Écrits sur Bergson

1890

1893

1894

1897


1901
1902


James Sully. Essay on Laughter. London: Longmans, Green (1902): xvi, 441. Print. The author claims that Bergson’s metaphysics prejudices his theory of laughter. Bergson sees laughter as attacking the mechanical but fails to see it as an appreciation of life. Moreover, laughter is not only socially corrective; it is socially indulgent.


1903


1904


1905


1907


1908

Emile Boirac. La psychologie inconnue. Introduction et contribution à l’étude expérimentale des sciences psychiques. Paris: Alcan (1908): 346. Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine. Print. On pp. 40-41 the author uses Bergson’s “filter” theory of perception, as developed in Matière et mémoire (Matter and Memory), to explain the ordinary mind’s imperviousness to psychic influence. Interestingly, he does not note the extensions of this notion in Bergson’s essays on dreams and on psychical research.


thanks Bergson for his account of his early intellectual crisis, and suggests a visit with Bergson in
Paris.


Mélanges, pp. 777-778. Print. James here once again concedes that he will not be able to meet
Bergson. He thanks Bergson for his kind remarks concerning his essay on Bergson’s philosophy.

William James. “Letter to Henri Bergson. October 4, 1908” in Ralph Barton Perry. The Thought and
Mélanges, pp. 778-779. Print. In this letter James responds concerning his meeting with Bergson
in London and ponders what Bergson will have to say about Substanzbegriff.

William James. “Letter to T. Flournoy. October 4, 1908” in Ralph Barton Perry. The Thought and
here upon his three-hour meeting with Bergson that morning.


1909

Bradley notes, vis à vis “the continuity of the given,” that the previous winter he has read two of
Bergson’s books, Données immédiates and L’Evolution créatrice and was rather bored: “Connu is
what I kept saying to myself.”

Alphonse Chide. “Autour du Problème de la connaissance” in Revue Philosophique de la France et de
Knowledge.”


“Concerning Scientific Time.”


Cornelius Albert Steenbergen. *Henri Bergson’s Intuitive Philosophie*. Jena: Diederichs (1909): 109. Print. This item is in English. It was published at the same time (1909) in a German edition.


1910


Nathan Söderblom. Religionsproblemet inom Katolicism och Protestantism. Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Verlag (1910): 518. Print. Ch. 7 of this work (pp. 136-61) is titled (in rought translation)
“Philosophy of Action: Briefly Described, through Henri Bergson and Emile Boutroux. Or: a Chapter on Voluntarist Mysticism.” For a description of some main tenets of Bergson’s philosophy see pp. 154-58. For the influence of Léon Olle-Laprune on the young Bergson, see p. 140. For comparisons of Bergson’s philosophy with that of Vitalis Norström, see pp. 260-61, 409, 411.


1911


Bertrand Russell. “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars.” Aristotelian Society Proceedings, N.S. 12 (1911-12): 1-24. Print. It was this talk that Bergson, who was at the 1911 meeting of the Aristotelian Society, criticized Bertrand Russell for his “too material” treatment of Platonic forms.
1912


Lionel Dauriac. “Quelques Réflexions sur la philosophie de M. H. Bergson.” *Année Philosophique*, 17 (1912): 55-72. Print. This is a penetrating study. The author compares Bergson with Kant and Ried.


F. B. Jevons. *Motion and Change*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Andrew Reid (1912): 127-52. Print. This essay deals with the concepts of motion and the psychology of motion in Bergson. It is an excerpt from the minutes of proceedings of the North-East Coast Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders, Vol. 27, 1911-1912.

Auguste Joly. “Le Futurisme et la Philosophie. II. Futurismo e la Filosofia.” Print. This essay, presented in both French and Italian, was published by the Direction du Mouvement Futuriste, Corso Venezia, 61, Milan, Italy. It bears no date, but was taken from *La Belgique artistique et littéraire*, July, 1912. The author uses Bergsonian ideas to explore the nature of futurism. He cites Marinetti as the paradigm of futurism-in-action. Eng. trans. “Futurism and Philosophy.”


