of Bergsonian thought. Memory in Bergson turns out to be not a memory of an idea, or even of the good, which is one, but a memory of multiplicity. Therefore, Bergson’s memory is really, from a Platonistic standpoint, forgetfulness or even, a countermemory.” (edited) Philosopher’s Index, 38.3, 2004, 298.
Leonard Lawler. *The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics.* London: Continuum, 2003, 154. Bergson’s concept of “duration”, the author argues, stands as a challenge to phenomenology (since Bergson denies that “presences” is defined by “presence to consciousness”); to ontology (since, contrary to Heidegger’s accusation, Bergson’s inversion of Platonism privileges not the present, but memory); to ethics (since it escapes Levinas’ insistence on intersubjectivity and the logic of alterity). The author’s analysis of Bergson’s image of the cone (pp. 43-59) is extremely clear and unusually insightful. It is, the author states, inspired by J. Hyppolite’s “Aspects Diverse de la mémoire chez Bergson” (1949), which appears in translation on pp. 112-127. The author’s interpretation of *The Two Sources* with reference to *Matter and Memory* is equally clear and original.


F.C.T. Moore. “Bergson.” in *The Cambridge History of Philosophy.* Ed. Thomas Baldwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 63-73. “Bergson and Russell revived interest in analysis. Russell emphasized its liberating power, Bergson drew attention to its tricky limits. Bergson’s notion of durée is described, and its cautions against the spatialization of time, which permitted processes as made up of constituents. His notion of intuition is described. It enabled Bergson to go beyond earlier issues about the mind, to discuss evolutionary and relativity theory. But he warned against viewing philosophy as a handmaiden to scientific work. The intellect developed in evolution as a pragmatic instrument. In philosophy we reverse this normal direction of thought to think backwards.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 38.2, 2004, 283.


John Mullarkey. “The Rule of Dichotomy: Bergson’s Genetics of Matter.” *Pli*, 104, 2003, 125-43. This is a joint analysis of Bergson’s theory of matter and his concept of biological evolution, showing that, given their profound interdependence, they can not be understood as constituting a dualism: “Both the processes of organic life and of death are immanent in the *élan*. It is as much a theory of biology as it is a theory of ‘metabiology’.” p. 143.

Francesca Murphy. “Gilson and Maritain: Battle Over the Beautiful.” in *A Thomistic Tapestry: Essays in Memory of Etienne Gilson*. E. Peter Redpath. New York: Rodopi, 2003, 95-106. “The aesthetics of Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain were both influenced by Henri Bergson, but in different ways. Gilson learned metaphysical realism from Bergson. Maritain absorbed Bergson’s epistemology of intuition. Maritain argued that an artist creates in virtue of ‘poetic intuition’, a precognitive grasp of beauty reproduced in the artwork. For Maritain an artwork is an analogate of the real world. For Gilson, an artwork is nonrepresentative to the extent that it aims to be beautiful. The divergence of their aesthetics reflects their views of God’s knowability. Maritain’s God is the unknown.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 37.3, 2003, 270.

Greg O. Niemeyer. “The Function of Stereotypes in Visual Perception.” *Documenta Opthomologica*, 106, 2003, 61-66. The author proposes a cultural modification of our modality of perception, arguing for a shift in our emphasis of stereotypes towards the recognition of flows, processes and durations. He utilizes the work of both Bergson and Heidegger as “the philosophical basis for this modification” and cites several empirical and experimental examples to illustrate such modifications in practice.

Hernán Neira. “Créacion y reproducción de la libertad en la obra de Jean-Paul Sartre.” *Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica*, 41.104, 2003, 85-96. “Taking as point of departure the insufficiently studied link between Bergson and Sartre, this paper brings to the fore the creative character that morality has for both thinkers. That allows for the reinterpretation of the fundamental characteristics of the Sartrean concept of freedom. Finally, the paper addresses the question stated at the conclusion of *Being and Nothingness*: can freedom take itself as its own end? This essay responds in the affirmative: but then it shows the necessity of showing a theory of freedom as producer of freedom, of the broadened reproduction of freedom. This concept, not developed by Sartre, deepens the Bergsonian inspiration in the theory of freedom, and at the same time remains faithful to the essence of Sartrean philosophy.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 40.1, 2006, 437. Eng. trans. “Creation and the Reproduction of Liberty in the Work of Jean-Paul Sartre.”

B. Neveu. “Bergson et l’Index.” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, No. 4, 2003, 543-51. Abstract.— “Since 1998 the congregation for the Doctrine of Faith which is the heiress of the archives of the Holy Office’s congregation and together with them of those of the Index congregation, has opened up to consulting the historic collections which is in its possession. Until this very recent date these documents were strictly out of reach. From now on the historian finds himself in quite a new situation and is acceding to information that may throw a light on some still imperfectly known episodes. Thus an edition of the whole materials regarding the Alfred Loisy’s condemnation, that has been pronounced by the Holy Office’s decree on the 16th of December 1903, should soon be brought to light. Compared to this voluminous dossier the thin Index fascicle relative to the first three of Henri Bergson’s books holds a very modest place: yet its disclosure should bring out some points so far unknown by the philosopher’s biographers.”

Thomas Osborne. “What is a Problem?” *History of the Human Sciences*, 16.4, 2003, 1-17. “By way of a selective comparison of the work of Georges Canguilhem and Henri Bergson on their respective conceptions of ‘problematology’, this article argues that the centrality of the notion of the ‘problem’ in each can be found in their differing conceptions of the philosophy of life and the living being. Canguilhem’s model, however, ultimately moves beyond or away from (legislative) philosophy and epistemology towards the question of ethics in so far as his vitalism is a means of signaling the refusal of the supposition that all of the dimensions of life are or might be in our possession. Michel Foucault’s project, though directed for the most part to very different subject-matter, worked out a similar logic in the historical problematology of the sciences of ‘man’ and mentalities of government and power.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 38.4, 2004, 309.

Anthony O’Shea. “(R)evolving New Product Innovation?” *Process Studies*, 32.2, 2003, 244-57. “In this paper, I argue that the management and engineering literatures on new product innovation conceive it as evolving by some form of biological evolutionary mechanism: punctuated equilibrium, neo-Lamarckian genetic transfer or neo-Darwinian natural selection. These accounts hold out the possibility of ‘best practice’ models based on particular views of time and progress that are too limiting to adequately explain radical innovation in terms of a process rather than a ‘final’ product. I then turn to the works of Henri Bergson to consider how these may help us too consider the processual quality of innovation.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 38.3, 2004, 327.


Krzysztof Pezdek. “The Problem of Teleology in H. Bergson’s Philosophy.” (In Polish) *Sudia Philosophiae Cristianae*, 39.1, 2003, 135-67. “The issue of teleology often crops up in Bergson’s philosophy. The author of *Creative Evolution* analyzes both inner and external teleologies. However, he tries to spell out the investigative values of the teleological interpretation of reality. Bergson’s purpose was not only to analyze the very nature of teleology but to analyze the doctrines of mechanism and teleology. This critique had to reveal weaknesses of both these doctrines. He considers the nature of teleology in three dimensions: ontological, epistemological and methodological. Such—one may say—complimentary attitudes toward teleology allow him to expose several important features which establish the originality of this phenomenon but also its restrictions.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 39.4, 2005, 378.


Llan Safit. Movement as Concept and as Image in Philosophy and in Modernist Literature. Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2003, 264. The author deals, as examples, with the writings of Uri Nissan Gnessin and Samuel Beckett. He argues that their work demonstrates movement in the form that Bergson and Hegel thought it: an activity of the mind that finds its physical correlate in the physical world.

Milos Sevcik. “Bergson’s Conception of Art: Art as a Reference to the Reality of Time. (In Czech).” Estetika, 39.3-4, 2003, 159-194. “This study pursues the development of Bergson’s conception of art in its relation to his conception of time as ‘real duration’. The author primarily analyzes possibilities of art as ‘hypnosis’ or ‘suggestion’ as a moment or a part of evolution of duration which forms the profound reality of human consciousness. However, art can not really express ‘duration’. Subsequently the study concentrates on the relation between art and duration, which Bergson conceives as godly consciousness creating the universe. Art as ‘rhythm’ demonstrates the power of this consciousness, which is the universal ‘duration’.” Philosopher’s Index, 38.4, 2004, 336.


Yannis Prélorentzos. “Introduction à la philosophie d’Henri Bergson (Introduction to Bergson’s Philosophy).” in The Teaching of Philosophy at a Distance. (In Greek) Ioannina: Department of Philosophy, 2003, 47-78.


Margaret A. Simons. “Bergson’s Influence on Beauvoir’s Philosophical Methodology.” in The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir. Ed. Claudia Card. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 107-128. “Having discovered in Beauvoir’s unpublished student diary her early enthusiasm for Henri Bergson’s Time and Free Will, I set out to investigate Bergson’s influence on Beauvoir’s early philosophical methodology. Analyzing Beauvoir’s metaphysical novel, She Came to Stay (1943) and Bergson’s Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution, I identified three Bergsonian themes in Beauvoir’s methodology: the use of the novel as a vehicle for doing philosophy; second, an interest in exposing the distortions in perception and thought; and third, the turn to immediate experience and the disclosure of freedom.” Philosopher’s Index, 38.1, 2004, 323.

Demet Kurtoğlu Tasdelen. “Bergson’s Conception on Metaphysical Freedom.” (In Turkish) Tartismalari, 31, 2003, 69-86. “In this article I discuss how language, society and our habits play a role in Bergson’s concept of freedom, his distinction between the superficial self and the fundamental self within the context of freedom, his ideas concerning determinism and libertarianism and the conception of causality. I end up by claiming that freedom in Bergson’s philosophy is a choice. Whether we are free or not depends on the way we conceive reality. If we conceive reality only spatially, we can only understand homogeneous reality whereas acting freely means to conceive reality heterogeneously.” Philosopher’s Index, 38.2, 2004, 329.
Demet Kurtoğlu Tasdelen. “Bergson’s Conception of Time: Its Effects on a Possible Philosophy of Life.” Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, Middle East Technical University, July, 2003, 215. “The aim of this study is to show how a possible philosophy of life can arise from Bergson’s conception of time. In realizing this aim I appeal to Hadot’s description of the paradox of the human condition.”

Demet Kurtoğlu Tasdelen. “Conforming to Society or Understanding Reality?” (in Turkish) Felsefe Tartısmaları, 30, 2003, 109-15. “In this article I claim that the question ‘conforming to society or understanding reality?’ is a question one can not avoid asking within Bergson’s philosophy. It arises from our thinking tendency, the habit of thought. Based on this the two kinds of individual come out: the individual who lives according to the habit of thought and therefore conforms to society and the individual who, by trying to dispense with the habit of thought by trying to understand reality in intuition, avoids conforming to society. The real metaphysician seems to be an idealized metaphysician who succeeds both in conforming to society and in understanding reality.” Philosopher’s Index, 38.2, 2004, 329.


Luis António Umbelino. “A Naturaleza am Merleau-Ponty. Prolegómenos a uma leitura das Notes de Cours du Collège de France, 1956-1960.” Revista Port: Filosof, 59.3, 2003, 713-30. “The aim of this paper is to shed light on some of the central themes that Merleau-Ponty pursued throughout his Notes de Cours du Collège de France, 1956-1960, thus presenting what might be considered the main features of Merleau-Ponty’s meditation on the concept of nature. The paper starts by underlining how much nature is part of the ontological quest of Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy. According to Merleau-Ponty, nature needs to be seen as a leaf of “Being” or the “sensible” itself, present in every living being and in its environment, but also as inscribed in the body of the painter, beyond any noetic effort, as lived space-time, aesthesiological echo, savage thinking or an experience of the universal sensed as an ontological continuity without losses.” Philosopher’s Index, 38.2, 2004, 334. Eng. trans. “Nature in Merleau-Ponty: Prolegomena to a Reading of Course Notes, Collège de France, 1956-1960.”

Richard Vernon. “Bergson’s The Two Sources Revisited: The Moral Possibility of Nationalism.” Contemporary Political Theory, 2.3, 2003, 271-88. “Beyond borrowing the terms ‘open’ and ‘closed’ societies, political theorists have not had much time for Henri Bergson’s book The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932, English translation 1935). However, the recent flowering of interest in liberal nationalism provides a context for understanding what the book has to contribute. For it takes up the relation between the nation-state and ‘special ties’ on the one hand and ‘cosmopolitan’ obligations on the other. Although both nationalists and cosmopolitans will find things to welcome in Bergson’s book, its most original contribution may be its claim that nationalists can not consistently resist the demands of cosmopolitan morality, for the nation-state already draws upon it for its legitimatization.” (edited) Philosopher’s Index, 38.3, 2004, 380.


Calvin Yu. *Cezanne and Bergson*. (in Chinese) Pref. Vincent Shen. Taipei: Cultuspeak, 2003, 244. The author states: “The main crux of this book is to discuss the analogy between Paul Cezanne’s late work and Henri Bergson’s philosophy, thereby providing those who are interested in or troubled by the artist’s motivation a Bergsonian interpretation. I would then like to proceed from the basis of this case to outline Bergson’s influence on modern painting in the early 20th century. I will adopt the method of contrast in analyzing both their notions of “intuition and reason” epistemology-wise as well as “appearance and reality” epistemology-wise. This thesis will also compare their respective use of abstract philosophical symbols and concrete artistic symbols. In sum, aside from arguing the intensive analogy between Cezanne and Bergson, this thesis will also point out that Bergson’s philosophical development continued to have influences on some of Cezanne’s artistic successors. This included, but was not limited to the main proponents of such artistic movements as Fauvism, Cubism, and Futurism. Consequently, a principle characteristic of early 20th century French painting could be interpreted as the multiple formal expressions and innovative developments of “Bergsonian style”, or the crystallization of Bergsonian spiritual-positivism.

2004

Andrew Aitken. “An ‘Applied Rationalism’ of Time: A Reinvestigation of the Relationship Between Bachelard and Bergson-Deleuze.” *Pli*, 15, 2004, 76-102. This is a careful analysis of Gaston Bechelard’s concept of duration and his various responses to Bergson. The author sidelines works in which Bachelard directly attacks Bergson. Both philosophers agree in the analysis of the open and dynamic nature of science and in “an intuition of radical difference in the infinitely small.” p. 102. They diverge over their views of nature, which for Bachelard is absurdinhuman.


Paul Atkinson. “Bordering Duration: The Shifting Surfaces of Materiality and Corporeality in Bergson.”
Doctoral Thesis, Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, Monash University,
Melbourne, Australia, 2004, 274.

José María Atencia Páez. “Razón, intuición y experiencia de la vida: Coincidencia y divergencias entre H.
“In this paper a comparison of some central elements of the philosophies of H. Bergson and J.
Ortega and Gasset is tried. After analyzing their coincidences and divergences we will establish
their common ownership to a line of development of European metaphysics that begins with
Intuition and Experience of Life: Coincidence and Divergence between H. Bergson and J. Ortega
and Gasset.”

Henri Bah. “Les hérois bergsoniens et la manifestation du sens de l’être.” Horizons Philosophiques, 15.1,

analysis of the factors which separate Bergsonian intuition from Husserlian phenomenological
reduction, an analysis which includes an examination of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of
Bergson. In the end, the author asserts that Bergson’s standpoint, which is limited to the
organism’s need to survive and endure, does not make a place for life as essentially desire.

Eng. trans. God the Creator or Creative Evolution. This item was originally published (Paris:
Laurier) in 1997.

Hervé Barreau. Séparer et rassembler. Quand la philosophie dialogue avec les sciences. Chennevières-
Reversibility.” The author argues that one can find many supports in contemporary science and
philosophy for Bergson’s belief in the irreversibility of time. Among those thinkers cited are: O.
Costa de Beaugard, S. Watanabe, A. Pacault, R. Thom, and A. Kastler.

Sébastien Blanc. “Comme elle même et en elle-même, ce n’est pas la même chose, la perception chez
305-332. Eng. Trans. “As Itself and In Itself Are Not the Same Thing: Perception in Husserl
and Bergson.” This essay is unique in analyzing the difficulties inherent in the theories of perception
of both Bergson and Husserl. In both there is a strong and unresolved tension between subjects
and the objective, mind and matter, to whose resolution both continued to return. The author’s
comparisons of Bergson and Husserl are of real value.

Arnaud Bouaniche. “Origine et histoire dans le moment philosophique des années 1930. Les deux sources
de la morale et de la religion (1932) et la Crisis de Husserl (1935-1936).” Annales bergsoniennes II.
Philosophical Moment of the 1930’s: The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932) and
Husserl’s Crisis (1935-1936).” The author seeks a profound kinship between Bergson and
Husserl, a kinship not found in the specific comparison of their texts. Both insist on the
importance of original individuals, a universal collective horizon open to these individuals, a
collective transformation of humanity. Three terms characterize their approach to these three
factors: novelty, act, and life. The author concludes that, nonetheless, contrasts between phenomenology and process metaphysics remain.”


Stephen Crocker. “The Past is to Time What the Idea is to Thought or What in General is the Past in General?” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology,* 35.1, 2004, 42-53.


Robin Durie. “The Mathematical Basis of Bergson’s Philosophy.” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 35, no. 1, 2004, 54-67. “This paper begins by reviewing Russell’s argument that Bergson mistakenly reduces number to spatiality, and relies on outdated theories of mathematical interpretation. It demonstrates that Bergson does not simply reduce number to spatiality, and that the sophistication of Bergson’s position derives from a nuanced interpretation of Riemannian mathematics. In fact, it is shown that space and number are assimilable only to the extent that they share the more basic characteristic of divisibility. The paper concludes by suggesting that the importance of Bergson’s recourse to Riemann consists in the ontological significance he gives to the Riemannian fundamental axioms to geometry.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 39.1, 2005, 273.

Robin Durie. “Nature From the Perspective of Immanence.” *Pli*, 2003, 144-158. This item concerns Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature in comparison with Bergson’s. Both philosophers, the author states, attempt to develop and “immanent ontology of nature.” Bergson, however, maintains a belief in “non-coincidence”; the impossibility of entering simply into nature-as-primordial. The author argues that Merleau-Ponty failed to understand Bergson’s notion of difference, taking it to mean division.

Elie During. “‘A History of Problems’: Bergson and the French Epistemological Tradition.” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 35, no. 1, 2004, 4-23. The author argues that the so-called “French Epistemological Tradition”, though defined by its anti-Bergsonism, contained an unavowed Bergsonian heritage from its beginnings in the 1930’s until now. The author analyzes this unavowed heritage in the divergent strands of French philosophy in the 20th century. This is a searching, careful, and convincing study. (Ed.)


Arnaud François. “Histoire de la mémoire et histoire de la métaphysique.” *Annales bergsoniennes II*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, 17-40. This is an introduction to a serious of previously unpublished lectures by Bergson (published here, pp. 41-149, and cited in the part of
this bibliography devoted to items by Bergson). Eng. trans. “The History of Memory and the History of Metaphysics.”


Sandro Kobal Fornazari. “O Bergsonismo de Gilles Deleuze.” Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia, 27.2, 2004, 31-50. “The text is an interpretation of Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of Henri Bergson’s philosophy. It aims to focus on subjects that Deleuzean philosophy will return to, developing them in Difference and Repetition and from this work. Among the most outstanding, we find the affirmative ontology subject that involves the passage from virtual to actual though being differentiation process. Being does not stop to have existence to actualize itself, but it differentiates itself in this process, being individualized as things. Being is thus pre-individual and pre-subjective in Bergson, there should be a virtual coexistence of all different degrees in Bergson.” Philosopher’s Index, 39.4, 2005, 200.


Suzanne Guerlac. “The ‘Zigzag of a Doctrine: Bergson, Deleuze, and the Question of Experience.” Pli, 15, 2004, 34-53. The author first examines the state of French philosophy at the time Gilles Deleuze wrote Bergsonisme (1966). Deleuze’s Bergson had to be defended, even at significant cost, against the charge of being “phenomenological”. Intuition, characterized as a method, is
then separated from the experience of duration. To recover from Deleuze’s view of Bergson we must “…reintroduce the energies of contact (or experience) back into our reading of Bergson.” p. 37 For other critiques of Deleuze’s Bergson Cf. Mark B.N. Hansen (2004) and Pete A.Y. Gunter (2009).