J. Middleton Murry. “Bergson and the Coal Strike.” *T. P.’s Weekly*, 12 Mar. 1912: 357. Print. This is a celebration of the contemporary coal strike in Great Britain. The author urges that this strike is not merely an inconvenience, but marks the transition into a new era. In justifying this claim, he points to the thought of Georges Sorel, “The Apostle of Syndicalism,” with its foundations in Bergson’s intuitionism. He asserts: “We cannot harden the intimate life of a class, the class, of society into a formula; we need an individual artistic expression for them, an aesthetic symbol, and this symbol is the complete industrial war of producer against parasite, the general strike.”

J. Middleton Murry. “Mr. Middleton Murry Replies to Critics.” *T. P.’s Weekly*, 3 May 1912: 570. Print. Here the author replies to criticisms of his celebration of the contemporary British coal strike in the March 22, 1912, issue of *T. P.’s Weekly*. Mr. Rock Publicman has seen that in his article the author has not proposed a political viewpoint but merely described one. Mr. K. O. Samuel objects that Bergson’s is a theory of continuity, not revolution. The author replies that Bergson’s is a philosophy of discontinuity, of “evolution in spasms.” F. S. Kitchin accuses the author of eulogizing Sorel’s views, but the author states that he has no desire to do so. Mr. Thompson denies that Sorelian syndicalism is the logical outcome of Bergsonism; the author argues that it is. Murry also holds that “an intuitionist philosophy is absolutely untenable.” Mr. de Tunzelman argues that to saddle Bergson’s philosophy with Sorel’s syndicalism is to reduce it to absurdity. The author agrees. If Bergson believes in the “social organism,” Sorel’s politics follows.


1913


1914


Umberto Boccioni. *Pittura scultura Futuriste: Dinamismo plastico*. Milano: Edizioni futuriste di “Poesia” (1914): 469. Print. This is a statement of the fundamentals of Italian futurism based on Bergson’s philosophy.

L. Brink. Rev. of *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* by William Ernest Hocking. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 1.4 (Oct. 1914): 472-79. Print. On p.479 the reviewer contrasts Bergson’s concept of the unconscious mind with Hocking’s, holding that Bergson’s is much truer to fact: “Not alone much simpler but more true to the fact is Bergson’s picture of the unconscious, an undivided whole, the vast deposit of the conscious life admitted beyond the portals of consciousness only in so far as it is useful for our present purposes. As such a deposit, a product of our conscious life it is a product of our character, too, but is not that character itself, which has rather risen upon and beyond it.”


Daniel-Lesuer (pseud.). “M. Bergson a promis de venir.” *Gazette du bon ton*, 3 (Mar. 1914): 30. Print. The author notes that a fashionable couturier has produced a gown titled “M. Bergson has promised to come.”


“Diopterophobia and so on.” *The Sun*, 31 August 1914. Print. This is an editorial opposing Bergson’s interpretation of the causes of the First World War.


Albert Lafontaine. La philosophie de Bergson. Alençon: Imprimerie Alençonnaise (1914): 25. Print. This lecture was given in London before the College of Preceptors. Eng. trans. Bergson’s Philosophy.


Paul Souday. Les Livres du temps (2e série). Paris: Emile-Paul Frères (1914): 524. Print. This item, a highly critical survey of French writers circa 1914, contains several references to Bergson and Bergsonism. In general the author is highly critical of Bergson’s “antiintellectualism” (esp. pp. 263-66, 337, 398-99). The author notes the Bergsonian tendencies of the young André Gide (p. 194) and relates Bergson to Abel Hermant (p. 337), Léon Blum (p. 399), and Agathon (pp. 263-64).


1915


Lynn Harold Hough. The Quest for Wonder and Other Philosophical and Theological Studies. New York: Abingdon Press (1915): 302. Print. This item contains an essay titled “Bergson, as Seen from a Preacher’s Study.”


1916


Lee J. Levinger. The Philosophy of Henri Bergson and Judaism: With a Discussion by Louis L. Mann (1916): 45 pp. Print. This item appears to be found only in the Princeton Theological Seminary Libraries, Special Collections, Luce no. 250, noncirculating.


1917


A. Seth Pringle-Pattison. The Idea of God in Recent Philosophy. The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the Years 1912 and 1913. New York: Oxford University Press, 1917: 425. Print. See Lecture 19, “Bergsonian Time and a Growing Universe,” 366-85. The author, in the course of providing an accurate account of Bergson’s protest against the spatialization of time, argues that Bergson falls into the very trap he has sought to avoid. Denying that the past can account for the present, he holds that the present can determine the future. Bergson thinks that the present is “… fatally and externally determining the future beforehand, in such a way as to deprive future actions, when they occur, of their proper reality…” (p. 375). The author also criticizes Bergson’s “teleology” (pp. 378-79).


1918


Jean Piaget. *Recherche*. Lausanne: Edition La Concorde, 1918: 210. Print. This is a novel, written by the founder-to-be of genetic epistemology. It describes the struggles of a young French-Swiss intellectual to resolve the antithesis of science and religion. In Part I, Chapters 6 and 7, the protagonist, Sebastian, debates with himself the merits of three philosophies: positivism, pragmatism, and Bergsonism, rejecting all three in favor of the creation of a new science of types, similar to that of Aristotle. Bergson’s unresolved oppositions are unsatisfactory, while his intuition either reduces to inexpressible mysticism or an enlargement of the intelligence (in which case it loses its special character).


1919


1920


1921


Roman Ingarden. “Intuition und Intellect bei Henri Bergson. Darstellung und Versuch einer Kritik.” Freiburg, philosophy dissertation, 1921: 98. Print. The author’s dissertation was completed in 1918, but not officially accepted until 1921. Eng. trans. “Intuition and Intellect in Bergson. Presentation and Attempt at a Critique.” This is an important essay on Bergson’s epistemology by a prominent member of the phenomenological school.


Jean Piaget. “Essai sur quelques aspects du développement de la notion de partie chez l’enfant.” *Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique*, 18 (1921): 449-80. Print. The author states: “Tachistoscopic experiments and the analyses of M. Bergson have shown that sentences are not read and understood in detail, but in one inspection. In this regard, the phenomena of the limitation of the field of attention are fundamental: it is in part thanks to them that we have been able to characterize the three stages of our classification.”


Albert Thibaudet. “Réflexions sur la littérature. Psychanalyse et critique.” Nouvelle Revue française, 16.4 (Apr. 1921): 467-81. Print. Throughout the author compares Bergson’s views with Freud’s, arguing that “les théories de Freud s’éclairent singulièrement à la lumière de Matière et Mémoire.” p. 469. He speculates whether, if Bergson had been allowed to teach at the Sorbonne, he would have had disciples as does Freud, and a journal for research inspired by his method.


1922


Albert Einstein on Bergson. “Gestern lass ich in Bergsens Buch über Relativität und Zeit. Merkwürdig dass ihm nur die Zeit aber nicht auch der Raum problematisch ist. Er scheint mir mehr sprachliches Geschick als psychologische Tiefer zu haben. Bei der Objektivierung des psychisch-Gegebenen macht er sich wenig Skrupel. Er scheint aber die Realitätst-Theorie sachlich zu begreifen und setzt sich mit ihr nicht in Gegensatz. Die Philosophen tanzen beständig um den Gegensatz Psychisch-Real und Physikalisch-Real herum und unterscheiden sich nur durch Wertungen in dieser Beziehung. Entweder erscheint ersteres als “blosses Individualerlebnis” oder letzteres als “blose Gedankenkonstruktion”. Bergson gehört zur letzteren Gattung, objektiviert aber unvermerkt in seiner Weise.” (No. 29-131 in the Einstein Control Index.) Eng. trans. “Yesterday I immersed myself in Bergson’s book on relativity and time. Amazingly, he considers time, but not space, to be problematic. He seems to me to possess more linguistic facility than psychological depth. He does not hesitate to objectivize the psychologically-given. But he seems to really (sachlich) understand relativity theory and not to put himself in contradiction to it. The philosophers deal (tanzen) constantly here with the contrast between psychologically-real and physically-real and in this respect distinguish themselves only through what they value. Either the first appears as “mere individual experience” or the second as “mere thought-construction.” Bergson’s views are of the latter sort, he objectivizes in his own way without realizing it.” Trans. Pete A. Y. Gunter. No. 29-131 in the Einstein Control Index (Collected papers of Albert Einstein). 10/9/1922. Print.


François Jean Desthieux. L’Incroyable Einstein : ses théories scientifiques et leurs conséquences de Leibniz à Bergson, une métaphysique nouvelle. Paris: Editions du Carnet-Critique, 1922: 52. Print. See Ch. 4, “Devant les Philosophes : de Leibniz à M. Bergson,” pp. 30-44. The author, who concedes that he is neither a mathematician nor a physicist, notes the opposition of both Leibniz and Bergson to Newton, and professes amazement that Bergson should believe that Einstein has corroborated some of his own ideas. In general science is correct, while philosophers merely fabricate.