Maria Rodica Iacobescu. “Intuition versus Intelligence in H. Bergson.” Rivista Româna di Studi Culturale (pe Internet), n. 4, 2004, 64-70. “Intuition for Henri Bergson is a wager. He has succeeded in demonstrating the falseness of many of the ideas of classical rationalism. This justified reaction against the excesses of scientism, an appeal to the continuity of our sentiment, thought, and potential thoughts.” The text of this item is in English.


Izilda Johanson. “Bergson e a busca do tempo perdido.” Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofica, 27, n. 2, 2004, 21-29. “Having as point of reference the works of Henri Bergson and from these, the relationship of the identity between freedom and creation, free and action and creative action, the purpose of this paper to bring to light some questions about the function of method to a philosophy which faces the art, the artist and the artistic activity as examples for which the knowledge of the real and the true are possible, and for this reason, take it as paradigms of the own philosophy. In other words, it interests one to give some steps in the direction of investigations of one wants and what a philosophy, which has profound affinities with art and, beyond this, can search to understand it in its essence, in its principles, and reveal its nature.” Philosopher’s Index, 39.4, 2005, 320. Eng. trans. “Bergson and In Search of Lost Time.”

Tomotaro Kaneko. “Bergson’s Theory of Creation and Fabrication.” Bigaku, 55.1, Summer, 2004, 1-13. “In the essay I propose an approach to his theory of art production, which is based on the difference and the relation between fabrication in producing art. In Bergsonism, creation means endless self-creation, and the way life exists. On the other hand, fabrication is defined as the action giving forms to materials in Creative Evolution (1907). According to Bergson, the object of fabrication relates to the confrontation between life creating itself and matters interacting each other inevitably. In this confrontation, fabrication supports creation by making ‘indeterminations’ within matters. I consider such difference and relationship between creation and fabrication could be found in Bergson’s art production theory (edited).” Philosopher’s Index, 39.2, 2005, 315.

Margarita Karkayanni. “On Certain Transitory Themes That Allow the Passage from Duration to the Intuition of Duration.” Pli, 15, 2004, 54-75. The author states: “In this text, we will focus on the conditions of the formation of the problem of life (and consequently of the problem of knowledge as well) through the Bergsonian idea of time (duration). In accordance with this task, we will illustrate those themes proper to Bergsonian time that give this dynamic and transitive character.” p. 35 The author examines the concept of duration in G. Deleuze, V. Jankélévitch, E. Levinas, Plotinus, and Kant.

Joshua Kavaloski. “The Fourth Dimension: Time in Modernist Novel.” Ph.D Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2004, 202. The author challenges the view that time in modernist novels involves subjectivity (instead of form and narrative) and as merely responding to the spirit of its times (Bergson, Einstein, Heidegger…).

Frédéric Keck. “Le primitif et le mystique chez Lévy-Bruhl, Bergson et Bataille.” Methodos, 3, 2003, 17 p. (http://methodos.revues.org/document111.html) The author’s abstract states: “The French human sciences at the beginning of the 20th century assimilate the figures of the mad person, the primitive and the child. This assimilation should not be interpreted as an opposition between the archaic and the developed, or the normal and the pathological, but, once the figure of the mystic is added to this list, in the sense of an opposition between rationality and its other. Three examples allow us to analyze the link between the primitive and the mystic: the sociology of Lévy-Bruhl, the metaphysics of Bergson, the literature of Bataille. The author shows that the link between the primitive and the mystic allows us to think a larger experience by opening it to an alterity. It also prepares the ground for an empty and formal experience that will be explored by structuralism.


Pavel Koubá. “Le mouvement entre temps et espace (Bergson aux prises avec sa découverte).” Annales bergsoniennes II. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, 207-225. Eng. Trans. “The Movement Between Time and Space (Bergson Grappling With the Difficulties of His Discovery)” Bergson struggled to overcome the sharp distinction drawn in his first work, Time and Free Will, between inner duration and outer space. From his second work Matter and Memory onwards “pure memory” and “pure perception” become limits of a single reality. The author, however, does not believe that Bergson was able to quite overcome his initial dualism.

remembering to the question of the nature of passed time. The author emphasizes that Bergson’s treatment of the relation of the topic of memory to the concepts of matter and image is close to Ricoeur’s examination of the topic of traces. The comparison of both philosophers shows that hermeneutics could offer the starting point for two important amendments to Bergson’s philosophy of time and memory: the introduction of the dimension of the future and of the collective aspect of memory.” (Author’s abstract)

Maria Lakka. “Duration, Rhythm, Present.” Pli, 15, 2004, 18-33. Starting from Bergson’s definition of duration as the preservation and prolongation of the past in the present, the author attempts to show how duration is prolonged into the present. In the first part she argues that the present “doubles itself and endures as the most contracted degree of the past.” In the second part she defines the Bergson past as a “virtual repetition of the whole.” In the third and final part she argues that to account for duration as a continuous creation in the present, we must account for the force of the future.

David Lapoujade. “Intuition and Sympathy in Bergson.” Trans. David Reggio. Pli, 15, 2004, 1-17. The author examines the manner in which Bergson relates the concept of sympathy with that of intuition. Intuition cannot be understood as sympathy. Rather: “…sympathy receives its condition from intuition while intuition receives its extension and generality from sympathy.” p. 17. The author relates reasoning from analogy to this epistemic duality.


Leonard Lawler. “Dieu et le concept. Une petite comparaison de Levinas et Deleuze à partir de Bergson.” Annales bergsoniennes II. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, 442-451. Eng. trans. “God and the Concept: A Brief Comparison of Levinas and Deleuze, Starting from Bergson.” Heidegger’s posing of the question of Being (1927) is, the author states, the turning-point of twentieth century philosophy, opening up a field of options for philosophy which includes the work of Levinas and Deleuze. The author treats Deleuze’s work as stemming from Bergson’s Matter and Memory, Levinas’ work as stemming from Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The main section of this work deals with the (problematic) approach to immanence and transcendence by Deleuze and Levinas.


Izar Lunacek. “The Way They Laughed.” in Slovak Phenomena, 13.47-48, 2004, 193-214. “Comparing Bergson’s and Freud’s theories of laughter, the essay reveals that despite their contrary positions in distributing attributes between the subject and the object of laughter. Bergson’s rational, dispassionate and self-conscious representative of life/society laughs at the unconscious, passionate individual, while Freud has the unconscious, socially disrupting tendency of the individual laughing at the inert inhibitions of society. They both conform to the division between subject and object, enabling them to refer laughter to a form of serious statement on behalf of the object in the effect of confirming the central notion of their respective theories (life, the unconscious tendency) and denying its other in the mocked object (the automation and inhibition). Bachtin’s theory reveals the possibility of converging the subject and object of laughter by making the former collective and the latter universal.” Philosopher’s Index, 39.4, 2005, 342.


John C. Mullarkey. “Creative Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Creativity.” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 35.1, 2004, 68-81. “Bergson asserts that ‘the true empiricism is the real metaphysics’ and that a ‘superior metaphysics’ must become ‘experience itself’. What can Bergson mean by this? Is he foreshadowing that deconstruction of the difference between the analytic and the synthetic? Moreover, how can he reconcile this reconfiguration of metaphysics as a superior empiricism without at the same time conceding philosophy’s traditional place to science? It is these questions that this paper examines by looking at the peculiarities of his view of a creative metaphysics and its concomitant notion of metaphysical possibility, which is what grounds this naturalized, nontranscendental notion of the metaphysical.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 39.1, 2005, 349-350.

John C. Mullarkey. “The Rule of Dichotomy: Bergson’s Genetics of Matter.” *Pli*, 15, 2004, 125-143. The author points out two contrasting views of Bergson. Is he a process philosopher (like Whitehead) or an existential phenomenologist (as is held by Levinas, Jankélévitch, and Merleau-Ponty)? In *Creative Evolution*, however, there is a seemingly reconciliation between naturalism and subjectivism. Bergson here proposes a philosophy of time prior to a philosophy of life, insisting that matter and life are two forms of movement: and *élan vital* co-engendered with an *élan matériel*, a genesis of matter. Given this duality, the question arises as to what subtends both matter and life. The author responds that is the dissociative character of the *élan* itself. The author parallels the present science of deterministic chaos with Bergsonian matter, complexity with Bergsonian life. (Cf. pp. 136-139 for this apt comparison)


Débora Cristina M. Pinto. “Bergson e os dualismos.” *Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia*, 27.1, 2004, 79-91. “This article is an introducing presentation of Bergson’s analysis of ontological dualism and his critical dialogue with the modern tradition. The proposal of metaphysical reconstruction demands a study of Cartesian dualism to dissolve the antithetical positions of conceptual thought. In this way Bergson’s philosophy makes an analytical dissolution of two domains of human experience and determines two domains of reality. Only the idea of duration can solve the tensions of Bergson’s dualism.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 39.4, 2005, 380. Eng. trans. “Bergson and his Dualisms.”


Bernard G. Prusak. “*Le rire* à nouveau: Rereading Bergson.” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 62.4, October, 2004, 377-388. “Although Henri Bergson’s 1900 *Le rire : essai sur la signification du comique* predates his *L’évolution créatrice* by seven years, the earlier book not only anticipates, but is already organized by the doctrine of the elan vital or ‘life drive’ that the latter book would elaborate. It is argued in this paper that Bergson’s metaphysics distorts *Le rire*’s account of laughter and the nature of the comic. A critical reading of this book, however, also finds in it insights that Bergson himself apparently did not see. Notably, we stand to gain new insight into the meaning of the scholastic proposition, *Homo est animal risibile.*” *Philosopher’s Index*, 39.2, 2005, 373.


the second of which reveals the duration of things underlying the world of ordinary experience. These two reductions are profoundly opposed to those of Husserl, for whom the world is not accepted as is but is put in question.


Yuko Rojas. “Space and Female Consciousness in Virginia Woolf’s Fiction: Idealist and Phenomenological Perspectives.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 2004. The author states: “This thesis begins by arguing that Bergson’s idea of duration…bears close resemblance to Woolf’s evocations of a continuously evolving totality of consciousness…” Much of her writing can be understood as an attempt to escape Schopenhauerian pessimism through a more optimistic vision resembling the theories of Bergson.


M. Scott Ruse. “Technology and the Evolution of the Human: From Bergson to the Evolution of Technology.” *Essays in Philosophy*, 6.1, 2005, 1-12. “Philosophy of Technology is gaining recognition as an important field of philosophic scrutiny. This essay addresses the import of philosophy of technology in two ways. First, it seeks to elucidate the place of technology within ontology, epistemology, and social political philosophy. I argue technology inhabits an essential place in these fields. This philosophy of Henri Bergson plays a central role in this section. Second, I discuss how modern technology, its further development, and its intercultural transfer constitute a drive toward a global ‘hegemony of technology’. The crux of the argument is that the technology impulse within humanity insinuates itself into nearly every aspect of human existence. The structure of the state, the economy and culture are each framed by the impulse. In the final analysis, it is argued that only a thorough examination of the intimate connection between humanity and technology can lay the foundation for a comprehensive philosophy for human existence.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 39.1, 2005, 381.

Oliver Sachs. “In the River of Consciousness.” *The New York Review of Books*, 51.1, January 15, 2004, 41-44. This is a review of James’ *Principles of Psychology*, Bergson’s *Creative Evolution*, Hebb’s *Organization of Behavior*, Edelman’s *Neural Darwinism* and several other works by contemporary neurophysiologists. The author first states the view of Bergson and James—that consciousness is continuous, then criticizes it from the vantage-point of contemporary neuroscience (utilizing evidence that perception consist of consecutive static units). He concludes, however, that it is not just physiological movements but “movement of an essentially personal kind, which constitute our very being.” (p.44) This item contains many interesting challenges to the James-Bergson theory of “psychological time.”


Anne Sauvagnargues. “Deleuze avec Bergson. Le Cours de 1960 sur *L’évolution créatrice*.” *Annales bergsoniennes II*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, 151-165. Eng. Trans. “Deleuze with Bergson: The 1960 Course on *Creative Evolution*.” The author, in introducing Deleuze’s lectures on *Creative Evolution*, points out that Deleuze returned to the reading of Bergson at important junctures throughout his career. One of these junctures is marked by Deleuze’s lectures in 1960 on Chapter 3 of *Creative Evolution*. Deleuze takes the notion of difference as an operation of life from Bergson while transforming Bergson’s opposition of duration and matter into the duality of the virtual and the actual. Bergson’s fundamental problem, Deleuze argues, lies in his dualism.


Ryan Turnbull. “The Ontology of Duration, Intuitions and Transcendental Empiricism.” M.A. Thesis, Carleton University (Canada), 2004, 135. The author concludes that in Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism it is seen how Bergson provides a radical empiricism used to modify the transcendental project of Kant.

Julia Urabayen. “La filosofía de Marcel: del idealismo al realismo, del realismo a la filosofía concreta.” *Penamiento*, 6.226, 2004, 115-136. “En estas páginas se reflexiona acerca del pensamiento de Marcel para delimitar qué es la filosofía concreta. Se incide en su formación neoidealista y su contacto con Bergson, que le conduce a una crítica del pensamiento sistemático que se agudiza tras la Primera Guerra Mundial. En Segundo lugar se produce un acercamiento al realismo, pero aparece un punto de desavenencia: para Marcel el ser está más allá del juicio predicativo. De ahí que opte por una filosofía existencial basada en dualismos y que se desarrolla como una serie de acercamientos al ser y no como una ontología.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 38.4, 2004, 353. Marcel’s original idealism was changed by his contact with Bergson, leading to a criticism of philosophical system. He then moved to an existential standpoint based on dualisms and an approximation to “being” but not an ontology. This latter is his version of “concrete philosophy.”


Remigijus Veprauskas. “Conception of Time in H. Bergson’s Scientific Work ‘Matter and Time’.” (in Lithuanian) Sotor: Religijos moklso zumalas (Journal of Religious Science), 14.42, 2004, 265-270. “Especially in his scientific work, Matter and Memory, Henri Bergson finds the argument that consciousness and memory aren’t only the function of our body. Brain doesn’t create the contents of consciousness, but it transfers the connection, expedient connection of irritating and moving. The main philosopher’s scientific work confirms the reality of spirit and matter and tries to determine the connection between these two components with the help of memory. Memory is resisting to the flow of time, it means to the time itself. (edited)”Philosopher’s Index, 41.4, 2007, 579.


Frédéric Worms. “A concepção bergsoniana do tempo.” Dois Pontos, 1.1, 2004, 129-149. “The aim of this article is to show how Bergson’s philosophy derives from the understanding of the passage of time as an original and primordial fact. In this way his works can be considered to be different attempts to explain this experience of temporality which, philosophically considered, consist of the intuition of duration. Thus we examine the way in which the treatment given to distinct philosophical problems discussed in each of his works takes place as a meditation on the primitive fact ad its progressive clarification. First we follow the course of deduction of the main characteristics of duration, succession, conservation, and act, emphasizing some of his philosophical consequences. We then examine the critical dimension of Bergson’s philosophy through the analysis of the concept of the instant, which distorts the experience of time and gives rise to an equivocal way of traditional metaphysics; in this examination we shall seek to differentiate this idea from the experience of simultaneity that constitutes our concrete relationship with things.” Philosopher's Index, 41.4, 2007, 593. Eng. trans. “On Bergson’s Concept of Time.”

Frédéric Worms. “À propos des relations entre nature et liberté” in Bergson. La durée et la nature. J.-L. Vieillard-Baron. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, 159-166. Eng. trans. “Concerning the Relations Between Nature and Liberty.” The author argues against a prevalent false opposition of nature and liberty. For Bergson liberty is in nature or it is nowhere. This realization, as is made clear in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, has important practical (social/economic/ethical) implications.


Frédéric Worms. “Problèmes. La conscience ou la vie ? Bergson entre phénoménologie et métaphysique.” Annales bergsoniennes II. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, 191-206. Eng. trans. “Problems. Consciousness or Life? Bergson Between Phenomenology and Metaphysics.” As a rule, the author notes, Bergsonism and Husserlian phenomenology are dramatically contrasted, with Husserl seen as sharply distinguishing the knower from felt reality and Bergson seen as immersing the knower in this (temporal) reality. The author protests strongly against this view, arguing that Bergson both immerses the knower in the known and distinguishes the knower from its object. Bergsonian intuition rejoins Husserlian reflective consciousness, engendering it in a confrontation with felt temporality.


2005


Alia Al-Saji. “The Memory of Another Past: Bergson, Deleuze and a New Theory of Memory.” *Continental Philosophy Review*, 37.2, January, 2005, 203-39. “Through the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze, my paper explores a different theory of time. I reconstitute Deleuze’s paradoxes of the past in *Difference and Repetition* and Bergson to reveal a theory of time in which the relation between past and present is one of coexistence rather than succession. The theory of memory implied here is a nonrepresentational one. To elaborate this theory I ask what is the role of the ‘virtual image’ in Bergson’s *Matter and Memory*? Far from representing the simple afterimage of a present perception, the ‘virtual image’ carries multiple senses. Contradicting the immediate past for the present or expanding virtually to hold the whole of memory (and even the whole of the universe), the virtual image can form a bridge between the present and the nonrepresentational past. The non-representational account of memory sheds light not only on the structure of time for Bergson, but also on its concepts of pure memory and virtuality. The rereading of memory also opens the way for Bergsonian intuition to play an intersubjective role: intuition becomes a means of navigating the resonances and dissonances that can be felt between different rhythms of becoming or planes of memory, which constitute different subjects.” (Author’s Abstract)


method, analytic philosophers have typically read Brentano as a philosopher of mind engaged in the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his empirical psychological method, tended to read Brentano as merely “on the way” to a truly phenomenological approach. I offer a third reading of Brentano’s thesis, one that attends to both his motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of his psychological prospect.” 

Rudolf Bernet. “A Present Folded Back on the Past (Bergson).” Research in Phenomenology, 35, 2005, 55-76. “In Matter and Memory, Bergson examines the relationships between perception and memory, the status of consciousness and its relation to the brain, and more generally a possible conjunction of matter and mind. Our reading focuses particularly on his understanding of the evanescent present of the present and of the debt vis-à-vis the “unconscious” of a “virtual past”. We wish to show that the Bergsonian version of a critique of the “metaphysics of presence” is, for all that, an offshoot of a Platonic type of metaphysics. It is true that Bergson departs from traditional standpoints on the side of a self-sufficient and original present and a form of presence to which the transparency of consciousness would confer the character of immediate evidence. All the same, it can hardly be claimed that his rehabilitation of the past and the unconscious opens up new perspectives on how forgetting and death are bound up with the work of memory.”

Margo Bistis. “Simmel and Bergson.” Journal of European Studies, 35, No. 4, 2005, 395-418. The author states: “Taking a comparative approach, this essay uses Simmel’s famous theory of the ‘blasé person’ and assembles contrasting personality portraits of Simmel and Bergson. It is argued that Simmel was not the blasé person, the modern urbanite whose nerves are overwhelmed by the metropolitan environment, and that Bergson was the better exemplar of this theory. It interprets Simmel’s personality in light of his ideas of the salon and disinterested sociability as potential therapies for the blasé condition. It shows Bergson’s affinity to Simmel’s model, with all of its florid neurasthenic symptoms, and it is argued that this model provides a useful point of departure talking about the interrelations of Bergson’s personality, cultural vogue, and philosophy of vitality.”


Jimena Canales. “Einstein, Bergson, and the Experiment that Failed.” MLN, 120.5, 2005, 1168-1191. The author analyzes the Bergson-Einstein debates, the first over the nature of Time, the second over political issues concerning the International Commission for Intellectual Cooperation. These debates were to affect the “boundaries between nature, science, and politics.” The author explores the cultural forces that ended up endowing Einstein with the authority of a philosopher and reducing Bergson’s status to that of a mere writer.