Arthur Liebert. Henri Bergson. Stuttgart: Franck, 1922: 70-86. This is an extract from Philosophiebüchlein, vol. 1, 1922; Print.


1923


Thomé H. Fang. “A Critical Exposition of the Bergsonian Philosophy of Life.” Master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin at Madison. 1923. Print. The author was to become a leading Chinese philosopher who used Bergson’s ideas to build a bridge between Eastern and Western thought. For an account of the factors underlying the writing of this thesis, see Thomé H. Fang, 1981.

Beatrice M. Hinkle. The Re-creating of the Individual: A Study in Psychological Types and their Relations to Psychoanalysis. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923: xiii, 465. Print. The author notes of C. G. Jung: “He saw in the term libido a concept of unknown nature, somewhat similar to Bergson’s élán vital, a hypothetical energy of life, which is manifested not only in sexuality and the reproductive function but also in various physiological and psychological processes” (p. 23). The author was a translator and associate of Jung.


J. Rogues de Fursac and Eugene Minkowski. “Contribution à l’étude de la pensée et de l’attitude autistes (Le Rationalisme morbide).” L’Encéphale, 18.4 (1923): 217-28. Print. This is a Bergsonian analysis of a case of “morbid rationalism.” The patient’s neurosis stems, the authors contend, from an attempt at complete personal isolation from his personal and physical milieu. This project is based on two factors, l’attitude antithétique (an enforcement of strict antitheses: yes/no, good/evil) and l’égocentrisme actif (making the self the “field” of one’s actions). The patient’s symptoms derive, the authors state, from failure to participate with his surroundings, and hence with himself. He is abstracted from himself to the point of illness. Eng. trans. “A Contribution to the Study of Autistic Thought and Attitude (Morbid Rationalism).”
1924


Zygmunt Mystakowski. *Intuicjonizm Bergsona,* Krakow, 1924. This was the author’s doctoral thesis, Warsaw, 1924. An English translation of the title of this item is: *Bergson’s Intuitionism.*


1925


Etienne Souriau. *Pensée vivante et perfection formelle*. Paris: Hachette, 1925: xvi, 308. Print. This essay marks the beginning of the reaction against Bergsonian aesthetics in France. It stresses the “formal” aspects of art over and against the “vital.”


1926


Jérôme and Jean Tharaud. *Notre cher Péguy*. Genève: La Palatine; Paris: Librairie Plon, 1926: 324. Print. This is a personal, chatty, sometimes very moving account of Charles Péguy’s *milieu* and personal life. It includes several interesting references to Péguy and Bergson: to Bergson’s


Jan Christian Smuts. Holism and Evolution. New York: Macmillan, 1926: 362. See pp. 92-102: “Where Bergson seems to me to have gone wrong is his impoverishment of the creative principle by reducing it to the bare empty form of Duration” (p. 95). See pp. 99-100 for a similar critique of élan vital as empty of specific content: mere form.


1927


André Ceillier. “Recherches sur l’automatisme psychique.” L’Encéphale, 2.4 (1927): 272-97. Print. In this talk, presented at the Société de Psychiatrie de Paris, the author attacks mechanistic theories of mental illness, arguing that even in those cases in which illness is physiologically based, the “elaboration” of the illness is mental in nature. The author’s position is very much like that of Bergson in Matter and Memory: mental illness involves the enfeebling of the will and of the capacity to focus attention effectively, with a consequent loss of personal unity, flexibility, creativity. Personality thus descends from mental health to mental “automatism.” The author refers to Bergson on pp. 274, 275, 279, 283, 286, 291, 297. The author portrays himself as, in most respects, a follower of M. Séglas.


Daniel Mornet. *Histoire de la littérature et de la pensée françaises contemporaines (1870-1927)*. Paris: Bibliothèque Larousse, 1927: 263. Print. The author cites Bergson from his “critique of intelligence” (pp. 38-39), his treatment of the unconscious (p. 92), and his philosophical influence (pp. 107-08).


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**1928**


1929


M. Dide. “Variations psychopathiques de l’intuition durée-étendue.” *Journal de Psychologie Normale et pathologique*, 26 (1929): 410-24. Print. This is an analysis (prefaced by a reference to Bergson) of psychological problems involved in judging spatial extent, temporal extent and both spatial and temporal location. The fundamental basis of all such judgments, he argues, is the patient’s difficulty in combining the abstract concepts of space-time successfully with the personal experience of duration-extensity. The author cites both psychiatric and neurophysiological factors. Eng. trans. “Psychopathological Variations of the Intuition Duration-Extensity.”


André Gide. *Travels in the Congo*. Trans. Dorothy Bussy. New York: Knopf, 1929: 375. Print. The author states: “I have just finished a small book by Cresson: *Position actuelle des problèmes philosophiques*. His exposition of Bergson’s philosophy convinces me that I have long been a Bergsonian without knowing it. There are no doubt pages in my *Cahiers de André Walter* which might even be thought directly inspired by *L’Evolution creatrice*, if the dates allowed of it. I greatly mistrust a system that comes so pat in response to the tastes of the period and owes a great part of its success to flattering them” (p. 33).


1930


Dominique Parodi. *Du Positivisme à l’Idéalisme. Etudes critiques*. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1930: 253. Bibliothèque d’Histoire de la philosophie. Print. This collection contains an essay on Bergson’s theory of laughter (“Le Rire d’après M. Bergson”, pp. 144-59) first published in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1901. It is a thoughtful critique of Bergson’s theory of comedy. The author holds that Bergson needs to pay more attention to the physiology of laughter, to its relations with pleasure, and to the relativity of situations in which we laugh. He argues that Bergson’s definition of the *form* of the object of laughter (mechanism imposed on the living) and laughter’s function (social correction) should apply equally to each instance but do not. (An infant’s laughter may have something to do with the contrast mechanism/life but surely has nothing to do with social correction.) Laughter may have come to play a social role, but surely in its origins it expresses a natural capacity in the individual. Eng. trans. *From Positivism to Idealism: Critical Studies*.


*Yushi no tetsuri*. Tokyo: Shunjusa, 1930: 175. Sekai dai shiso zenshu, 1[036]. Print. This item deals with both Western and Eastern thinkers. It contains a section on Bergson.

1931


**1932**

Heinrich Berl. “Begegnung mit jüdischen Zeitgenossen: Bergson, Husserl, Scheler, Buber, Gundolf, Mombert, Wasserman.” *Menorah*, 10.7-8 (Aug. 1932): 319-35. Print. Eng. trans. “Interview with Famous Jews: Bergson, Husserl, Scheler, Buber, Gundolf, Mombert, Wasserman.” On pp. 319-21 the author briefly reports an interview with Bergson. He remarks that the impression Bergson made on him was “one of the best in his life” (p. 320). He concludes that, though Bergson wished to be seen as Greek, he was essentially Hebraic (Rabbinic, Talmudic) in his caste of thought. He reports Bergson as saying that, like Spinoza, he is alone and goes his own way. His students, Berl reports him as stating sadly, have left him for a kind of purely humanistic philosophical anthropology. Berl states that Bergson is referring here to Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger! The interview ends with a discussion of Husserl, idealism, and phenomenology.


1933


François Picard. *Les Phénomènes sociaux chez les animaux.* Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1933: 201. Collection Armand Colin, Section de Biologie. Print. In his introduction the author takes issue with Bergson’s contention that nature is “more preoccupied with the society than with the individual.” The social animals are not always good at “architecture,” he argues, while some solitary animals do very well at it. The author scorns Bergson’s reflections concerning the problem of the unity of the organism versus its plurality, and the similar problem of “superorganisms”: Is the bee really distinct from the hive or is the hive a single organism? Solitariness and sociability are simply two biological possibilities, states the author. There is Providence or there is nothing. Eng. trans. *Social Phenomena in Animals.*


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1934


Leonardo Coimbra. *A filosofia de Henri Bergson.* Porto (Portugal) 1934. An English translation of the title of this item is: *The Philosophy of Henri Bergson.* A new edition of this work has been published in 1994 (Lisbon).