Pierre Cassou-Noguès. “The Unity of Events: Whitehead and Two Critics, Russell and Bergson.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 43.4, 2005, 545-559. “The aim of this paper is to discuss the
philosophical premises of Whitehead’s definition of time in The Concept of Nature and other works of the same period. Whitehead probably introduced this definition, which depends upon what he calls the “method of extensive abstraction”, in 1913, just after the publication of Principia Mathematica with Russell. He only published his results in 1919. However, Russell takes up the method, with slight modifications, after personal communication with Whitehead, as early as 1914, in Our Knowledge of the External World. It is also carefully studied by G. Mead, in particular in Philosophy of the Present and also by Merleau-Ponty in his lectures at the Collège de France.” Philosopher's Index, 40.3, 2006, 368.


Kevin Corrigan. “A New View of Idea, Thought, and Education in Bergson and Whitehead?” - Interchange, 36.1-2, 2005, 179-98. The author states: “… a view which has come to be accepted in modern times, that ideas or thoughts are discrete items of information or concepts from which all feeling and movement must be radically extirpated, if not exorcized, represents neither some of the more subtle trajectories of earlier thought in the Western world nor, in particular, the dynamic thinking of Bergson and Whitehead. Their thought plunges one radically into movement, connectedness, newness, and unfinishedness in such a way that Whitehead, for example, proposes an entirely new view of education, according to which the holy engagement of the idea in the tender movement of understanding contrasts sharply with the ritualized mutual slaughter that lurks not so inconspicuously in the shadow-sides of our educational systems.”


Caroline Guendouz. “La philosophie de la perception de Maurice Pradines. Héritage et critique de Bergson.” Phainomenon, 10, 2005, 29-48. “According to Pradines, Bergson had the merit of thinking perception in accordance with its vital dimension; however, it is necessary to make its approach more radical. According to Pradines, this consists in constructing a philosophy of space that not only reveals the limits of Bergsonism but also permits us to account for the intentionality of a living being as an encounter with a world to be ruined away or conquered. Thus, the correlative appearance of spatiality and vital intelligence makes it possible to reconsider, against Bergson once again, the status of memory and also the relationship between psychology, theory of knowledge and metaphysics.” Philosopher’s Index, 40.4, 2006, 423. Eng. trans. “Maurice Pradines’ Philosophy of Perception: Heritage and Critique of Bergson.”


Suzanne Guerlac. “Thinking in Time: Henri Bergson (An Interdisciplinary Conference).” MLN, 120.5, 2005, 1091-98. The author describes articles on Bergson, given first at a 2004 conference at the University of California at Berkeley and published in MLN 120.5, 2005. Their authors are Paola Marrati, Keith Ansell Pearson, Pheng Cheah, Mark B.N. Hansen, Frédéric Keck, David Lapoujade, Paul-Antoine Miquel, Jimena Canales, Darlene Pursoley, and Frédéric Worms. These essays are cited in this section of the present bibliography.


Wayne J. Hankey. “Neoplatonism and Contemporary French Philosophy.” Dionysius, 23, 2005, 161-90. “This essay shows that a central aspect of twentieth-century French philosophy, theology, and spiritual life involves a continuing engagement with Neoplatonism which extends from Henri Bergson to Jean-Luc Marion and results in the retrieval of the theurgical and henological Neoplatonism of Iamblichus, Proclus and Damascius. It devotes substantial sections to Bergson, Emile Bréhier, André Festugiére, Henri-Dominique Saffrey, Edouard Jeanneau, and while Maurice Blondel and Henri de Lubac are bypassed, the connections with Erid Dodds and A. Hilary Armstrong are mentioned. Pierre Hadot, Stanislas Breton, Jean Trouillard, Henry Duméry, Joseph Combès, Michel Henry, Dominique Janicaud, Marion, and the French Canadian philosopher Jean-Marc Narbonne are central figures.” Philosopher’s Index, 40.4, 2005, 427.
Marc B.N. Hansen. “Movement and Memory: Intuition as Virtualization in GPS Art.” *MLN*, 120.5, 2005, 1206-1225. Using the work of global positioning satellite artist Laura Kurgan, the author takes up the Deleuzian challenge to renew or extend Bergson’s philosophy. To pursue Deleuze’s imperative, however, involves a critique of his concept of Bergsonian duration, which is not a movement of differentiation but of composition.


Frédéric Keck. “The Virtual, the Symbolic, and the Actual in Bergsonian Philosophy and Durkheimian Sociology.” *MLN*, 120.5, 2005, 1133-145. The author reads Bergson’s *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* as an extended reply to Durkheim’s *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, published twenty years earlier.

Michael R. Kelley. “What’s Phenomenological About Bergsonism(?): Critical Notice of Leonard Lawler’s *The Challenge of Bergsonism*.” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 13.1, 2005, 103-19. “The paper’s first half reviews Leonard Lawler’s interpretation of Bergsonism as a challenge to (1) phenomenology, (2) ontology, and (3) ethics. The second half of the paper critically evaluates Lawler’s three Bergsonian challenges. In particular, the author suggests that a different interpretation of classical phenomenology may reveal Bergson as a compliment rather than a corrective to phenomenology, particularly with respect to the issues of embodied-consciousness and inner time-consciousness. The cogency of Bergson’s theory of memory and ethics is then considered.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 39.4, 2005, 325.


Loretta Kong. “Building Upon Weakness: Exploring the Productivity of Weak Architecture.” M. Architecture, Carleton University (Canada), 2005, 98. The author states: “This thesis explores the visceral encounter as a measure of contemporary architecture through the writing of architectural theorist Ignasi de Sola-Morales and twentieth-century philosopher Henri Bergson.”


David Lapoujade. “The Normal and the Pathological in Bergson.” *MLN*, 120.5, 2005, 1146-1155. The author examines a crucial turn in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* in which Bergson displaces the phrase “attention to life” to the notion of “attachment to life”. He explores Bergson’s idea of a leap out of the pathologies of intelligence via a new kind of attachment to life involving a “practice of detachment.” Cf. the author, *Annales bergsoniennes* (2008) for a more complete development of these ideas.

Paola Marrati. “Time, Life, Concepts: The Newness of Bergson.” *MLN*, 120.5, 2005, 1099-111. The author stresses the pragmatic dimension of Bergson’s thought, arguing that his thought, since it does not coincide with a philosophy of subjectivity, is not a phenomenology. Bergson’s most fundamental idea is that “if time does nothing it is nothing”.

Jorge Martin. “Borges, Funes y… Bergson.” *Variaciones Borges*, 19, 2005, 195-208. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Borges, Funes and… Bergson.” This concerns Borges’ appropriation of Bergson’s belief that all memories are preserved in Borges’ short story “Funes, el Memorioso”.

David Heath Massey. “The Persistence of the Past: Heidegger and Bergson on Time.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Memphis, 2005, 273. The author states: “This dissertation… reconstructs Heidegger’s critique of Bergson, and shows how Bergson’s thought breaks more radically with the philosophical tradition than Heidegger admits.” Heidegger does not provide sufficient support for his claim that Bergson’s *durée* is a development of Aristotle’s concept of time.


Paul-Antione Miquel. “Evolution of Consciousness and Evolution of Life.” *MLN*, 120.5, 2005, 1156-167. Starting from Bergson’s insistence in *Creative Evolution*, understood temporally and in depth, that evolution resembles the becoming of a consciousness, the author goes on to conclude that Bergson’s viewpoint has its support in the work of contemporary scientists. Intuition, in Bergson’s sense, leads to new science.

David Middleton and Steven D. Brown. *The Social Psychology of Experience: Studies in Remembering and Forgetting*. London: SAGE, 2005, xi, 252. This item contains a discussion of Bergson’s concept of memory. The authors present new insights into the social psychology of experience, drawing upon a number of classic works (particularly those of Frederick Bartlett, Maurice Halbwachs and Henri Bergson).

François Moll. “La réforme du mécanisme ou le ‘rêve’ d’Henri Bergson.” *Dialogue* (Canada), 44.4, 2005, 735-761. “When it comes to explaining life and living organisms, it is insufficient to see in Descartes a proponent of radical mechanicism (the human body is not just any sort of body since it is united with a soul) and in Kant a proponent of radical finalism (in biology, scientific explanations are in the last resort mechanistic) as it is to see in Bergson nothing other than the opponent of mechanism. In fact in *Creative Evolution* Bergson “dreams” of a “mechanism of transformation” that should consist of a reform of mechanicism, the conditions of the possibility of which are based not only on the progress of chemistry, but first of all on the progress of mathematics, and more precisely of the infinitesimal calculus, the only method able to objectively grasp movement.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 4.4, 2006, 497. Eng. trans. “The Reform of Mechanicism or the ‘Dream’ of Henri Bergson.”

Débora (Cristina) Morato (Pinto). “O tempo e seus momentos interiores.” *Analytica*, 9.2, 2005, 59-86. “This paper discusses Bergson’s concept of interiority, especially its role in the first outline definition of duration developed in his *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*. The
concept of interiority is present in various levels of the essay’s analyses, and it is the key to an understanding of the notion of internal difference and of the refutation of that homogeneous time, which is substituted by the apprehension of the inner moments of the passage of the passage of time as such. Bergson’s philosophy as a whole can be read as a search for the intelligibility of the passage of time qua internal differentiation—that is at once as the movement of differentiation and totalization (the critical dialogue with Kant is a fundamental step towards this theory).”


David Morris. “Bergsonian Intuition, Husserlian Variation, Peircean Abduction: Toward a Relation Between Method, Sense, and Nature.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 43.2, 2005, 267-98. “Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and Peircian abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the traditional philosophical problem of deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. Each method implies a correspondingly different view of the generation of the variations from which knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter differences and to distinguish the different sorts of variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a distinction between extensive, intensive, and abductive-intensive variation is introduced. The link between philosophical method and the generation of variation is used to illuminate different philosophical conceptions of nature and nature’s relation to meaning and sense.” Philosopher’s Index, 40.1, 2006, 432.


Thomas Nesbit. “Rivers of Ecstasy: Henry Miller’s Affair with Religion.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 2005, 270. The author states: “The influence… particularly of Henri Bergson’s Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932) helped (Miller) develop a religious view situated between immanence and transcendence, in which self-liberation through the channeled flow of the élan vital is the chief objective.”


Kyoku Okubu. “Henri Matisse’s Jazz. Regarding the Date of ‘Completion’ of the Original Maquettes.” Bigaku, 55.4, 2005, 42-55. “The date of ‘completion’ of the original maquettes of Jazz has been considered to be 1944, mainly due to three letters of Matisse, in spite of the date of July, 1946 written in the maquettes. What is the meaning of this delay? The connection between Matisse and Surrealism contributed to establishing the artistic environment around him from the 1930’s. It changed Matisse’s artistic view from static to dynamic, especially the concept of signe. Matisse’s interest in Bergson in Jazz explains its dynamic character. In 1942 Matisse finished Thèmes et variation. The central idea is a series along the same theme, with the same model. The connection between the drawing gives the figure a Bergsonia durée. In Jazz Matisse created signes from his memories. He used his intuition to be united with the objects, and realized the inherent durée, which was built right into the process of this work. This is the reason for the delay in working on the maquettes.” Philosopher’s Index, 39.4, 2005, 369.

Jesús Pardo Martinez. “Espacio y duración: Bergson frente a Kant.” Diálogo Filosófico, 21.1, 2005, 69-82. “Bergson has granted Kant the credit for having homogeneous space and time distinctively
construed as acts of spirit void of all sensible content. He criticizes Kant for overlooking its practical and not theoretical nature. Hence the possibility of metaphysics as knowledge of durée once the space building mechanism of the understanding has been suspended.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 39.4, 2005, 374. Eng. trans. “Space and Duration: Bergson Confronting Kant.”

Nickolas Pappas. “Morality Gags.” *Monist*, 88.1, 2005, 52-71. “Bergson’s Laughter illuminates the jokes in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Bergson’s analysis of “the comic” foregrounds the ambiguity between moral and physical, and the corollary ambiguity between figurative and literal, that power many of those wisecracks in which Nietzsche juxtaposes moral and psychological interpretations of a phenomenon. But Bergson pictures society mocking outsiders; for Nietzsche laughter comes from outside civilization, especially from the future. Bergson can not account for something’s becoming, as Nietzsche trusts will happen with his jokes. For Nietzsche only a transfigured world will see the visible falseness of morality—which explains why his jokes are not funny yet.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 40.3, 2006, 521.

Keith Ansell Pearson. “Bergson’s Encounter with Biology.” *Angelaki*, 10.2, August, 2005, 59-72. The author’s abstract states: “The article discusses philosopher Henri Bergson’s optional text for the book *Creative Evolution*. Bergson presented a crucial aspect of his attempt to reform philosophical thinking in the text. He speaks of the mind having a natural inclination to always turn in the direction of materialism. He also cited that change, transformation, and evolution are bound up with living and open systems.”

Keith Ansell Pearson. “The Reality of the Virtual: Bergson and Deleuze.” *MLN*, 120.5, 2205, 1112-1127. The author focuses on the “virtual-actual circuit” as it functions in the work of Bergson and Deleuze. He distinguishes the thought of Bergson from that of Deleuze, and then uses Bergson to defend Deleuze against Alain Badiou’s charge that Deleuze uses the “virtual” as an ontological category to signify “the Great One”. He demonstrates this contention through the analysis of Deleuze’s *Proust et les signes*.


Darlene Pursley. “Moving in Time: Chantal Akerman’s Toute une nuit.” *MLN*, 120.5, 2005, 1192-1205. The author uses a work of Chantal Ackerman to challenge certain features of Gilles Deleuze’s film theory and to prompt a return to Bergson’s texts. The author, by focusing directly on Bergson’s writings, displaces fundamental questions in film studies.

Bento Prado Neto. “Wittgenstein e Bergson.” *Analytica*, 9.2, 2005, 43-58. “This paper is an attempt to reassess Pariente’s thesis concerning the similarities between Bergson and Wittgenstein. We argue that the thesis can be given an enlarged basis when we consider the texts written by Wittgenstein in 1929-30 dealing with the problem of time. The relevance of Wittgenstein’s reflections on time for the dismissal of the project of a phenomenological language has already been noted by authors like Denis Perrin. Nevertheless, I think they do not provide all the reasons which led Wittgenstein to abandon that project. I offer a brief analysis of Chapter 7 of *Philosophical Remarks*, trying to show that a central clue to this issue is to be found in Wittgenstein’s mention of the Bergsonian concept of a ‘heterogeneous’ time (the time of immediate experience) as opposed to the homogeneous physical time.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 41.2, 2007, 466. Pariente’s paper is found in the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 1969, and is developed in his *Le Langage et l’individu*, 1973. (Ed.)


Jesus Ríos Vicente. “Espiritualismo y Bergsonismo en Marcel: Interiorización y libertad.” *Anuario Filosófico*, Pamplona, Spain, 38.2, 2005, 597-632. This paper shows how Bergson influences Marcel or, in other words, the manner in which Bergson’s spiritualism is present in Marcel. A second part of the essay depicts how freedom is a consequence of the ‘interiorization’ required by spiritualism. (This freedom does not surpass ‘the state of nature’ or pilgrim state.) Therefore, in this perspective, it is necessary a moment of ‘illumination’ in order to restore the ‘state of grace’ in which freedom will be complete by means of ‘participation’.” *Philosopher's Index*, 40.1, 2006, 510. Eng. trans. “Spiritualism and Bergsonism in Marcel: Interiorization and Liberty.”


James Homer Thrall. “Mystic Moderns: Agency and Enchantment in Evelyn Underhill, May Sinclair and Mary Web.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 2005, 406. The author describes how three British writers developed “systems of mysticism” enabling them to establish personal agency as individuals and, more specifically, as women. The author states: “They turned in particular to contemporary theories of life force or energy that drew from both Arthur Schopenhauer and Henri Bergson.”


Miklos Vetö. “Le passé selon Bergson.” Archives de Philosophie, 68.1, 2005, 5-31. “Bergson’s thought is known as a philosophy of duration. Yet duration should not be understood as a flux, as an unbounded becoming. Duration does have a structure of its own whose essential elements are the two tenses of past and present. Through the comparison of perception and remembering, past and future display their essential distinction. They are identical categories, general forms not to be understood only in terms of their respective place in temporal succession. The comparative analysis of past and presence demonstrates the temporal essence of Bergson’s metaphysics of heterogeneity.” Philosopher’s Index, 40.1, 2006, 510.

John K. Walser. “Edgewood Orchard Galleries.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 2005, 80. This is a manuscript of lyric poetry which “… explores what Henri Bergson in Creative Education called duration.”

Jason M. Wirth. “Nietzsche’s Joy. On Laughter’s Truth.” Epoche, 10.1, 2005, 117-39. “This essay is devoted to an examination of the relationship between truth and laughter in the works of Nietzsche. My central text will be the much maligned book four of Zaratustra, with special attention payed to the braying of the ass. Laughter has been traditionally considered irrelevant to serious philosophical content and, at best, a stylistic quirk. I argue that this stems from a basic prejudice that is constitutive of a large part of the western tradition, namely, the confusion of working hard with taking oneself seriously. I then analyze laughter in Nietzsche’s work as the voice of truth itself. Laughter is the affirmation of (?) as the voice of truth itself. Laughter is the affirmation of a register of truth as the other beginning that has been lost in everything that begins. Such an analysis involves a discussion of the nature of both truth and laughter. I also distinguish Nietzschean laughter from three representative and seminal accounts of laughter provided by Hobbes, Bergson, and Kant.” Philosopher’s Index, 40.3, 2006, 605-06.


Frédéric Worms. “Time Thinking: Bergson’s Double Philosophy of Mind.” MLN, 120.5, 2005, 1226-234. The author argues that Bergson’s philosophy is both a philosophy of time and a philosophy of mind: for Bergson “one has to think mind to be able to think time.” The author concludes: “In this double philosophy of reality and mind, that Bergson might also be most important for us today.”


Caterina Zanfi. “La conferenze di Madrid di Henri Bergson.” Dianoia (Italy), 10, 2005, 97-151. Eng. trans. “Henri Bergson’s Madrid Conferences.” The author states: “Two interventions that Henri Bergson gave in Madrid in 1918 are here presented in Italian for the first time: the Discorso agli student and the two lectures Sull’anima umana and La personalità. These interventions, given during the First World War when Bergson was in Spain for a diplomatic mission, reveal Bergson’s political engagement. Apart from their importance as historical and political documents, these texts present traces of psychological and metaphysical theories, the product of Bergson’s new interest in mysticism and a more introspective philosophy which will be more fully developed in Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion.” Philosopher’s Index, 40.3, 2006, 610-11.

Sebastian Leonhardt Zeidler. Defense of the Real: Carl Einstein’s History and Theory of Art. Ph.D. Dissertation, 2005, 519. This is an intellectual biography of the German art critic and historian Carl Einstein (1885-1940). “… Einstein mined the work of thinkers like Nietzsche, Bergson, Mach, and Freud in order to imagine how a newly postmetaphysical world—the “real” of our title—a modern subject emerged out from under the ruins of older orders of being…”

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Camille Atkinson. “What’s So Funny? Or, Why Humor Should Matter to Philosophers.” Philosophy Today, 50.5, 2006, 437-43. “What makes us laugh and why should this be important for philosophy? Beyond its psychological appeal or its social function, does comedy have any philosophical significance? Using the works of Simon Critchley and Henri Bergson, I will identify three theories of humor—superiority, relief and incongruity. It is the latter that serves a philosophical purpose insofar as it provokes wonder or inspires us to question the human condition. While relief and superiority forms of comedy tend to emphasize individual or cultural idiosyncrasies, the incongruous focuses attention on our shared humanity.” Philosopher’s Index, 41.2, 2007, 289.