Wilfred Monod, *Le Problème du bien. Essai de théodicée et journal d’un pasteur*, Vol. 1. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1934: 1140. Print. See “29 juin 1911. Entretien avec le philosophe Bergson,” pp. 225-28. This recounts a brief discussion between Monod and Bergson. Bergson is impressed by the position taken by Monod in his book *Aux croyants et aux athées*, in which he denies that God is omnipotent. This position, Bergson states, makes possible a kind of *rapprochement* between believers and nonbelievers. Bergson notes that in the previous year he has studied Mme Guyon, and that he had already studied the great mystics. He and Monod agree concerning the personalities of the mystics: They are free spirits, not slaves; they work with God. Bergson argues here for the soul’s survival after death but not for the “eternity” of the soul. He speculates that the earth does not possess sufficient carbon for life to fully express itself and that on other planets things may have gone differently. (See. H. Sundén, 1947: 12). Eng. trans. *The Problem of the Good*.


1935


Jean Baruzi. *Problèmes d’histoire des religions*. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1935: 151. Nouvelle encyclopédie philosophique. Print. This study consists of three chapters: “Remarques sur l’état présent de l’histoire des religions” (First given as a lecture at the Collège de France, 6 Feb. 1934); “Le Problème de la forme et l’exégèse contemporaine. A propos de la ‘Formgeschichte’”; and “Sur une hypothèse d’Asin Palacios.” The author states in his introduction that he is concerned with methodology: “une introduction méthodologique à des recherches concernant l’Histoire des Religions.” He refers to Bergson’s discussion of method in *La Pensée et le mouvant* (1934). The problem, Bergson states, is not to proceed deductively, from prior ideas, in pursuing an investigation; we must learn first how to *Pose a question before we can find an answer to it*. See especially pp. 50-52. Here the author, referring to Bergson, urges historians of religion to study “des nuances obscures et cachées qui ont constitué et constituent en ces religions mêmes ce qu’elles contiennent de vivant.” We should look behind appearances, for what is living and vital in religion. Eng. trans. *Problems of the History of Religions*.


L. I. German. “Intuitiva Filosofia Bergsona.” Literaturnyi kritik, 5 (1935): 3-26. Print. This is an orthodox Marxist exposition and critique, first, of Bergson’s theory of knowledge, then of his aesthetic theory. The author describes Bergson’s philosophy as an apologia for a dying capitalist society and his theory of knowledge as an incoherent juxtaposition of merely subjective intuition and science-oriented pragmatism. Bergson’s aesthetic theory, as developed in An Introduction to Metaphysics and Laughter is entirely misguided. In particular, Bergson fails to see that the function of art is to produce good conduct, while the basis of true art is knowledge of socioeconomic conditions. Eng. trans. “Bergson’s Intuitive Philosophy.”


Richard Müller-Freienfels. The Evolution of Modern Psychology. Tranas. W. Béran Wolf. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935: 513. Print. On pp. 89-92, the author cites Bergson as one of the “three great critics of the mosaic theory.” The other two are William James and Wilhelm Wundt. On p. 263 the author cites Bergson as the most original theorist of “French psychomotor psychology and instinct psychology.” Bergson made important contributions to “psychology in its psychomotor aspect” (p. 266). Bergson may be described as a psychologist because of his influence on psychology. Among the psychologists influenced by Bergson are G. Dwelshauvers, D. Roustan, C. Blondel and G. Finnbogason.


**1936**


Jean Nogué. *Essai sur l’activité primitive du moi*. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1936: 232. Print. The author dedicates this work to Louis Lavelle. In general his concepts of duration, action, abstraction, space, memory and expression, as well as personal freedom, are closely similar to Bergson’s. One is reminded throughout of Bergson’s defense of individual freedom in *Time and Free Will* and *Matter and Memory*. The author refers to our basic grasp of duration as “analytical,” however, and finds less distance between language and fundamental reality than Bergson does. Eng. trans. *Essay on the Primitive Activity of the Self*.


Guy Coburn Robson and O. W. Richards. *The Variation of Animals in Nature*. London: Longmans Green, 1936: 425. Print. On pp. 343-47 the authors refer to Bergson’s biology as a nonscientific alternative to Darwinism. The authors liken Bergson’s evolutionary theory to orthogenesis and compare his writings to the similar views of J. C. Smuts and E. S. Russell.