David Belot. “‘Un tableau de l’histoire humaine’: Merleau-Ponty au-delà de Bergson.” *Archives de philosophie*, 69.1, Spring, 2006, 79-100. “History is of specific concern to Merleau-Ponty when he comes back to Bergson’s work in the fifties. While Merleau-Ponty regrets the excessive ‘generality’ of the Bergsonian intuition of history, he does follow a Bergsonian inspiration, although deeply renewed, as he tries to rethink the ‘flexible’ concept of institution. The unity of history, although inaccessible to anyone in overarching position, emerges from the communication between times, in their proper uniqueness. But, for a full understanding of the ‘public time’ idea, we need to know exactly in what sense Merleau-Ponty claims that the concept of history must be formed in the example of arts and expression. This development of thought is one of the pathways through which Merleau-Ponty finds out an original idea of the dialectics.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 41.1, 2007, 292. Eng. trans. “A Tableau of Human History.”


Elie During. “Philosophical Twins? Bergson and Whitehead on Langevin’s Paradox and the Meaning of ‘Space-Time’” in *Les principes de la connaissance naturelle d’Alfred North Whitehead*.” *Actes des Journées d’études internationales tenues à l’Université de Nantes, les 3 et 4 octobre 2005 (Chromantiques Whiteheadiennes, VIII)* Ed. Guillaume, Durand. Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006, 79-104. This is a highly insightful analysis of Bergson’s treatment of relativity physics. Though Bergson’s critique of relativity is no longer to be seen as valid, the author clears Bergson’s position on numerous misunderstandings.

Patricia M’Closky Engel. *The Silko-Vonnegut Factor: Literary Strategies that Re-map Temporal Instincts*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Lehigh University, 2006, 296. The author states: “…Leslie Marmon Silko’s *Ceremony* and Jurt Vonnegut’s *Slaughterhouse-Five* explore the extent to which the Western conception of time as a linear impetus restricts personal growth and autonomy, while contributing to divisive unrest among cultures.” Bergsonian duration or “pure time” is essential to the doing of free acts by definite persons.

Paulina Ochoa Espejo. *The Time of Popular Sovereignty: Political Theology and the Democratic State*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2006, 273. The author states: “I examine this problem in the light of the process metaphysics of Henri Bergson and José Ortega y Gasset, and argue that when we think of the people as a process, rather than a mere assemblage of individuals or a fixed and stable thing, we can conceptualize a new form of democratic legitimization for the state.”


Benjamin Russell Fraser. “The Difference Space Makes: Bergsonian Methodology and Madrid’s Cultural Imaginary Through Literature, Film and Urban Space.” Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Arizona, 2006, 375. The author states that both Henri Lefebvre and Henri Bergson share a common idea of space as neither a static ground or a Kantian *a priori* condition of experience but as a process inseparable from time. The author relates this (shared) notion to the literature, film, and urban spaces of Madrid. In Bergsonian fashion these explorations “seek to dispense with the stagnant and irreconcilable philosophical tropes of both pure materialism and pure idealism…”


Mark B.N. Hanson. *New Philosophies for New Media*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, 333. The author suggests that a new view of Bergson, different from that of Deleuze, should involve concepts of embodiment, affect, and “experience”. p. 115. He proposes “a potential to expand the experiential grasp of the embodied human being.” p. 16. Hanson focuses on new media artists who follow a “bergsonist vocation.”


Soyeon Jung. “Memory of November.” M.F.A. Thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2006, 38. This item is both a written work and a four-channel video installation. It describes the author’s transition from a Korean into an American culture: “The theories of Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, and Julia Kristeva will be used to foster an understanding of memory as trauma.”


Paul-Antoine Miquel. “Evolution of Consciousness and Evolution of Life.” *MLN*, 120.5, 2006, 1156-167. The author’s fundamental concern is the relation between Bergson’s philosophy of evolution and scientific truth. Bergson argues that biological evolution “resembles the evolution of consciousness”. This, for the author was a “creative mistake”, for if it were true scientific progress would be “*a priori* controlled by philosophy and metaphysics: a disaster. But it was a creative mistake because it inspired scientists (I. Prigogine, S. Kauffman, Henri Atlan) to scientifically validate the general view of evolution propounded by Bergson.”

Paul-Antoine Miquel. “Is the Bergsonian Critique of Sensations Measurement Still a Topic Today?” *Synthesis Philosophica*, 21:1 (41), 2006, 161-69. “This paper attempts to show how the Bergsonian method works in philosophy on a concrete problem: how is it possible to measure sensations? Bergson explains that a sensation is not a psychological object, since what it is depends on what is, is doing to us. Then it is not only represented, it is lived. All sensation measurement is adding a new feeling to what is measured. This specific feeling is connection with nothing but duration. The first aim is to show that this old epistemological problem is still active today. We don’t know exactly how to measure sensations either with additive or with ordinal measuring. But we want to explain also how the metaphysical intuition is working in Bergson’s first book. It does not come first. It always comes after the examination of a specific scientific problem, since the philosophical insight always emerges in an indirect way. It is impossible then to assert with Bergson that science is not thinking. It is just important to observe that science is not thinking alone. It needs the critical action of philosophy. (edited)”


understandings of temporality by Bergson, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, showing that our concepts of self and meaning “constellate” around our concept of time.


Dorthea Olkowski. “Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Intertwining and Objectification.” *Phaen Ex. Journal of Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture*, 1.1, 2006, 113-139. “In chapter four of *The Visible and the Invisible*, titled ‘The Intertwining—The Chiasm’, Merleau-Ponty considers the relation between the body and the sensible, which is to say ‘objective’, and the body as sentient, that is, as ‘phenomenal’ body. He makes this inquiry in the context of interrogating the access of such a sensible-sentient or objective-phenomenal body to Being. ‘Objectivity’ and the objective body, as Merleau-Ponty defines it in *The Phenomenology of Perception*, are to be defined in relation to experience. Objectivity requires knowing how it is possible for determinate shapes to be available for experience at all. But the possibility of determinate shapes is also called into question by Merleau-Ponty insofar as the body is experienced as a point of view on things; thus everybody would experience a different point of view, even though things are given as abstract elements of one total world. Since the two elements form a system, an intertwining, in which each moment expressive of each other: objectivity would seem to be hard to achieve. The relationship between body and things, point of view and world, if the relata continually express one another, would be anything but determinate and the question of how objectivity is possible remains unanswered. This essay will explore this question in the light of Merleau-Ponty’s
(mis)reading of Henri Bergson and from the point of view of Sartre’s original expression of the
relation of intertwining.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.1, 2008, 510.

dreamer with his theory of spiritual energy and the self-preservation of memories. The work
of the cognitive sciences, of psychology, of neuroscience do not cite him. Working against this
forgetting, this study recalls that the now ontology of *Matter and Memory* permits us to think the
present status of cerebral imagery and to avoid a new worship of icons.”

Alain Panero. “La surface comme image chez Bergson. Le premier chapitre de *Matière et mémoire.*” in
*La Surface.* Eds. Mathilde La Cassagnère and Marie-Odile Salati. Chambéry: Université de
Chapter One of *Matter and Memory.*”

Joan Pegueroles. “Libertad, creación y finalidad.” *Espíritu: Cuadernos del Instituto Filosófico de

Joan Pegueroles. “Textos de Péguy: La mística y la política, la libertad y la gracia, la grandeza pagana.”
“Texts of Péguy: Mystical and Politics, Liberty and Grace, Pagan Grandeur.”

Vincenza Petyx. “Gli incantesimi del meneur: La psicologia della folla in Henri Bergson e Gustav Le
Leader: They Psychology of Madness in Bergson and Gustav Le Bon.”

Débora Cristina Morato Pinto. “A construção da metafísica enquanto experiência integra: conhecimento
interior e imediato como atributos da intuição em Bergson.” *Atas do XII Encontro Nacional de
Knowledge as Attributes of Intuition in Bergson.”

Débora Cristina Morato Pinto. “A meditação Segundo a percepção: Bergson, Merleau-Ponty e
overdadeiro sentido da experiência.” in *A fenomenologia da experiência: horizontes filosóficos
Overriding Sense of Experience.”

Débora Cristina Morato Pinto. “Crítica da tradição: Refundação da metafísica e descrição da
experiência: Bergson e Merleau-Ponty.” in *Questões de Filosofia Contemporâneas.* Eds. A.
Tradition: Reworking the Foundations of Metaphysics and the Description of Experience:
Bergson and Merleau-Ponty.”


Yannis Prélorentzos. “Bergson’s Approach to Certain Aspects of Aristotle’s Philosophy.” (In Greek) in
*Vita contemplative. Essays in Honor of Demetrios N. Koutras.* Ed. Athanassia Leontsini. Athens:
National University of Athens, 2006, 433-57.


Stephen E. Robbins. “Bergson and the Holographic Theory of Mind.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5.3-4, 2006, 365-94. “Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed with Gibson’s model of perception. It is applied to the problems of consciousness, direct realism, qualia and illusions. The model implies an entirely different basis for memory and cognition, and a brief overview is given for the basis of direct memory, compositionality and systematicity.” Philosopher’s Index, 41.3, 2007, 549.


Claude Romano. “Le contingent, le libre, le nécessaire. Bergson critique de la métaphysique.” Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 104.1, Fall, 2006, 75-103. “Bergson’s doctrine of freedom has often been read in a purely internal way. This article seeks to reinstate Bergson’s theses in the dialogue, sometimes explicit, often implicit, which they maintain with the history of metaphysics. The criticism of the notion of possible pre-existing its realization leads Bergson to break the Scotist concept of contingency as a determination of a state of things, the opposite of which is possible at the same moment; contrary to the ‘synchronic’ definition of contingency which underlies all modern controversies on free will, Bergson returns to an understanding of the contingent closer to Aristotle, in which time, or rather duration, plays a determining role. Hence his original conception of the free act as an action that is new, unforeseeable.” Philosopher’s Index, 41.1, 2007, 468. Eng. trans. “The Contingent, the Free, the Necessary: Bergson as a Critic of Metaphysics.”

David Scott. “The ‘Concept of Time’ and the ‘Being of the Clock’: Bergson, Einstein, Heidegger and the Temporality of Modernism.” Continental Philosophy Review, 39.2, 183-213. “The topic to be discussed in this paper, that is, the distinction between the ‘concept’ of time and the being of the clock, divides into two parts: first, in the debate between Bergson and Einstein, one discovers the ground for the diverging concepts of time characterized by physics in opposing itself to philosophy. Bergson’s durée or ‘duration’ in opposition to Einstein’s ‘physicist’s time’ as ‘public time’ one can argue, sets the terms for Martin Heidegger’s extending his ontological analysis of
Da-sein, as human being in the world. Second, in this the concept of time gives way to the analysis of the “being of the clock”. What is the being of the clock that makes evident the fundamental temporality of Da-sein? This question is rehearsed in division two of *Being and Time*. My claim is that the fundamental insight into the nature of time revealed in the encounter between Bergson and Einstein is that time extemporizes itself. Temporality “is” not a being but a process that temporizes itself, precisely because it “is not”. “Philosopher’s Index, 41.2, 2007, 489.

Theodore R. Schatzki. “The Time of Activity.” *Continental Philosophy Review*, 39.2, 2006, 155-182. “This essay analyzes the time of human activity. It begins by discussing how most accounts of action treat the time of action as succession, using Donald Davidson’s account of action as an illustration. It then argues that an adequate account of action and its determinants are able to elucidate the “indeterminacy of action”, but requires an alternative conception of action time. The remainder of the essay constructs a propitious account of the time and determination of action. It does so by critically drawing on Henri Bergson’s notion of duration and Martin Heidegger’s notion of the teleological dimensionality (past, present and future) of existence. Whereas Bergson provides valuable insights into the continuity of activity, Heidegger illuminates the determination of action. Combining their insights yields an account of the time of activity that supplements succession with nonsuccessive temporality.” “Philosopher’s Index, 41.2, 2007, 486.

Matthew Scherer. “The Politics of Persuasion: Habit, Creativity, Conversion.” Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 2007, 211. The author concludes: “Bergson and Deleuze extend the dynamics of conversion, creativity and habit beyond the world of common human meanings to include non-organic forms of life. Contemporary political thought must re-engage the interplay between conversion, creativity and habit in order to address political liabilities of the settlements reached by the secular enlightenment.” (Editor’s note: Cf. T.C. Curle, 2007.)


Eero Tarasti. “Semiótica de la Resistencia: El ser, la memoria y la historia. La contracorriente de los signos.” *Opción*, 22.50, 2006, 29-54. Basing itself on the ideas of Hegel, Bergson, Ricœur and Eco, the author examines the semiotic strategies which have been used against the process of homogenization. These are three: being, memory and history.


Julia Urabayen. “Tiempo y Libertad en el Pensamiento: de Henri Bergson y Emmanual Levinas.” *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofía*, 62.2-4, 2006, 675-96. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Time and Liberty in the Thought of Henri Bergson and Emmanuel Levinas.” “The present article has two distinct parts. It starts by considering the mode in which Henri Bergson thinks about freedom and the spontaneity that is the root of the spiritual and personal character of the human being. The first part of this article shows how Bergson’s thought attempts to respond to
the positivist challenge, a position which misrepresents both the human nature of time and the nature of freedom as an emanation of the I. In its second part, however, the article shows how for Levinas the defining aspect of what the human being is resides not primarily in his freedom, but rather in the experience of vulnerability, heteronomy and in its listening capacity. Levinas offers us a new definition of what it means to be a human being based on the principle that the meaning of the human being is nothing more but our destiny of being-for-the-other. The article also underlines the fact that the two thinkers pay great attention to the notion of time, particularly when it comes to the definition of the identity of human dignity. (edited)” *Philosopher’s Index*, 41.3, 2007, 597. Eng. trans. “Time and Liberty in Thought: Henri Bergson and Emmanuel Levinas.”

Ufuk Uras. *Sezgiciligin sonu mu?* Istanbul: Devin yayincilik, 2006, 96. (Devin Yayincilik; Bilim dizisi, 3) This item concerns ethics, phenomenology, and ontology in Bergson.


Matthias Vollet. “Imágenes: percepción cine en Bergson y Deleuze.” *Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte* (Barraquilla), 5, 2006, 70-93. “Deleuze determines the nature of cinema in terms of two key concepts: image-movement and the image-time. With the help of these concepts he explains the essence of cinema before WWII as being founded on action and movement, while cinema after WWII as having changed into a reflexive cinema which is directed towards time and its realizations. Deleuze says that he has taken both concepts from Bergson’s *Matter and Memory*. In this article these Deleuzian concepts are roughly explained. I will then address the question in what sense Bergson can be considered the originator of these concepts. I will finally specify the Deleuzian concepts of image-movement and image-time and discuss their explanatory force.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 41.4, 2007, 582. Eng. trans. “Images: Perception and Film in Bergson and Deleuze.”


Michel Weber. “La dialectique de l’intuition chez A.N. Whitehead. Sensation pure, pancréativité et continuism (Introduction à la lecture de la *Process and Reality*, 1929).” *Chromatiques whiteheadiennes*, Vol. 1, Heisenstamm bei Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006. “A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947) *Process and Reality* (1929) is probably the most important book towards understanding the meaning and significance of process thought. This monograph provides a convergent series of contextualizing analyses that are structured in the following way. First, it puts the concept of “pure feeling” on the hot seat with the help of a contrast between its Whiteheadian and Bergsonian acceptations. Second, it lays out Whitehead’s “systematic” intuition, which consists of the rationalization of a relational mode that accounts for—and is justified by—his presystematic intuition (sketched in part 1). Third, it focuses on the concept of the ‘ultimate’ by activating the togetherness of the two previous analytical moments.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 40.3, 2006, 600. Eng. trans. “The Dialectic of Intuition in Whitehead: Pure Sensation, Pancreativity and Continuism (Introduction to the reading of *Process and Reality*, 1929).”


2007

Alia Al-Saji. “The Temporality of Life: Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the Immemorial Past.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45.2, 2007, 177-206. “Borrowing conceptual tools from Bergson, this essay asks after the shift in the temporality of Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception to his later works. Although the Phénoménologie conceives life in terms of the field of presence of bodily actual, later texts point to a life of invisible and immemorial dimensionality. By reconsidering Bergson, but also by revising his reading of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty develops a nonserial theory of time in the later works, one that acknowledges the verticality and irreducibility of the past. Life in the flesh relies on unconsciousness or forgetting, on an invisibility that structures the passage.” (Author’s Abstract)


Arnaud François. “Life and Will in Nietzsche and Bergson.” Trans. Roxanne Lapidus. Substance, No. 114, 36.3, 2007. The author compares the philosophies of Bergson and Nietzsche, arguing that (as opposed to Schopenhauer) Bergson argues that life is not the objectification of will but will itself. Both philosophers make similar criticisms of Darwinism, though Nietzsche, unlike Bergson, attacks any notion of “finality” in evolution.


2008


Nadine Asswad. “L’image-danse. Quand la danse et le cinéma se rencontrent dans l’immanence.” M.A. Thesis, Concordia University (Canada), 2007, 100. The author states: “This thesis will explore the ways in which the dancing body and the moving image intersect.” This study is inspired by the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson.


Aaron S. Belz. “‘Something Mechanical Encrusted on the Living’: The Influence of Popular Comedy on Modern American Poetry, 1900-1960.” Ph.D. Dissertation, St. Louis University, 2007, 184. The author states: “This dissertation states that in order to fully understand modernist poetry, one must view it through the lens of comic theory, especially as proposed by Henri Bergson in Laughter (1900).” The author examines E.E. Cummings, Gertrude Stein, T.S. Eliot and John Asbury and compares their work to the comedies of Henry Wheeler Shaw, Charlie Chaplin, Groucho Marx and Jacques Tati.

Jovile Kotryna Bereviciute. “Relationship Between Élan Vital and the Phenomenon of Simulation: H. Bergson, J. Baudrillard.” (in Lithuanian) Problemos: Mokslo darbai (Problems: Research Papers), 71, 2007, 91-102. “The author analyzes a relationship between two concepts—that of the impulse of life by a representative of the ‘philosophy of life’ H. Bergson and that of simulation represented by the contemporary French thinker J. Baudrillard. The ‘positive metaphysics’ of H. Bergson and the philosophy of media of J. Baudrillard are compared not to find the common denominators, but rather to discover certain substantial changes in the phenomena of reality. There is a striving to reflect a change of the Bergsonian impulse of life in reality by the process of simulation. It is demonstrated how the impulse of life degenerates in the sphere of hyperreality. (edited)” Philosopher’s Index, 41.3, 2007, 324.


Giuseppe Blanco. “Présentation du ‘Commentaire’ de Georges Canguilhem.” *Annales bergsoniennes III*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 99-111. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Presentation of Georges Canguilhem’s ‘Commentary’.” The author examines Canguilhem’s original extremely antibergsonian stance before outlining Canguilhem’s careful and appreciative analysis of chapter three of *Creative Evolution*. Canguilhem took Bergson’s intention to be that of understanding the mechanism (i.e. biological mechanisms) of living things and how they have emerged in evolution.


Teresa Marie Freeman Coronado. “Locating the Butt of Ridicule: Humor and Social Class in Early American Literature.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oregon, 2008, 107. The author “… critiques the performance of class identity through the works of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century colonial and early national period authors using the lens of humor, primarily as posed by Elliot Oring and Henri Bergson’s theories of laughter and the ridiculous.”


Clinton Timothy Curle. Humanité: John Humphrey’s Account of Human Rights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007, 212. This is an important book. The author shows that Bergson’s philosophy, particularly as developed in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, was instrumental in the thinking of the Canadian philosopher, John P. Humphrey. Humphrey, an important figure in the international human rights movement, wrote the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in doing so transcribed Bergson’s philosophy of the open society into the legal and political terms of the Declaration. The author does an in-depth analysis of the relations between Bergson’s thought and the Thomistic philosophy of Jacques Maritain, and develops a fascinating account of the relations between Bergson’s philosophy of religion and the (neglected) theology of the Greek Patristic Tradition. Bergson’s philosophy can form the basis for a universal concept of human rights, one which can deal with the tension between universal and particular and which can be related to our dynamic, pluralistic world.

Gilles Deleuze. “Lecture Course on Chapter Three of Bergson’s Creative Evolution.” Trans. Bryn Loban. Substance, #114, 36.3, 2007, 72-90. These lectures were given at the École Supérieure de Saint-Cloud in 1960. They were first published, in French, in Annales bergsoniennes (2004).


Elie During. “Bergson et la métaphysique relativiste.” Annales bergsoniennes III. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 258-93. Eng. trans. “Bergson and the Metaphysics of Relativity Physics.” This careful and persuasive study of Bergson’s treatment of relativity physics can be profitably read in unison with Duration and Simultaneity. The author views Bergson as, throughout, critical of a “metaphysics of relativity” spontaneously and without prior reflection applied to relativity physics as a science. Bergson’s interpretation of relativity physics should, the author argues, be understood in this sense. In spite of Bergson’s error in interpreting the special theory of relativity, he has opened up a new direction in terms of which a unitary time in nature can be understood and formulated.


Benjamin Fraser. “Unamuno and Bergson: Notes on a Shared Methodology.” Modern Language Review, 102.3, July 1, 2007, 753-67. The author states: “Both Henri Bergson and Miguel de Unamuno shared a common methodological emphasis. Like Unamuno’s use of contradiction and paradox, Bergson’s insistence on the ‘composite’ acknowledges the limitations of the simplistic dualism and posits a more complex articulation of opposing yet entwined forces: reason and faith for Unamuno, space and time for Bergson. Each uses unresolved contradiction to escape the abstract and untenable positions of both realism and idealism and to favour intuition over intellection. This essay addresses Bergson’s underemphasized historical connection with Spain and explored Unamuno’s explicit and implicit incorporation of Bergsonian ideas.”


Hisashi Fujita. “Bergson’s Hand: Toward a History of (Non)-Organic Vitalism.” Trans. Roxanne Lapidus. *Substance*, #114, 36.3, 2007, 115-130. The author, conceding that Bergson is in some sense a vitalist, tries to define what sort of vitalism Bergson proposes. It is not a substantialist vitalism, and does not involve a pre-established harmony. His is a “nonorganic vitalism” involving a “history of transevaluation” or a “genealogy of genealogy”.


Michael Glynn. *Vladimir Nabokov: Bergsonian and Russian Influences in His Novels*. Blasingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, xi, 202. This item includes a section on Bergson and Nabokov. In general it seeks to counter the view that Nabokov is a symbolist writer concerned with transcendent reality.

Pradines argues, fails to account for the activity of the mind in perception, hence construes perception as a kind of representation.

Paul C. Grimstand. “Experience and Experimental Writing From Emerson to William James.” Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 2001, 301. The author examines Henry James’ The Ambassadors “…through the lens of the correspondence between Henri Bergson and William James, revealing both the affinities and the divergences between James’ radical pluralism and Bergson’s notion of durée and the way in which both thinkers modified their philosophies in accordance with the others influence.”

Elizabeth Grosz. “Deleuze, Bergson and the Concept of Life.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 61 (3:241), 2007, 287-300. “This paper explores a new, Darwinian concept of life that emerges from the writings of Henri Bergson and is later elaborated by Gilles Deleuze. This concept refuses to separate life from matter, but sees it as an open-ended, unpredictable emergence out of materiality. This notion of life entails the emergence of entities that carry their past along with their present. Life returns to the world of materiality that very indeterminacy that it exploits in its own eruption, drawing the material universe itself into becomings that can not be predicted. Life returns to matter itself a kind of inorganic life.” Philosopher’s Index, 41 (2), 2007, 401.


Pete A.Y. Gunter. “Bergson’s Creation of the Possible.” Substance, #114, 36.3, 2007, 33-41. In “The Possible and the Real” Bergson argues against the deeply entrenched notion that prior to the emergence of any reality there is a realm of “possibles” into which reality must “fit” in order to exist. Bergson denies this assumption, arguing that it involves an illicit projection of a present, novel state of affairs into a mythical past, which is then supposed to precede it. In making this argument, however, he is led to say that the only thing that can be said of the creative event is that nothing prevents it from happening. But in Creative Evolution he shows that specific conditions must precede the creative act: namely non-distinct factors which interpenetrate, and which become progressively more distinct as they diverge and cease to interpenetrate. This is the nature of his famous (and difficult to interpret) élan vital. A way to make sense of the élan vital is to compare it with a quantum wave function or “superposition”.


191. The author concludes: “Furthermore, the final chapter devoted to Existentialism also offers a comparison of *Maskeblomstfamilien* protagonist with The Theater of the absurd and analyzes Henri Bergson’s essay *Laughter* as a theoretical background of Saabye Christensen’s novel.”


Christian Kerslake. *Deleuze and the Unconscious*. London: Continuum, 2007, ix, 246. (Continuing Studies in Continental Philosophy) The author describes Gilles Deleuze as taking up and preserving all the ideas of the unconscious which had been rejected by the prevailing Freudian orthodoxy, infusing them with new life. These included Bergson’s theories of memory and instinct and Jung’s theory of archetypes. Deleuze is concerned to establish a wholly new approach to the unconscious according to which there are active (as well as passive and pathological) relations between the unconscious and consciousness.

Wahida Khandker. “Two Natures: Whitehead on Bergsonism.” *Process Studies*, 36.2, 2007, 245-71. “Whitehead calls for an extrication of the concept of nature from models of the body/subject, which is always engaged in a process of “extensive abstraction” or simplification, issuing forth our conceptions of serial time and divisible space. The incorporation of serial time into process (thereby unifying the sciences with philosophy) is commonly held to be a key distinction between Whitehead and the more “dualistic” thought of Henri Bergson. This essay examines the affinities between the two thinkers, with particular reference to their common espousal of the primacy of process and a fragmentation of the Kantian unity of subjectivity.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.3, 2008, 443.


Maurizio Lazzerato. “Machines to Crystalize Time: Bergson.” *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24.6, 2007, 99-112. The author states: “We are interested in Bergson because he describes natural perception as a relation between flows [flux] of images, between durations and different rhythms. This relation between flows is guaranteed functionally by the body, consciousness and memory, which operate as true interfaces, introducing a time of indeterminacy, elaboration and choice into the flow of things.” Bergson avoids the “disappearance” of the real and visible. The author then applies this standpoint to film and video technologies and to the notions of intellectual labor and of subjectivity.


Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond. “Le boulet d’Einstein et les boulettes de Bergson.” Annales bergsoniennes III. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 237-58. Eng. trans. “Einstein’s Projectile and Bergson’s Projectiles.” The author demonstrates why and in what respects Bergson’s criticism of Einstein’s special theory of relativity fails. (Notably, Bergson did not see that accelerated movement can be accommodated by the special theory.) Nonetheless, in posing the criticisms that he did, Bergson raised some issues that are still significant, touched on problems that are still not resolved.

Enrica Lisciani Petrini. “Fuori della persona: L’‘impersonale’ in Merleau-Ponty, Bergson e Deleuze.” Filosofia Politica, 21.3, 2007, 393-409. Eng. trans. “Beyond the Person: The ‘Impersonal’ in Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and Deleuze.” The author’s abstract states: “The concept of ‘person’ is the time-old performative device which crosses over different rhetorical strategies related to man—as it is today from personalism to phenomenology. In this essay the author interprets this concept moving from Merleau-Ponty’s rupture of the traditional theoretical framework, arguing through the notions of ‘dimensions of personalization’ or ‘impersonal’. Such notions are firstly developed by Bergson and will reach an advanced level of thematization in Deleuze.”


Paul-Antoine Miquel. “Bergson and Darwin: From an Immanentist to Emergentist Approach to Evolution.” *Substance*, #114, 36.3, 2007, 42-56. Granting the gap between Bergson’s and Charles Darwin’s concepts of evolution, the author argues that Darwin uses an emergentist standpoint in terms of which evolution embodies real duration. Nonetheless Darwin’s belief in variation and natural selection is not compatible with Bergson’s belief in a “dissipative” creativity in nature. The two are not philosophical brothers but cousins.


John Mullarkey. “Life, Movement and the Fabulation of the Event.” *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24.6, 2007, 53-70. The article introduces “Bergson’s notion of fabulation” (Section One). It then connects fabulation with the concept of the Event… which, for Bergson, is another essential prerequisite for the fabulation of any set of processes into a single, living event: every event has its roots, no matter how distant, in a memory of past, stressful processes, movements of disaster (Section Two). Section Three will then shift to Film Theory… The fourth and final section brings these ideas together through a discussion of disaster films.


Sebastian Olma and Kostas Koukouzelis. “Introduction: Life’s (Re-)Emergences.” *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24.6, 2007, 1-17. This is an introduction to the Bergson number of *Theory, Culture and Society* (2007). The authors protest a no longer tenable separation between nature and culture and look to Bergson (and also Deleuze) for a “new vitalism”. A genealogy of this vitalism includes A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, G. Tarde, H. Bergson, A.N. Whitehead, M. Foucault, and G. Deleuze. The authors present brief accounts of each essay in this journal issue (whose specifically Bergsonian articles are included in the present bibliography, with annotation).

Joseph T. Palencik. “Amusement and the Philosophy of Emotion: A Neuroanatomical Approach.” *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review*, 46.3, 2007, 419-34. “Philosophers who discuss the emotions have usually treated amusement as a nonemotional mental state. Two prominent philosophers making this claim are Henri Bergson and John Morreall, who maintain that amusement is too abstract and intellectual to qualify as an emotion. Here, the merit of this claim is assessed. Through recent work in neuroanatomy there is reason to doubt the legitimacy of dichotomies that separate emotion and the intellect. Findings suggest that the neuroanatomical structure of amusement is similar to other commonly recognized emotional states. On the basis of these it is argued that amusement should be considered an emotion.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.1, 2008, 515.


Keith Ansell Pearson. “Beyond the Human Condition: An Introduction to Deleuze’s Lecture Course.” *SubStance*, #114, 36.3, 2007, 57-71. This is an introduction to Gilles Deleuze’s 1960 lectures on Bergson (following, pp. 72-90). Deleuze lectures, first, demonstrate Bergson’s importance for philosophy and, second, reveal much about the Development of Deleuze’s thought. Bergson’s importance for philosophy is seen (a.) in his relations to Kant (b.) his effort to think beyond the human condition.

Emmanuel Picavet. “Action et décision. Le sens des interrogations de Bergson.” *Annales bergsoniennes III*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 191-216. Eng. trans. “Action and Decision: The Meaning of Bergson’s Interrogations.” The author states that in this article “… a reading of Bergson is confronted with some persistent questions about the representation of decisions and about practical reasoning. It is shown that Bergson’s analysis of the process of consciousness in deliberation identifies still important problems involving definite methodological choices.” The author deals with decision theory, the valorization of acts, the principle of optimality.


This is an editorial in the first issue of the first volume of a new electronic journal dedicated to creating a dialogue between psychology and the biological sciences. The author introduces Bergson’s thought as a basis for research.

Smita A. Rahman. “Politics, Time and Memory.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2007, 187. The author “… attempts to articulate a complex concept of time that emerges in fragments in the genealogy of political theory, particularly in the works of Bergson and Nietzsche.” This construal of memory and perception is then related to the “politics of memory” in Algeria, South Africa, and Rwanda.

Bryony Randall. *Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, x, 221. This study of time in modernist literature uses the work of Bergson and William James to “frame” the writings of Dorothy Richardson, Gertrude Stein, H.D. and several others.

Rebecca Suzanne Rauve. “Immanent Fiction: Self-Present Consciousness in the Novels of Dorothy Richardson.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 2007, 375. The author states: “This dissertation argues that a fascination with immanent states (seen, for example, in Bergson’s duration, William James’ stream of consciousness, and Lévy-Bruhl’s analysis of the 'primitive mind’) had a significant, largely unrecognized impact on Modern British Literature.”
Camille Riquier. “Bergson et le problème de la personnalité.” Les Études Philosophiques, 81.2, 2007, 193-214; 266-267. Eng. trans. “Bergson and the Problem of Personality.” The author argues that one of the principle aims of Bergson was to center philosophy around the problem of personality. In dealing with the personality Bergson found a way of dealing with both mental pathology (“folie”) and with morality and religion.


student, had a profound but largely neglected influence on his thinking. In this paper I focus on
the new light that recognition of this influence throws on Sartre’s central argument about the
relation between negation and nothingness in his *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre’s argument is in
part a response to Bergson’s dismissive, eliminativist account of nothingness in *Creative Evolution*
(1907): the objections to the concept of nothingness, with which Sartre engages are precisely
these raised by Bergson. Even if Sartre’s account of nothingness in its entirety is found to be
flawed, I argue that the points he makes specifically against Bergson are powerful. My discussion
concludes with a brief examination of the wider philosophical background to Sartre’s and

Delfim Santos. “Uma visita a Bergson.” in *Obras Completas*, Vo. I. Lisbon: Fundação Calouste


About Memory? Reminiscence in Henri Bergson.”

the tendency of critics of modernism to reduce biology to ‘biopolitics’, Michel Foucault’s term
for the social engineering of life, I show how modernist poetry approaches what Bergson calls
‘creative evolution’ with experiments in poetic form that correspond to or imagine organic and
utopian changes in life.” The author deals with Marianne Moore, Mina Loy, William Carlos
Williams, Gertrude Stein, Louis Zukovsky.

Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc. “Comment se fait-il que tout ne soit pas donné ? Attente, rythme et retard dans
*L’Évolution créatrice*.” This talk was given at the Ateliers franco-japonais sur *L’Évolution
créatrice* de Bergson, Université de Toulouse-Le Miracl, April, 2007. It is published online at
www.europhilosophie.edu. Eng. trans. “How is it That Everything is not Given All at Once?
Waiting, Rhythm and Delay in *Creative Evolution*."

Peter Spateneder. *Leibhafrige Zeit: die Verteidigung des Wirklichen bei Henri Bergson*. (Ursprünge des
Defense of Actuality*. The author examines *Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory, Creative
Evolution* and *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, treating them as variations on a single
formal and identical thought.

2007, x, 233. Drawing on the philosophy of Bergson, the author presents a model of bureaucracy
as capable of doing what bureaucracies ordinarily do not do: apprehending both its functional
organization (with its continuous ongoing modifications) and the necessity of adapting to external
conditions.

Maria Jesús Lopez Sanchez-Vizciano. “The Waters of the Mind: Rhetorical Patterns of Fluidity in Woolf,
William James, Bergson and Freud.” *PSYART*, 1/1/2007. (PSYART is an online journal.)

Demet Kurtoglu Tasdelen. “Dilthey’s Placement of Shakespeare in the Human World and Macbeth as an
Exemplary for an Effort to Form the Forgotten Historicism.” (in Turkish) *Kaygi: Uludag
Alberto Toscano. “Vital Strategies: Maurizio Lazzarato and the Metaphysics of Contemporary Capitalism.” *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24.6, 2007, 71-91. “This article seeks to introduce the important work of Maurizio Lazzarato to an English-speaking audience, focusing in particular on his appropriation of Bergsonism to forge a metaphysics of contemporary capitalism and resistance to capitalism. (It) tries to contextualize his stance in terms of a heretical post-workerist tradition forged in an Italian Marxist milieu in the 1970’s…”


Baron briefly presents the content of each of the essays appearing in this volume. (Each of these essays appears in this bibliography with annotations.)


Matthias Vollet. “Introduction au cours de Bergson sur *De rerum originatione radicalis* de Leibniz.” *Annales bergsoniennes III*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 25-34. Eng. trans. “Introduction to Bergson’s Course on Leibniz’ *De rerum originatione radicalis*.” This course was given in 1898, at the same time as a course on Fichte. The manuscript, comprised of two sets of class notes by Bergson’s students, is admittedly incomplete. But Bergson’s criticisms of Leibniz are nonetheless clear. Leibniz’ metaphysics is founded on the erroneous idea of preexisting “possibles”. Hence Leibniz is unable to account for human liberty or for any valid account of “tendency” in nature or human life.


Rafael Winkler. “Nietzsche and l’Élan Technique: Technics, Life, and the Production of Time.” *Continental Philosophy Review*, 40.1, 2007, 73-90. “In this paper we examine Nietzsche’s relations to the life sciences of his time and to Darwinism in particular, arguing that his account of the will to power in terms of technics eschews three metaphysical prejudices: hylomorphism, utilitarianism, and teleological thinking. Telescoping some of Nietzsche’s pronouncements on the will to power with a Bergsonian lens, our reading of the will to power, as an operation productive of time, the future, or life, offers an alternative to Heidegger’s. Rather than being reducible to a technics of domination or mastery, the will to power, we argue, is best regarded as a technics of material forces that recasts all things past and future, near and far, moment by moment.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 41.4, 2007, 591.


Frédéric Worms. “La biologie au sens ‘très compréhensif’ : de Bergson à aujourd’hui.” *Annales bergsoniennes III*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 337-54. Eng. trans. “Biology in the ‘Very Comprehensive’ Sense: From Bergson Until Now.” The author deals with the question of the relation between morality and life, not only as a question central to *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* but as the most important of our problems today. The distinction between the open and the closed may, in itself, serve to orient us in our history.


2008


Alia Al-Saji. “‘A Past Which has Never Been Present’: Bergsonian Dimensions in Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of the Prepersonal.” *Research in Phenomenology*, 38.1, 2008, 41-71. The author’s abstract states: “Merleau-Ponty’s reference to “a past which has never been present” at the end of “Le sentir” challenges the typical framework of the *Phenomenology of Perception*, with its primacy of perception and bodily field of presence. In light of this “original past,” I propose a rereading of the prepersonal as ground of perception that precedes the dichotomies of subject-object and activity-passivity. Merleau-Ponty searches in the *Phenomenology* for language to describe this ground, borrowing from multiple registers (notably Bergson, but also Husserl). This “Sensory life” is a coexistence of sensing and sensible—bodily and worldly—rhythms. Perception is, then, not a natural given, but a temporal process of synchronization between rhythms. By drawing on Bergson, this can be described as a process in which virtual life is actualized into perceiving subject and object perceived. Significantly, this process involves noncoincidence or delay whereby sensory life is always already past for perception.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.3, 2008, 312.

Antanas Andrijauskas. “The Relation of Bergson’s ‘Positive’ Metaphysics in Western Thinking (in Lithuanian).” *Logos: Religijos, filosofijos komparatyvistikos ir meno žurnalas*, 56, 2008, 14-19. The author states: “This article considers how the concept of “positive” metaphysics of Henri Bergson is related to the tradition of classical as well as nonclassical philosophy. It also analyzes the leading ideas and doctrines of intuivistic philosophy. The influence of the main leading philosophers on Bergson’s thinking and teaching is concisely discussed, focusing attention on such nonclassical thinkers as Arthur Schopenhauer and Fredrich Nietzsche. Relying on the
analysis of Bergson’s philosophical texts, the peculiarities of his “positive” metaphysics are shown.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 43.1, 2009, 25.

Arnaud François. *Bergson*. Paris: Ellipses, 2008, 128. (Philo-philosophes) This is a general work intended for introductory students in philosophy. The author argues that Bergson’s thought contains an over-all structure distinguishable from its particular applications.


François Azouvi. “Le magistère bergsonien et le succès de l’élan vital.” *Annales bergsoniennes IV*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 85-93. The author examines the intense and powerful impact of *Creative Evolution* in France 1907-1914. This was possible because Bergson’s thought was taken up by the anti-egalitarian, antidemocratic, and antirationalist spirit of the time in France. This article is significant for the light it sheds on Bergson’s influence on various movements in art in his time: futurism, cubism, l’Action d’art.


Hervé Barreau. “Bergson face à Spencer. Vers un nouveau positivisme.” *Archives de Philosophie*, 71.2, 2008, 219-43. Though Bergson was, as a young philosopher, full of admiration for the philosophy of Spencer, he severely criticized the Spencerian conceptions of space and time in his thesis *Les
Données immédiates de la conscience. However Bergson was led by his psychological studies no longer to restrict space to matter and time (duration) to consciousness, so that the question of evolution, formerly handled by Spencer, was set again by Bergson. The “vital impulse” of Bergson, which is the motor of evolution, has all the properties of “creative duration”. The result is a new evolutionism, which is also a new positivism, because mechanism only holds for inert matter. *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.4, 2008, 385. Eng. trans. “Bergson Confronting Spencer. Towards a New Positivism.”


Rudolf Bernet. “Bergson over het driftmatig Karakter van bewustzijn en leven.” *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 70.1, 2008, 51-85. Eng. trans. “Bergson on the Emotional Character of Consciousness and Life.” The author’s abstract states: “A comparative analysis of Matter and memory (1896) and Creative Evolution (1907) shows how the notion and structure of “duration”, first introduced in Time and Free Will (1889), is given a new, dynamic meaning as a creative force when used to explain how unconscious memories of the past are actualized in a present perception and how the evolution of life is steered by the “élan vital”. His description of how the initial opposition between mind and brain, or between life and matter, is transformed into an order of mutual dependency also opens new metaphysical perspectives that lead beyond traditional forms of dualism or monism. This new metaphysics, which understands the movement of consciousness and life “from within”, also requires a new form of nonintellectual knowledge that Bergson calls “intuition”. Intuition as a new “method” of philosophical (and artistic) insight remains faithful to the driving force animating consciousness and life, without disregarding its genuine form of rationality (edited).” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.3, 2008, 329.


Alain Berthoz. “Les théories de Bergson sur la perception, la mémoire et le rire, au regard des données des neurosciences.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 163-178. Eng. trans. “Bergson’s Theories of Perception, Memory and Laughter, With Regard to the Data of the Neurosciences.” The author is critical of Bergson’s belief that the brain is entirely action (behavior) oriented. The brain contains mechanisms which allow it to function independently of the external world. (The brain, for example, can simulate models of the world.) He commends Bergson for his (very contemporary) view that motion is single, unitary and for his treatment of “inhibition” (the halting of motion). The author finds many insights ahead-of-their-time in Bergson’s notion of the brain as a practical coping device. He insists, however, that Bergson’s mind-brain dualism is not tenable in the light of contemporary cognitive neuroscience.


Claire Blencoe. “Destroying Duration: The Critical Situation of Bergsonism in Benjamin’s Analysis of Modern Experience.” Theory, Culture and Society, 24.4, 2008, 139-58. “Benjamin’s conception of Erfahrung/experience is defined in relation to Bergson’s conception of experience in durée/duration. Benjamin implicitly evokes and extends a Bergsonian conception of creativity. This is central to Benjamin’s understanding of the political implications of the decay of aura. The enhanced potentiality for creativity constitutes the possibility of new forms of genuine Erfahrung in the scattered debris of the old. This would be based upon an affirmative nihilism, the mobilization of the creative second technology, the feeling of the masses, and the ‘ politicization of art’. Crucially, however, Benjamin rejects Bergson’s ahistorical approach to creativity within human experience. Virtual difference, the durée, is not external to human history. Creativity does not ‘flow into’ actual human life but is the actualization of virtual difference that is generated and delimited by given sociotechnological conditions (edited).” Philosopher’s Index, 42.4, 2008, 398.


Arnaud Bouaniche. “De la surprise devant le temps à la surprise devant la création.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 611-27. Eng. trans. “From Surprise in Confronting Time to Surprise in Confronting Creation.” For Bergson, the author insists, there are two strongly contrasting forms of surprise: our astonishment before the sheer complexity of nature, viewed through the eyes of the intelligence and our (veridical) astonishment at the creativity of a volition aware of itself. In the latter case we are able to “see the invisible”.
Alain Boyer. “Popper, Bergson : l’intuition et l’ouvert.” Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 198.2, 2008, 187-203. The author states: “In the thirties, Popper used Bergson’s idea of a “creative intuition”, against inductivism and positivism. But he denied it any infallibility. In the forties, he borrowed from Bergson the expressions “société ouverte/société close”, but gave them a rationalist interpretation, criticizing fiercely Bergson’s mysticism, as well as his vitalism, regarded as essentialist historicisms à la Hegel. But eventually in the sixties Popper gave his epistemology an evolutionary turn, somewhat rehabilitating the Bergsonian idea of a “creative evolution” and even the idea of an “élan vital”. He argued that an “activist” understanding of Darwinian mechanisms was able to simulate the latter idea, without presupposing it. He proposed a cosmology of the “open universe”, stressing the reality and irreversibility of time. He went on to use the concept of emergence and tried to give an account of man’s freedom, regarded as a power to create genuine novelty in the world, as Bergson had proposed. But Popper eliminated all substantialist spiritualism, and he gave no religious background to his vision of the world. It may be added that he confessed his admiration for the lucidity of Bergson’s writing.” Philosopher’s Index, 42.3, 2008, 338. Eng. trans. “Popper, Bergson: Intuition and the Open.”

Roland Breeur. “Het niets en de materie bij Bergson.” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 70, No. 1, 2008, 87-108. Eng. trans. “The Nothing and Matter According to Bergson.” “This article explores the relation between Bergson’s concept of nothingness, as he analyses it in his work The Creative Evolution, and his conception of life. It is argued that he only can determine nothingness as a “pseudo-idea” at the price of some general presuppositions concerning life and the spirit. Hence, the core question this article deals with, is: what are these presuppositions and how do they influence Bergson’s description of life and matter?” Philosopher’s Index, 42.3, 2008, 339.


James Burton. “Bergson’s Non-Archival Theory of Memory.” Memory Studies, 1.3, 2008, 321-39. The author states: “Literal and metaphorical associations between memory and archives are found throughout traditional and contemporary thinking about memory. Despite a long-running tendency in the western tradition to doubt the adequacy of archival metaphors for memory, and despite much recent research that implicitly treats memory in terms of dynamic mnemonic and memorial processes, imprint/substrate models epitomized by Plato’s wax tablet seem extraordinarily resistant to attempts to think memory beyond them. Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory, in which he makes a radical separation between the processes of recollection and ‘pure memory’, provides both an argument for the tenacity of the memory-archive relation and an alternative, non-archival model of memory. In this article I suggest the possible implications of
this model for the way we think about memory and the archive, and on the basis of this point towards Bergson’s potential significance for the emergent field of memory studies.”

James Burton. “Machines Making Gods: Philip K. Dick, Henri Bergson and Saint Paul.” Theory Culture and Society, 25.7-8, 2008, 262-84. “Considering Paul alongside Philip K. Dick, this article will attempt to bring out this central role of fictionalizing in the religious experiences of both. Like Paul, Dick experienced a visionary encounter with a God-like entity that shaped his interests and writing for the remainder of his life, and developed his own soteriology in response to what he perceived as the continued existence of (the Roman) Empire in modernity. Bringing out the mutual complementarity of Dick and Paul is facilitated by a framework derived from Henri Bergson’s Two Sources of Religion, which theorizes the relation between mechanization as a human tendency characterizing both imperialism and industrialization, and fabulation as a human faculty for using fiction for the jointly immanent-transcendent purposes of survival/salvation. In this context, the diverse modes of fictionalizing employed by both Dick and Paul, including their unconsciously produced visions, may be understood as part of an ongoing, continually renewed strategy of revolutionary transformation of both self and world (edited).” Philosopher’s Index, 43.1, 2009, 369.

Florence Caeymaex. “Négativité et finitude de l’élan vital. La lecture de Bergson par Jankélévitch.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 629-640. Eng. trans. “Negativity and Finitude of the élan vital. Jankélévitch’s Reading of Bergson.” Bergson harshly criticizes the idea of a substantive “nothing” as well as the concept of logical negation. The author explores these criticisms but notes that the occurrence of negativity in Bergson’s thought, a felt negation (negation vécue) at the center interference of processes of contrasting direction (e.g. “life” and “matter”). She points to the interpretation of Bergson by Vladimir Jankélévitch of the élan vital as finite and thus as constrained to invert itself, producing repetition, externality, determinism. There is thus an opposition and a dialectic between “life” and “matter”.


Cayetano Aranda Torres. “Reverberaciones bergsonianas en Merleau-Ponty.” Revista de Filosofia, 44, 2008, 61-72. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Bergsonian Reverberations in Merleau-Ponty.” “In Praise of Philosophy (1953) is one of the indicated places more where Merleau-Ponty, halfway in his theoretical production, engages in a dialog with the philosophy of its time, which simultaneously clarifies the budgets and fundamental questions to which its thought tries to give an answer. The article takes care, mainly of the critical reading and singular Merleau-Pontian prolongation of the work of Bergson, looking to find some keys by the common speculative root of both thinkers and other contemporaries, simultaneously who raise to contribute some light on the novel Merleau-Pontian sense of philosophical activity like philosophy of the ambiguity, in which interrogation is its motor axis.” Philosopher’s Index, 43.1, 2009, 334.

extremely painstaking analysis of the gap between intuition and its necessarily spatial representation. Can intuition be expressed? The author’s remarks on Saussure (among other thinkers) are particularly insightful.

Axel Cherniavsky. “La expression de la durée en la filosofía de Bergson.” Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 34.1, 2008, 93-123. Eng. trans. “Expression of Duration in Bergson’s Philosophy.” Probablemente como toda crítica al lenguaje, la de Bergson, por ser lingüística, parece encerrar en una paradoja pragmática: ¿cómo logra Bergson transmitir la intuición metafísica de la durée si el lenguaje le resulta tan poco apto para expresar la naturaleza del espíritu? Intentaremos resolver el problema mediante la aplicación de la propia metafísica de Bergson y de su propio método a la cuestión del lenguaje. La operación nos obligará a interrogar la concepción bergsoniana del lenguaje, y a analizar en detalle su prosa. Descubriremos entre otras cosas que su estilo no es precisamente “fluido”, como han afirmado al pasar muchos de sus lectores, y que la figura clave de su discurso no es la metáfora.” Philosopher’s Index, 43.2, 2009, 334. The author explores Bergson’s philosophy of language and use of language. He concludes that Bergson’s language is not simply “fluid” and that the key to his discourse is not, simply, “metaphor”.


Rebecca Coleman. “A Method of Intuition: Becoming, Relationality, Ethics.” History of the Human Sciences, 21.4, 2008, 104-23. The author states: “This article examines social research on the relations between (young) women’s bodies and images through Bergson’s method of intuition, which suggests that the only way a thing can be known is through coinciding with the uniqueness of the becoming. I suggest that in this aim, intuition is, necessarily, an intimate research method. With a focus on my own research, which explored the relations between 13 girls’ bodies and images from a feminist-Deleuzian position, I argue that the interconnected issues of becoming, uniqueness and coincidence that Bergson raises connect with concerns in social research about ontology, concepts and methods. Drawing through the significance of relations, I argue that intimate, intuitive research is desirable because of the ethics that it opens up and enables; ethics intimate in attention to the becoming unique to the object at stake in research and in the attempt to coincide with this uniqueness (edited).” Philosopher’s Index, 39.1, 2009, 382.

Nicholas Cornibert. “Les Deux Sens de l’Absolu et la notion d’image dans L’Évolution créatrice.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 513-28. Eng. trans. “The Two Meanings of ‘Absolute’ and the Concept of the Image in Creative Evolution.” Bergson asserts two views which appear to stand in sharp contradiction: 1. Matter and motion are to be construed as a series of geometrical points 2. Matter and motion are to be construed as continuous and dynamic (as duration). This contradiction crops up at several points in Bergson’s thought. The author proposes that this contradiction can be overcome through an understanding of Bergson’s concept of the image, with its inherent ambiguity: on one side images are rendered stable, distinct, geometrical, but on the other they are durational. Hence our encounter with them in ordinary perception is a direct encounter with levels of duration.

Magda Costa Carvalho. “La Biologie et la psychologie. Les “clefs de contact” du dynamisme vitaliste bergsonien.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 339-348. Eng. trans. “Biology and Psychology: The “Ignition Key” of Bergson’s Vitalist Dynamism.” The alliance which Bergson creates between psychology and biology, the author argues, forms the basis for his philosophy, which is an attempt to “embrace the totality of the real”, in which science and philosophy can constantly fecundate and complete each other.


Jan Degraeuwe. “Verscheidenheid en eenheid in de creatieve evolutie volgens Bergson.” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 70.1, 2008, 27-49. Eng. trans. “Variety and Oneness in Bergson’s Creative Evolution.” The author states: “Bergson develops a metaphysical vision of the evolution of life in L’évolution créatrice. This vision exceeds the particular scientific theories and is supported by an epistemology. This article is a reading of L’évolution créatrice focusing on differences of kind: matter/life, plant/animal, intelligence/instinct and intelligence/intuition. These differences of kind are the philosophical ground to refute reductionism. Dualism is avoided by seeing these differences of kind as inverse movements developing out of a common source: universal life or consciousness in general (edited).” Philosopher’s Index, 42.3, 2008, 370.


Julien Douçot. “Le vivant en activité. Besoin, problème et créativité chez Bergson.” Archives de Philosophie, 71.2, 2008, 245-268. The author states: “From Matter and Memory to Creative Evolution, Bergson’s concept of life undergoes a series of changes following the development of a question: what are the main vital values? What is life aiming at? The classical notion of need—that fails to give an accurate account of the evolution process—is replaced by the specifically Bergsonian concept of indetermination. Thus, the vital activity and its paradoxical end is to be defined by the category of problematic. To raise and to solve problems becomes life and thought’s main operation.” Philosopher’s Index, 42.4, 2008, 448. Eng. trans. “Active Life: Need, Problem and Creativity in Bergson.”

Ronald Durán, Patricio Landaeta, Oscar Orellana and Ricardo Espinosa Lolas. “Interpretación del Tiempo en Ilya Prigogine a Partir de Aristóteles, Newton, Zubiri, Bergson y García Cacca.”

Marc Faessler. “Et pourtant... Note sur l’interprétation du judaïsme dans Les Deux Sources.” in *Bergson et la religion*. Ed. G. Waterlot. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 321-30. Eng. trans. “Note on the Interpretation of Judaism in The Two Sources.” This is a careful, pointed, remarkably clear analysis of Bergson’s analysis of Judaism, both in itself and in its relations to Christianity. It would be wrong to say that for Bergson Christianity is (simply) a development of Judaism. But it is the high ethical level of the Jewish prophets which made Christianity possible. On Bergson’s terms, in addition, it is not hard to imagine a complete mysticism within Judaism.

James Fairhed. “Popper, Plato, Voegelin. Openness and Kitsch Organizational Puppetry.” *Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society*, 2007, 17-42. The author states: “This paper first reviews the concept of kitsch which is proposed as a revealing descriptor of certain modern modes of being. Secondly, that paper turns to a particular corporate case history to suggest that corporate existence is kitsch to the extent that it is sentimentalizing, narcissistic, misleadingly portrayed not just as ‘fun’ but as ‘open’. Prompted by this observation, the paper reviews the concept of openness within three recent theorists, as well as within contemporary popular discourse, finding that in the classically inspired perspective of Bergson and Voegelin, the modern and Popperian view of openness seems paradoxically closed. Following form this, a Voegelinian analysis of the previous case material is attempted, suggesting that organizational kitsch is often no more than a thin highly burnished outer layer, tempting us into, and serving all the better to mask, a more complex and sometimes vicious honeycomb of fantasy modes structured within. The paper concludes with a few tentative remarks about the processes by which such fantasies are generated and the extent to which current legislative moves can help mitigate our modern management madness.”


Anthony Feneuil. “Morale et religion, quelle unité pour *Les Deux Sources*?” in *Bergson et la religion*. Ed. G. Waterlot. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 355-77. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Morality and Religion: What Unity for *The Two Sources*?” The author deals with the problem of Bergson’s two dualities, of morality and religion and of their two sources. If we study these from a biological viewpoint (that is, in terms of their functions) we find a basic unity. Morality and religion spring from the same need, to take away negativity and attach the human being to life. The gradual complexification of the closed society and its internal and closed morality gradually liberates the closed morality from the closed religion. This complexification, in turn, makes open religion and dynamic morality possible. In turn, these involve going beyond the idea of a mere function. A function fulfills what has already been. A creative emotion brings what is new.


Benjamin Fraser. “Toward a Philosophy of the Urban: Henri Lefebvre’s Uncomfortable Application of Bergsonism.” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 26.2, 2008, 338-58. The author argues that though Lefebvre consistently rejected the philosophy of Henri Bergson, his writings made great use of Bergson’s key ideas and method. Lefebvre’s urban philosophical project appropriated Bergson’s ideas through their application to urban life, stressing the importance of acknowledging the importance of movement, process and mobilities in approaches to the problems of urban life.


J.B.S. Haldone, T. Dobshansky, S. Wright) admired Bergson’s evolutionary ideas and also were critical of (“judged”) them, retaining some of Bergson’s most general ideas concerning evolution.


inability to grow and to develop. To cure mental illness is to free the patient from being figé in
time.

Pete A.Y. Gunter. “The Transformation of Analysis in Bergson.” *Annales bergsoniennes IV*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 563-573. Bergson appears to make a radical and permanent distinction between intuition and analysis. Intuition participates in duration; analysis breaks durational into static mutually external parts. The two are thus in perpetual conflict. In two ways, however, Bergson attempts to resolve this conflict constructively. First, starting with the emergence of Newtonian physics and the infinitesimal calculus, he insists that the intuition of duration is a basis for Newton’s mechanics and for modern mathematical analysis, and suggests its importance for future scientific research. In *Creative Evolution* he ponders the possibility of some future mode of analysis which will not reduce duration to timeless relata. The author suggests that quantum physics, which “reduces” nature to physical terms having temporal breadth, may provide an example of a durational scientific analysis.


Rebecca Hill. “Interval, Sexual Difference: Luce Irigaray and Henri Bergson.” *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*, 23.1, 2008, 119-31. The author states: “Henri Bergson’s philosophy has attracted increasing feminist attention in recent years as a fruitful focus for retheorizing temporality. Drawing on Luce Irigaray’s well-known critical description of metaphysics as phallocentrism, Hill argues that Bergson’s deduction of duration is predicated upon the disavowal of a sexed hierarchy. She concludes the article by proposing a way to move beyond Bergson’s phallocentrism to articulate duration as a sensible and transcendental difference that articulates a nonhierarchical qualitative relation between the sexes.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.3, 2008, 422.


such as September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center can be read as “departures” toward wider relational possibilities.”


Antoine Janvier. “Le Problème de la mort et de l’intelligence dans L’Évolution créatrice.” *Annales bergsoniennes IV*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 467-82. An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Problem of Death and the Intelligence in Creative Evolution.” The author notes Bergson’s contention, in Creative Evolution, that the death of individuals is necessary for the continued development of life. This fundamental assumption, applied to Bergson’s concept of human intelligence, reveals that intelligence is necessary if life is to reach its highest levels of development. In no way is Bergson’s philosophy an invitation to return to a life of instinct.


Michael R. Kelley. “Husserl, Deleuzian Bergsonism and the Sense of the Past in General.” *Husserl Studies*, 24.1, 2008, 15-30. The author states: “In this paper, I renew the Husserlian defense of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness in response to the recent movement of Deleuzian Bergsonism. Section one presents Bergsonism’s notion of the past in general and its critique of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness. Section two presents a rejoinder to Bergsonism’s critique of Husserl, questioning (1) its understanding of the living present as linearly extended, (2) its conflation of the living-present with Husserl’s early schema-apprehension interpretation, and (3) its failure to grasp Husserl’s revised understanding of primary memory as a result of (2). In conclusion, I suggest that Husserl’s theory of retention might articulate a notion of the past more consistent with Bergson than Bergsonism itself (edited).” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.3, 2008, 440.

Yala Kisukidi. “Néant, négation, négativité dans L’Évolution créatrice de Bergson.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 399-409. Eng. trans. “Nothing, Negation, Negativity in Bergson’s Creative Evolution.” Bergson breaks with traditional notions of being via a threefold critique of 1. the idea of nothing 2. the concept of the dialectic and 3. the concept of being as “identity with”. This standpoint, however, creates a puzzle. His own descriptions of creativity and evolution involve the opposition of matter and of life and involve both inversions of life’s élan and the passage of life into its ‘other’ as it takes on material form. The author finds in these factors a positive notion of negativity: an “operational negative.”


David Lapoujade. “Sur un concept méconnu de Bergson. L’attachement à la vie. Pour une relecture des Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 673-693. Eng. trans. “On a Little Recognized Bergsonian Concept, Attachment to Life. Towards a Rereading of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.” Bergson’s concept of “attention to life” (which allows him to distinguish between the normal and the pathological) has been examined by scholars. His later concept of “attachment to life”, however, has been fully neglected. (In a brief account like this, it is not possible to do justice to this excellent article, which explores Bergson’s account of the human condition with its inescapable deficits and corresponding neurosis. Closed religion for the author achieves a tolerable state of affairs for humanity; open religion would relieve our burdens and make possible a higher stability. Ed.)


Arvydas Liepuonius. “Laughing as Neurotic Anxiety Expression and Chance for Emancipation (According to H. Bergson).” (In Lithuanian). Logos: Religijos, filosofijos, komparatyvistikos ir meno žurnalas, 55, 2008, 82-88. The author states: “In this article, the mechanisms of psychosocial adaptation are considered as they are presented in the book of the famous French philosopher H. Bergson, Le rire. The main attention is paid to the capacity for laughter. Since its defect or absence, as a rule, causes inadequate personal reactions to psychosocial challenges, the testing of it is an important part of psychoanalytical diagnostics.” Philosopher’s Index, 42.4, 2008, 556.

Alexandre Lefebvre. The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, 305. (Cultural Memory in the Present) The author uses the ideas of Deleuze, Bergson, and Spinoza to rethink the nature of law, law-giving, and human institutions. He does this by bringing Deleuze “to everyday institutional concerns”, giving his ideas “more sober application than is often the case.” (xiii) The larger, central portion of this study “Part 2: The Image of Law: Bergson and Time” includes a reading of Bergsonian temporality in terms of the American Jurist, Oliver
Wendell Holmes. It also includes a section on Bergson, perception, and memory and a concluding section on Bergson and the concept of judgment. The author hopes to show the centrality of temporality and creativity to the making of law.


Julia Mahler. *Lived Temporalities: Exploring Duration in Guatemala*. Bielefield: Transcript Verlag, 2008, 280. (This is Volume 26 of Cultural Studies. Edited by Rainer Winter) The author states that the idea for this study of lived time came to her initially from Bergson, though clearly she owes much to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the virtual. The passive sensuous character of life in Guatemala, spelled out in the temporalities of fire, water, sweetcorn, and Saints, provide a way to limit the aggressive, narcissistic character of global capitalism.


Paul-Antoine Miquel. “Une harmonie en arrière.” *Annales bergsoniennes IV*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 133-45. Eng. trans. “A Harmony From the Past.” The author asks: “How can we understand that harmony is behind and not in front of us, how can we understand that it is a unity of impulse and not of aspiration? This is Darwin’s most dangerous idea and also Bergson’s. But it is not either Dennett’s or Dawkins’. “ p. 135. Both Bergson and Darwin deny that natural selection can be rigorously predicted beforehand, Miquel sees both thinkers as accepting a principle of emergence. Natural selection is not an algorithm or set of algorithms but a principle of perturbation.

Lara M. Mitias. *Memory, Reality and the Value of the Past*. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 2008, 501. The author argues that memory is the enabling condition for other means of knowing and perceiving. In spite of fascinating neuropsychological studies which “tempt us to take our remembered past as spread out in the brain”, as Bergson argued, hard questions about felt duration and the role of memory in perception remain. The author concludes: “Genuinely tensed ‘prior’ times, transcending actual individual minds, are seen to be embedded in impersonal Consciousness, as Abhinavagupta and Bergson had both concluded.”

Haime Montero Anzola. “Tempo y conciencia de tiempo: De la fenomenología de la neurofenomenología.” Franciscanum: Revista de las Ciencias del Espíritu, 50.149, 2008, 95-149. Eng. trans. “Time and Consciousness of Time: On the Phenomenology of Neurophenomenology.” This essay has two parts. In the first, a description of time is presented, giving relevance to two philosophers: Heraclitus and Plato; ideas about time in Augustine of Hippo are emphasized; afterwards the most important thoughts on time in Bergson and Husserl are described. Next, some aspects of the idea of time in Askin and the space-time in Desoille are illustrated, as well as the temporal negation in a text of the Upanshads and other concerning Buddhism Machyamika. Finally, it is shown briefly the conception of time in I. Prigogine, which is a crucial point of his studies. In the second part, research is done into the phenomenology of internal consciousness of time and the scientific review carried out by the neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience are the two sources taken as point of reference and permanent relation. In this part, some phenomenological analyses concerning the temporality of the consciousness are technically shown, and the “naturalization” done by Fransisco Varela about “The Lessons of the Phenomenology of the Internal Consciousness of Time” by Edmund Husserl (edited).” Philosopher’s Index, 44.1, 2010, 429.


Valentine Moulard-Leonard. Bergson-Deleuze Encounters: Transcendental Experience and the Thought of the Virtual. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008, x, 208. (SUNY Series in Contemporary French Thought) The author first analyzes Bergson’s “virtual empiricism”, dealing with duration, the role of the body, “positivism”. He then brings Bergson’s thought into relation with Deleuze, Deleuze’s notions of cinema, the crystal image, and Proustian essences. “Why read Deleuze after Bergson?” the author asks. In the end, it is Deleuze’s “virtual materialism” which must prevail over Bergson.

John Mullarkey. “Breaking the Circle: Élan vital as Performative Metaphysics.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 591-600. The author argues that Bergson’s philosophy is not a set of views or a single ultimate view of reality, but a performative approach which must continually involve the knower in reflecting on the known. The formal principles of holism and the language of intuition, immanence, and pluralism are fundamental to Bergson’s thought.


Alain Panero. “Kant, précurseur manqué de Bergson?” *Revue Philosophique de la France et de L’Etranger*, 198.2, 2008, 133-145. « In a passage of *Creative Evolution*, Bergson does not refute Kant, but presents him as a precursor of a new philosophy, and even as a liable but failed precursor of his own philosophy. If the transcendental philosophy, really promising, seems initially disappointing, it is because it only gives us a deduction of the categories and not a genesis of intelligence. How can Bergson say that? How can he compare two perspectives which seem diverging completely? Is there anything in Kant’s texts which evidences this connexion between a transcendental deduction and a genesis of intelligence?” *Philosopher's Index*, 42.3, 2008, 509. Eng. trans. “Kant, a Lacking Precursor of Bergson?”


Jean-François Perraudin, Eileen Rizo-Patron, Trans. “A Non-Bergsonian Bachelard.” *Continental Philosophy Review*, 41.4, 2008, 463-479. “In this essay, Perraudin sets out to contrast the competing philosophies of time and imagination of two major French thinkers of the twentieth century: Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962). Despite Bachelard’s polemical approach vis-à-vis philosophical tradition in the works on epistemology and poetics, his accounts of time and imagination have been shown by several critics to be significantly influenced and inspired by his predecessor. Perraudin nonetheless argues that Bachelard’s critique of Bergson’s theory of continuous temporality opens the way- though the subtle dialectics of his “philosophy of no” – to more prolific, and as yet untapped, therapeutic possibilities in our understanding of time and imagination than Bergson’s accounts of continuum of the *élán vital* had managed to reveal.” *Philosopher's Index*, 43.2, 2009, 567.


Marcelina Piotrowski. “Matter is Movement: Exploring the Role of Movement in Henri Bergson and Bruno Latour.” M.A. Thesis, York University (Canada), 2008, 98. The Author’s abstract states: “This thesis explores the meaning of matter and particularly the implications of the methodologies of Henri Bergson and of Bruno Latour in arriving at an understanding of the material milieu. It suggests that matter is movement, matter is the movement of time which in its duration is memory and creativity, conservation and action, as well as the reorientation of matter spatially through the constant collision between different surfaces of meaning. An investigation of matter through this approach allows for an understanding of matter to be achieved, one in which the material realm plays the steering role in the methodology, not a preconceived agenda which the theorist wishes to exemplify. The outcome is a shared agency between humans and matter, which has neither been found in idealism or materialism, which both Bergson and Latour reject. Bergson’s intuition, and Latour’s translation and Actor-Network-Theory, are further examined as ways of interpreting the documentary Manufactured Landscapes.”


T. Prankiskus-Ksaveras Czali. “Why Was Bergson Interested in Mysticism?” (In Lithuanian) Logos: Religijos, filosofijos, Komparatyvistikos ir meno žurnalas, 55, 2008, 64-73. The author states: “The purpose of this article is to show the importance of the reading of the mystic by Bergson as it is explained in his work Two Sources of Morality and the Religion, by putting to the test the coherence of his thought on this point and by indicating a new direction of interpretation. The first part of the article presents the conception of Bergson and shows how the subject of the mystic appears late—but not in an artificial manner—in his whole thought, seeing in the mystics, and in particular Christian mystics, the final expression of the vital élan. It is by the mystic that it becomes possible to think of morality and of religion according to his philosophical perspective. This effort, however, raises difficulties in detail when we try to analyze in depth the testimony of the mystics because certain aspects of the Bergsonian metaphysics does not correspond well with their experience, as described by them (edited)”. Philosopher’s Index, 42.4, 2008, 417.

Iannis Prelorentzos. “Le Problème de la délimitation des choses, des qualités et des états dans la continuité du tout de la réalité selon Bergson.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 433-466. Eng. trans. “The Problem of The Delimitation of Qualities and of States in the Continuity of All Reality for Bergson.” The author shows (through a careful and exhaustive study of Bergson’s text) that though Bergson insists 1. that reality is everywhere continuous and one, and 2. that we “cut up” reality according to our practical needs, 3. Bergson insists that there is real plurality in the world, which can be “divided” according to an intuitive approach. This is Bergson’s second methodological rule. There is in Bergson a real heterogeneous and dynamic discontinuity.


Camille Riquier. “Le problème de la volonté ou Bergson en chemin vers *Les Deux Sources*.” in *Bergson et la religion*. Ed. G. Waterlot. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 65-94. Eng. trans. “The Problem of the Will or Bergson on the Way to *The Two Sources*.” The author explores, in considerable depth, the problem of the weakness of the will, a problem which Bergson had not fully recognized until he began work on *The Two Sources*. The author’s exploration does not fully resolve Bergson’s problems, but suggests Bergson’s notion that we must invent new ways of solving our current problems, overcoming a new situation whose very uncertainties lead to weakness and hesitation.


Rocco Ronchi. “La troisième conception de la causalité. Science et métaphysique dans *L’Évolution créatrice.*” *Annales bergsoniennes IV.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 548-58. Eng. trans. “The Third Concept of Causality: Science and Metaphysics in *Creative Evolution.*” The author examines Bergson’s philosophy in its relations to Greek metaphysics (as developed by Plato and Aristotle). Classical Greek metaphysics began from a timeless One, from which all degrees of being derive through the One’s opposition to Nothingness (Nonbeing). Bergson’s “One” is, by contrast, inherently active, and can give rise to reality without the need of an opposing Nonbeing. This generative causality (the “third kind of causality”) frees pedagogy from its subordination to prior knowledge and science from subordination to metaphysics.


Melanie Seghal. “Das Kriterium der Intimität: James als Leser Bergson.” *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger,* 198.2, 2008, 173-86. Eng. trans. “The Criterion of Intimacy: James as a Reader of Bergson.” The author’s abstract states: “Reading Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* was an event of utmost importance for William James. Bergson’s critique of the intellect opened a way out of a methodological crisis that had troubled James in his development of a metaphysics of experience, calling the entire project of such a metaphysics into question. Since James’ solution, after reading Bergson, was to give up a logic of identity, his Bergson reception soon became associated with the charge of irrationalism. I will challenge this accusation by closely looking at James’ reading of Bergson in *A Pluralist Universe.* I suggest that the expansion of the concept of experience in James’ metaphysics, far from implying an abandonment of rationality, corresponds to an expansion of the concept of rationality. This expanded concept finds its expression in James’ notion of intimacy as a criterion.” *Philosopher’s Index,* 42.3, 2008, 554.

Kokou Vincent Simeon. *L’humour et l’ironie en littérature francophone subsaharienne. Une poétique du rire.* Ph.D. Dissertation, Queen’s University (Canada), 2008, 254. Eng. trans. *Humor and Irony in French-Speaking Subsaharan Literature. A Poetic of Laughter.* The author states: “… by using the theoretical frameworks of Bergson, Schopenhauer, Jankélévitch and Genette… [I show] just how humor and irony create a particular vision, one that shows the multiple ways in which we can perceive the world around us.”

Brigitte Sitbon-Peillon. “A la suite de *L’évolution créatrice: Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion:* l’entropie, un principe social ?” *Archives de Philosophie,* 71.2, 2008, 289-308. “Can we read *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* as a logical follow-up to *Creative Evolution,* since, in the latter work, there is place for glimpses on ethical and religious matters? The present paper shows that *The Two Sources*—in no way a theodicy—depends on *Creative Evolution* for a methodological reason. The *Two Sources* “applies” to the social theory Bergson’s interpretation
of Carnot’s second law of thermodynamics, such as it is presented in the third chapter of Creative Evolution. This interpretation thus becomes the unseen link between the 1907 and 1932 books.”


Brigitte Sitbon-Peillon. “Supraspiritualité et hyperspiritualité chez Bergson et Durkheim.” in Bergson et religion. Nouvelles perspectives sur “Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion.” Ed. Ghislain Waterlot. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 163-190. Eng. trans. “Superspirituality and Hyperspirituality in Bergson and Durkheim.” (Cf. Sitbon-Peillon, 2009, Religion, métaphysique, 250-317.) Hyperspirituality here connotes E. Durkheim’s sociological “whole”: society, transcending the individual. “Superspirituality”, by contrast, is used by the author to describe Bergson’s social psychology, whose locus is the individual but whose effects are social. The author argues that Durkheim’s hyperspirituality is on Bergson’s terms infraintellectual, while Bergson’s superspirituality is supraintellectual. Bergson’s great virtue is to see, and allow us to see, the essential unity of these two viewpoints.

Vesselin Petrov. “Milic Capek: The Bergsonian Process Philosopher.” Philosophical Alternative (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), 17.3, 2008, 31-42. The author’s abstract states: “This paper is devoted to the 10 years of the death of the prominent contemporary philosopher Milic Capek (1909-1997). The emphasis is put on Capek as the philosopher who is both a Bergsonian and a process philosopher. This is why the present exposition is based mainly on his book Bergson and Modern Physics (1971), but some other publications of Capek are mentioned also, as well as some criticism of Capek’s positions. The paper considers in particular Capek’s views on metaphysics, philosophy of science, and problems of time, continuity and atomism, causality, probability, etc.” Philosopher’s Index, 44.2, 2010, 499.

Anthony Paul Smith. “Custodians of a Machine for the Making of Gods: Thinking Ecological Restoration With Bergson and Deleuze-Guattari.” University of Nottingham, UK and DePaul University, U.S.A. M.A. Thesis, 2008, 37 pp. “This essay aims to show that the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari contain concepts that, alongside work already done in the philosophy of ecological restoration, can be used to construct an adequate philosophy that dissolves the false problem of authenticity found in the criticisms of Elliot and Katz. It does this through a philosophy of nature, which constructs an ontological account of ecosystem, and a philosophy of religion, which constructs an ethical defense of ecological restoration.”


item contains the proceedings of an international conference held at Bari, Italy in 2007. Each essay in this item is presented separately in this bibliography.


Demet Kurtuglu Tasdelen. “The Role of Closed Morality in Achieving Rational Communication Within Bergson’s Nonrationalist Morality.” *Kaygi: Uludag Universitesi Felsefe Dergisi*, 10, 2008, 71-81. “Based on Bergson’s *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, the paper attempts to investigate the role of closed morality in the achievement of rational communication. The claim is made that closed morality does not only have a destructive side but also a constructive side that may be present in achieving rational communication. Considering Bergson’s ideas about the plane of intellectuality, the author intends to find a place for rational communication within Bergson’s nonrationalist morality. Founded on the fact that closed morality and open morality are extreme limits and therefore cannot be found in a society in their pure form, the author claims that rational communication can be present in the transition stage between the closed soul and the open soul.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.4, 2008, 546.


Petr Tuma. “La Place de l’homme dans *L’Évolution créatrice*.” *Annales bergsoniennes IV*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 363-378. Eng. trans. “The Place of Mankind in *Creative Evolution*.” The author concludes that Bergson’s entire work has its ultimate meaning in the dualities (duration/space, open/closed) which are practical criteria. These criteria allow us to better “discern, grasp, and confront the problems to which man is exposed. These distinctions are instruments—organs—with which we can follow the essential dynamics of life.” (p. 378)

Nida Vasiliauskaite. “Derisiveness of the Theory of Laughter: *Pro et Contra Henri Bergson*.” (in Lithuanian) *Logos: Religijos, filosofijos, Komparatyvistikos ir meno žurnalas*, 55, 2008, 74-81. “The article deals with the classical tract “On Laughter” by Henri Bergson (1900) and, more precisely, with the problem that a critical analysis of the tract reveals: is it possible to have a *theory* of laughter, is laughter susceptible to rational scrutiny, or what if the basic formal assumptions of classical essentialistic philosophy are the very ones that hinder us from understanding our experience of the phenomenon in question? The article shows that Bergson’s approach on laughter is inconsistent with his explicit aims and general intuitivism, context-blind and has very limited explicative scope. Finally, in contrast, the article claims that laughter is better understood by defining it rather negatively.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.4, 2008, 704.

Lorenzo Vicente Burgoa. “Los ‘extractos intuitivos’ o la intuición abstractive según Ortega y Gasset (De Ortega y Gasset a Aristoteles).” Daimon: Revista de Filosofía, 43, 2008, 103-130. Eng. trans. “‘Intuitive Extracts’ or Abstractive Intuition According to Ortega y Gasset (From Ortega y Gasset to Aristotle).” “Formal abstraction or abstracting intuition is, no doubt, a discovery of Aristotle. Most Aristotelians after Ockham continue to ignore it, focusing on the so-called universal abstraction only. But non-Aristotelian authors have caught sight of it too, albeit with a different language. Here we deal with someone so distant of Aristotelian positions as Ortega y Gasset. It is striking how clearly he depicts formal abstraction—which he calls “intuitive extract”—with a sort of lucidity that we do not find in many Aristotelians; and all that with a view to resolve similar problems with respect to scientific language.” Philosopher’s Index, 43.2, 2009, 649.


Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. “L’événement et le tout. Windelband lecteur de Bergson.” Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, No. 2, 2008, 157-171. Eng. trans. “The Event and the Totality. Windelband as a Reader of Bergson.” “Windelband, well known as the leader of the neo-Kantian School of Bade, together with Bergson, is opposed to both relativism and positivism. According to him, understanding Kant means going further than the latter and, more, in Hegel’s direction. Reading Bergson means finding again the meaning of event within metaphysics of what may not be repeated which, by showing the insufficiency of criticism, opens a new way towards historical sciences. Such is the positive interpretation of Bergson. But the criticism is such as one should imperatively separate psychology from philosophy, contrary to the French philosophical tradition, still observed by Bergson. But Bergsonian voluntarism appears as some kind of representative of the spirit of philosophy at the turn of the 19th-20th century. Better further, with Bergson philosophy recaptures its (Hegelian) ambition to become a global vision of the world.” Philosopher’s Index, 42.3, 2008, 391.

Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. “Le mysticisme comme cas particulier de l’analogie chez Bergson.” in Bergson et la religion. Ed. G. Waterlot. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 233-248. Eng. trans. “Mysticism as a Particular Instance of Analogy in Bergson.” “The analogy between myself (le Moi) and the whole (Tout) is founded, the author states, on the psychological identity of life itself: that is, on the assumption that both are modes of duration. Mysticism for Bergson is a particular case of the analogy of the self and the whole, and must be treated as a particular case of individuality in general. This “particularity” helps us to understand the direct tie between the mystical soul, a grand historical individuality, and the whole of humanity, a tie which “bypasses” the nature of the group, which is closed.

Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. “Réflexion sur la réception théorique de L’Évolution créatrice.” Archives de Philosophie, 71.2, 2008, 201-17. “The reception of Creative Evolution by the biologists was slow, partial and sometimes angry. This important work is now ignored by historians of biology. Bergson won’t make a philosophy of biology, but he does understand and express metaphorically
the philosophical sense of the evolution of species and biological transformism. The theological reception was negative, too. This feature studies the clauses of the sentence from the Index which condemns Bergson’s three first works (except for *Le Rire*). *The Congregation of the Index* makes a negative judgment about the Bergsonian philosophy – on account of prejudiced neothomistic views which are no more valid than the scientific prejudice of the biologists.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.4, 2008, 708. Eng. trans. “Reflection on the Theoretical Reception of *Creative Evolution*.”


Peter Verc Warden. “Critique of a Homuncular Model of Mind From the Neo-Vitalist Perspective.” Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York of Stony Brook, 2007, 96. The author presents a philosophical defense of Bergson’s notion “that that which separates the quick from the dead is a special solidarity of the past with the present and the future”. The author also utilizes the ideas of William James, Antonio Damasio—and Daniel Dennett.


Ghislain Waterlot. “Dieu est-il transcendant ? Examen critique des objections du P. de Touquédec adressées à l’auteur de *L’Évolution créatrice*.” *Archives de Philosophie*, 70.2, 2008, 269-88. Eng. trans. “Is God Transcendent? A Critical Examination of P. de Tonquédec’s Objections Posed to the Author of *Creative Evolution*.” “The criticisms of the Father de Tonquédec drove Bergson to clarify his reasons for the assertion that God is transcendent. Throughout this discussion, we are led to think of the disparity laid down by Bergson, between God and the vital impetus. The philosopher encounters a real difficulty in affirming at once that God is transcendent, and that there is a certain imminence about God. Above all, in this debate, two conceptions of transcendence oppose each other, each one giving rise to problems. Can a Bergsonian consideration of the mystical experience remove these problems? In this article, we endeavour to provide a response to this question and to indicate the conditions necessary to institute a dialogue between philosophy and theology.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 42.4, 2008, 712.


can be possible for a philosopher to use mysticism as a component of or basis for philosophical research. The ordinary person does not follow much that the mystic tries to say, and to respond. Bergson concedes this but thinks the philosopher should base his/her study of mysticism on the writings of the great mystics, where the essence of mysticism is embodied. Bergson opens a program to the philosophers, involving studies of mysticism. He does not give us all the particularities of the methods to be used, however.

Ghislain Waterlot. “Penser avec et dans le prolongement des Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion.” in Ghislain Waterlot, Ed. Bergson et la religion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 1-42. Eng. trans. “Thinking With and In the Prologation of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.” The author explores Bergson’s philosophy of religion both with regard to many of the pointed critiques which have been leveled at it and with regard to present precarious state of humanity. The distinction between closed and open societies, between western and oriental religion, between open morality and dynamic action are rigorously examined. The result is a highly realistic view of Bergson’s religious thought: an appeal to a renewed effort to resolve our present dilemmas. In a concluding section the author explores the recent growth of interest in The Two Sources.

Wilhelm Windelband. “En guise d’Introduction à Matière et mémoire de Bergson.” Trans. Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, No. 2, 2008, 147-156. Eng. trans. “By Way of an Introduction to Matter and Memory.” “Wilhelm Windelband (1858-1915) presents Bergson’s work as issued from the French tradition which consists in deriving a whole metaphysics from the interior experience itself. He considers it as a criticism of the domination of exact sciences over philosophy. Being centered on the event, Bergson’s thought illustrates the importance of the sciences of the mind, against the sciences of nature and becomes part and parcel of the enhanced prestige granted to historical sciences. Matter & Memory shows that consciousness is first and foremost oriented towards action and not towards knowledge. And the whole of modern philosophy is voluntarist in so far as its principle rests on the idea that there’s always something new in the world.” Philosopher’s Index, 42.3, 2008, 601.


Frédéric Worms. “Ce qui est vital dans L’Évolution créatrice.” Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008, 641-652. Eng. trans. “What is Vital in Creative Evolution.” The author’s essay has two parts. In the first he shows that Bergson’s élan vital can be conceived only by first conceptualizing continuity, change, and life. To these must be added yet another concept, the vital (which involves tension, finitude, and dissociation). Given all of these one can then postulate the central image of the élan vital (which is never an a priori concept applied “from the beginning”). In the second part the author argues that today Bergson’s essential opposition of life and matter has been transformed into a polarity of life and death. The sheer precariousness of life today leads to a vitality whose goal is individual survival. But this narrow vitality calls for a broader focus which includes the survival of humanity. This focus brings us to rejoin Bergsonian vitality as a whole, with its appeal to reasserted creativity.

between opposing forces, and a “rupture”—a real break—between them which, in Europe, has
created the spirit of Christianity and a more open society. The open/closed distinction is hardly a
deaf issue. It confronts us today in unmistakable terms. Cf. the author’s second essay below in
Bergson et Religion, 379-388 ("Terrible réalité…").

Frédéric Worms. “Quale vitalismo al di là di quale nichilismo? Da L’evoluzione creatice oggi.” in Dio, la
Vitalism, Towards Which Nihilism?”

Frédéric Worms. “La rottura di Bachelard con Bergson come punto di unione della filosofia del XX
“The Rupture of Bachelard with Bergson as a Turning Point of Philosophy in 20th Century
France.”

Frédéric Worms. “‘Terrible réalité’ ou ‘faux problème’ ? Le mal selon Bergson.” in Bergson et la
“‘Terrible Reality’ or ‘False Problem’? Evil According to Bergson.” The author describes
Bergson as opposing false, abstract ways of approaching “the problem of evil” (for example, by
trying to quantify and “weigh” them, or by otherwise making them into false absolutes) preferring
instead to deal empirically with the facts of human suffering in contrast with the reality of joy.
In the end, it is not merely that we should be critical of evil, but indignant towards it, but that we
join “the force of joy or the resource of good will and justice which do not cease to oppose it.”

School University, 2008, 204. The author examines Levinas’ views of temporality, contrasting
them with temporality as construed by Bergson and Martin Heidegger. In contrast with these two
thinkers Levinas does not believe that the time “pertinent to our existence among other people as
a degradation of inner time.”

Justin Wen-Lo Yant. Sometimes I feel the Space Between People (Voices) in Terms of Tempos—A Work
for Percussion Duo with Computer Animated Notational Interface. D.M.A., Stanford University,
2008, 26. The author seeks to “… explore and evoke various durées (Bergson) both through the
sonification of materials and the modes in which performers engage the material.”

2009

France, 2009, 284. (Philosophie aujourd’hui) An English translation of the title of this item is:
Bergson, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche: Will and Reality.

Asegüi Baran. “The Dilemmas of the Realist and the Idealistic Subject: A Bergsonian Critique.” Ethos:
Falsefe ve Toplusal Dilimerde Dialoglar, 2.1, 2009, 1-16. The test of this item is in Turkish. The
author states: “This paper contains a Bergsonian critique to subject accounts of realism and
idealism; two distinct, even opposing understanding of the world. Even though there is a
supposition about subject accounts of realism and idealism, basically that they must be
fundamentally different from one another, this paper tries to show that they both are founded
upon the same assumption which is: world of the matter is fundamentally different from subject’s
perception of it. In this paper argument will be that Bergson changed the plane of argument by
simply changing the above mentioned assumption and his fresh account of subject could be a
healthier alternative especially for subject’s perception of itself.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 44.2, 2010, 422.

Erol Başar and Bahar Güntekin. “Bergson’s Intuition and Memory in View of NeuroQuantology.” *NeuroQuantology*, 7.4, 2009, 602-08. “This essay describes the concept of the great philosopher Henri Bergson, related to episodic memory intuition and duration. Further, the relation of ‘quantum theory’ to Bergson’s philosophy is shortly described. We discuss the importance of Bergson’s concepts to ‘Quantum Methodology’ and modern science.


Martha Blassnigg. *Time, Memory, Consciousness and the Cinema Experience: Revisiting Ideas on Matter and Spirit*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009, 256. The author applies Henri Bergson’s philosophy to an ontology of the cinema spectatorship and opens a discussion on the issues of time, movement and esprit (mind) in a broad interdisciplinary context of the late 19th and early 20th century with a focus on the oeuvre of Etienne-Jules Marey. It revisits his work in a dialogue with Bergson’s thinking and emphasizes the connections with art in his own commentaries as well as in relation to Aby Warburg’s method of the *Mnemosyne Atlas*. Through a think reading of the intersections between science, technology, art and popular culture in relation to the emerging cinema, it resituates the dimension of the mind (l’esprit) in the spectator’s cognitive processes. It draws on the insights of Bergson in an application to a contemporary understanding of the spectatorship in audio-visual environments and discusses the cinema as philosophical dispositif.


Project."The author finds a new notion of bios (broadly, life) in Bergson's *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. She applies this notion to, among other factors, environmental values.


James W. Felt. *Adventures in Unfashionable Philosophy*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009, 272. The author aims to enrich Thomistic philosophy through an encounter with the philosophies of Bergson and Whitehead. He deals, in particular, with the effects of considerations of metaphysical method on philosophical conclusions, the relations of time to experience and of possibility to actuality.


Gernot Kamecki. “What is it to Live? Critical Considerations With Regard to Badiou and Bergson Concerning Life Theory and its Language.” *Filozofski Vestnik*, 30.2, 2009, 207-25. The author’s abstract states: “This essay raises a philosophical question concerning the language of life theory. It aims to prove the assumption that in contrast to life science, which today is connected to neuroscience and biotechnology, a theory that comprehends “life itself” must exceed the computerized mathematics of modern materialistic positivism. For this purpose, the conceptual possibility of such a theory is analysed from the perspective of 20th-century philosophy of life. Beginning with Henri Bergson, who developed an immanent concept of life “from within itself” in *L’évolution créatrice* (1907), the analysis turns to Alain Badiou, whose fundamental onto-phenomenology of being is summed up in *Logiques des mondes* (2006) by answering the question “what is it to live?” The comparison between the two philosophies exposes the conditions of a life theory that encompasses, beyond the results of digitalizable language translated from the neurons of the human brain, the uncountable and unpredictable aspects of living and being alive. These conditions are: an ethics of universality, a differential philosophy of time, and a concept of independent novelty enforced by the (in)aeesthetics of subjective creation.” *Philosopher's Index*, 44.2, 2010, 422.


Clara Mandolini. “Memory and Action: The Conscience (Awareness, Ed.) of Time in Personal Becoming in Bergson and Blondel.” *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* Vol. CI: *Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life*. Ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, 2009, 25-49. “The aim of the article is to highlight the role of memory in subjective practical human becoming, in its particular relation given by action. Bergson and Blondel have both paid particular attention to action, conceived as a sphere of emerging of the conscience of the passing of time. Nonetheless, their analyses differ in the meaning attributed to action: while Bergson considers it as a limited part of human life, requiring a homogeneous and “spatial” approach to reality, Blondel enlarges the meaning of the term “action” to reach what, even in cosmic becoming, represents the radical spring of ontological novelty and tendency to fulfillment. According to a different evaluation of action in the context of human life, their works also offer a different conceptualization of becoming and of the role of memory, as a deeper concept than a simple collection of memories.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 44.1, 2010, 414.

Jorge Martin. “Es factible expresar la durée bergsoniana?” *Revista Latinamericano de Filosofía*, 35.1, 2009, 163-70. Eng. trans. “Is it Possible to Express Bergson’s Duration?” The author’s abstract states: “In the last two decades the renovation of Bergson’s philosophy has started the discussion about certain subjects present in his texts, as for instance the relation between durée and language. In this paper we intend to show that duration can’t be expressed through language—even the poetic one—but only suggested by means of images, since it refers to an intuition of extralinguistic nature.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 44.2, 2009, 458.


Camille Riquier. *Archéologie de Bergson. Temps et métaphysique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009, 488. (Epiméthée) Eng. trans. *Bergson’s Archeology: Time and Metaphysics*. It is an error, the author insists, to fail to take into account the profound reforms which Bergson undertook in metaphysics. Bergson did not attempt to derive metaphysics from a single principle, but to find his thought in the immediate experience that we have of ourselves. The search for this experience (not achieved until his last major work, *The Two Sources*) is in a sense an archeology.

Camille Riquier. “Henry, Bergson et la phénoménologie matérielle.” *Studia Phaenomenologica. Romanian Journal of Phenomenology*, 9, 2009, 157-72. Eng. trans. “Henry, Bergson and Material Phenomenology.” The author’s abstract states: “Michel Henry recognized himself within Maine de Biran’s work, while rejecting the French spiritualistic tradition to which the latter was attached. However, without occulting the great differences which separate him from this tradition, it seems that we find in Bergson’s first book, more than in Maine de Biran, the premises of an ontological dualism, such as he supported, which announces an authentic philosophy of the conscience, beyond any intentionality. In return, as if Michel Henry had emphasized a tendency already present in *Time and Free Will*, we could read again Bergson’s first book in the light of material phenomenology itself.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 44.2, 2010, 513.
Stephen E. Robbins. “The Cost of Explicit Memory.” *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 8.1, 2009, 33-66. “Within Piaget there is an implicit theory of the development of explicit memory. It rests in the dynamical trajectory underlying the development of causality, object, space and time—a complex (COST) supporting a symbolic relationship integral to the explicit. Cassirer noted the same dependency in the phenomena of aphasias, insisting that a symbolic function is being undermined in these deficits. This is particularly critical given the reassessment of Piaget’s stages as the natural bifurcations of a self-organizing dynamic system. The elements of a theoretical framework required to support explicit memory are developed, to include: (1) the complex developmental trajectory supporting the emergence of the explicit in Piaget, (2) the concrete dynamical system and the concept of a nondifferentiable time contained in Bergson’s theory required to support a conscious, as opposed to an implicit remembrance, (3) the relation to current theories of amnesia, difficulties posed by certain retrograde amnesic phenomena, the role of the hippocampus and limitations of connectionist models, (4) the fact that nowhere in this overall framework does the loss of explicit memory imply or require the destruction of experience ‘stored in the brain’.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 43.2, 2009, 587.

Keith Robinson. “Introduction: Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson—Rhizomatic Connections.” in *Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson: Rhizomatic Connections*. Ed. Keith Robinson. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 1-27. The author creates a highly instructive comparison of the philosophies of Bergson, Whitehead, and Deleuze, pointing out that their exclusion from mainstream twentieth-century philosophy has made it difficult both to see their connections to each other and the relevance of their ideas to central problems in contemporary thought. The author deals particularly with the impact of Bertrand Russell on the fortunes of Bergsonism (pp. 9-11), E. Levinas’ appreciation of Bergson (pp. 11-12) and Bergson’s relations to Gilles Deleuze (p. 12).

Allesandro Carvalho Sales. “A causalidade em Deleuze: difference interna e producão de si.” *Revista de Fofosofia*, 10.1, 2009, 215-231. An English translation of the title of this item is: “Concerning Causality in Deleuze: Internal Difference and Self Creation.” “The author examines Deleuze’s conception of causality in contrast to mechanism, Platonism and Hegelianism. This notion (causality), seen as internal causation (causa sui) favors the establishment of difference as the origin of being. The author concludes: “Therefore, we will show the relevancy of Michael Hardt’s comments in order to show the context that, crossing particularly Deleuze’s dialogue with Bergson, places causality in immanence and, at the same time, moves it away from negation’s domain.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 43.4, 2009, 541.

Philip Tenner. “The Return of the Relative: Hamilton, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty and French Phenomenology.” *Janus Head*, 11.2, 2009, 305-16. The author’s abstract states: “In this paper we explore the complex relationship between the philosophies of Sir William Hamilton and Henri Bergson. We then place these philosophies in a critical relation to ofrench phenomenological philosophy, particularly, Merleau-Ponty’s. By so doing we examine a historical and theoretical ‘ark’ that rises in 19th-century Scotland and falls in 20th-century France, an ark that has received little attention hitherto by historians of philosophy. Our aim is to open up a new dimension of these philosophies and provoke a fresh debate over their relationships and the philosophical tensions that exist between them.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 44.2, 2010, 561.


Mei Wegener. “Der psychophysische Parallelismus.” NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaftlichen, Technik und Medizin, 17.3, 2009, 277-316. Eng. trans. “Psychophysical Parallelism.” The author’s abstract states: “The article traces the rise and fall of “psychophysical parallelism”—which was the most advanced scientific formulation of the mind/body relationship in the second half of the 19th century—through an interdisciplinary and broad geographical spectrum. It sheds light on the extremely different positions that rallied round this discursive figure, ranging from Fechner, Hering, Mach, Wundt, Bain, Hughlings Jackson, and Taine to Freud and Saussure. The article develops the thesis that the psychophysical parallelism functioned as a ‘hot zone’ within and a symptom of the changes in the order of sciences at that time. Against that background, the criticism of the psychophysical parallelism which became prominent around 1900 (Stumpf, Busse, Bergson, Muthner et. al) indicates the cooling of this ‘hot zone’ and the establishment of a new order within the scientific disciplines. The article pays particular attention to the position of this figure in contemporaneous language theories. Its basic assumption is that the relationship between the body and the psyche is itself constituted by language.


Tomoki Yamauchi. “Durée de l’univers et logique du corps : le bergsonisme comme ‘esthétique de la sympathie’.” Bigaku, 60.1, 2009, 72-84. Eng. trans. “Duration of the Universe and Logic of the Body: Bergsonism as an Aesthetic of Sympathy.” The author examines Bergson’s concept of sympathy, which is portrayed in contrasting ways from his earliest to his latest writings. In Creative Evolution sympathy is less a coincidence with its objects as a “coexistence with the real”. Bergson’s aesthetics is an aesthetics of sympathy.” Philosopher’s Index, 43.4, 2009, 603.

Laurent Jaffro. “Infinity, Intuition, and the Relativity of Knowledge: Bergson, Carrau, and the Hamiltonians.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 18.1, 2010, 91-112. This paper presents a discussion of William Hamilton’s thesis of the relativity of knowledge and of its reception in nineteenth- and twentieth-century French philosophy. Scholars usually claim that Kant’s transcendental philosophy is the main target of Bergson’s rejection of the relativity of
knowledge. In contrast, Bergson’s plea for ‘intuition’ as absolute knowledge should be replaced within the context of the long-lasting debates between French spiritualists and the Hamiltonians about the relations of metaphysics with psychology. In the service of this discussion the author locates an important anticipation of Bergson’s philosophy of intuition in the forgotten figure of Ludovic Carrau.


Michael R. Kelley. “A Phenomenological (Husserlian) Defense of Bergson’s ‘Idealistic Concession’.” *Epoche: A Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 14.2, 2010, 399-415. The author’s abstract states: “When summarizing the findings of his 1896 *Matter and Memory*, Bergson claims “That every reality has… a relation with consciousness— that is what we concede to idealism.” Yet, Bergson’s 1896 text presents the theory of “pure perception”, which, since it accounts for perception according to the brain’s mechanical transmissions, apparently leaves no room for subjective consciousness. Bergson’s theory of pure perception would appear to render his idealistic concession absurd. In this paper, I attempt to defend Bergson’s idealistic concession. I argue that Bergson’s account of cerebral transmissions at the level of pure perception necessarily entails a theory of temporality, an appeal to a theory of time-consciousness that justifies his idealistic concession.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 44.2, 2010, 427.


1/24/2010. The author relates the “spell” Bergson’s philosophy cast on him as a young man and cites a statement by Bergson to the effect that time (i.e. duration) means the creation of forms, the continuous elaboration of the absolutely new. Bergson’s treatment of duration was to lead Prigogine into researches culminating in nonlinear thermodynamics and the award of a Nobel Prize in Chemical Kinetics.