1937


Charles Sumner Crow. *Creative Education: Some Relations of Education and Civilization*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937: 456. Print. On pp. 28-29 the author cites Bergson’s description of the way in which the invention impacts its inventor, increasing his potential freedom; on pp. 38-39 he cites Bergson’s account of the way in which freedom can congeal into automatism; on pp. 105-06 he cites Bergson’s treatment of the “marshalling of the past” toward a purpose; on pp. 184-85 he applies Bergson’s concept of memory to problems of learning; on pp. 279-80 he notes Bergson’s definition of man as *Homo faber*. This work is more the expression of a “climate of opinion” than of the influence of any one thinker.


1938

Georges Canguilhem. “Activité technique et création.” *Communication et discussions*, 2nd series, 1938, p. 86. (This is a publication of the Société toulousaine de philosophie.) An English translation of
the title of this item is: “Technical Activity and Creation.” Here the author states that technology (and science generally) depends on an “elan of vital creativity.” This view is similar to Bergson’s, which has, he states, been poorly understood. (Canguilhem had been previously antibergsonian. Cf. Giuseppe Bianco, 2007.)


“Henri Bergson.” *Index liborum prohibitorum.* In Civitate Vaticanæ: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1938: 46. Print. This is the Roman Catholic index of prohibited books. It includes many of Bergson’s works.


Vladimir Jankélévitch. *L’Alternative.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1938: 219. Print. This is a Bergsonian response to the unhappy dilemmas posed by existentialism. We are confronted, the author argues, with too much or too little possibility, too much or too little time; we develop one talent at the expense of others, our means are never sufficient for the realization of our ends. “Comme nous restons éloignés, en somme, de l’idéal bergsonien: agir en hommes de pensée, penser en hommes d’action!” (p. 12). Instead, we choose between speculative impotence and the brutality of fiat. This work consists of three chapters: “L’Alternative,” “L’Économie,” and “Méta physique de l’ennui.” Throughout, the author traces human failure to the inability to comprehend, and to live, “duration.”


Jacques Maritain. “L’expérience mystique naturelle et le vide.” *Etudes carmélitaines,* 23.2 (1938): 116-39. Print. This essay is concerned primarily with certain forms of Oriental religious experience involving “emptiness.” Maritain, in passing, uses an example taken from Bergson’s lectures at the Collège de France to describe the nature of “human” love. A sleeping mother will respond to the slightest sound from her infant while, Bergson notes, sleeping through the discharge of a nearby cannon.


philosophies of Samuel Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan as “New, important, and specifically British” variations of Bergson’s Creative Evolution. (However, see D. Blitz, 1992.)

Bertrand Russell. Power: A New Social Analysis. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938: 328. Print. In Chapter 12, “Power Philosophies,” the author states: “Bergson’s Creative Evolution is a power-philosophy, which has been developed fantastically in the last Act of Bernard Shaw’s Back to Methuselah. Bergson holds that the intellect is to be condemned as unduly passive and merely contemplative, and that we only see truly during vigorous action such as a cavalry charge. He believes that animals acquired eyes because it would be pleasant to see; their intellects would not have been able to think about seeing, since they were blind, but intuition was able to perform this miracle. All evolution, according to him, is due to desire, and there is no limit to what can be achieved if desire is sufficiently passionate. The groping attempts of biochemists to understand the mechanisms of life are futile, since life is not mechanical, and its development is always such as the intellect is inherently incapable of imagining in advance; it is only in action that life is understood. It follows that men should be passionate and irrational; fortunately for Bergson’s happiness, they are” (pp. 268-69). Surely Russell knew better. (Ed.)


1939


1940


Rushton Coulborn. *The Individual and the Growth of Civilizations, an Answer to Arnold Toynbee and Henri Bergson*. New York (?): Phylon, 1940, 58. The author complains that Toynbee was too blinded by Bergson to see the true reasons for the decline of civilization.


1941


1942


1943


An English translation of the title of this item is: The Two Sources, Conscious and Unconscious, of the Moral Life.


1944


1945


complicated and pointless task to indicate the diversity of philosophies on which this work rests. It is important only to point out the resonance that the repeated reading of Bergson, Husserl and Whitehead has left on the spirit of the author, as they are the only contemporary thinkers that opened new paths of philosophy.”


1946


Charles Du Bos. “Pages de journal (22 février 1922 et 30 janvier 1923).” Revue de Paris, 53.10 (Oct. 1946): 48-57. Print. On pp. 48-52, the author describes a conversation with Bergson on Feb. 21, 1922. Bergson stated opinions on the necessity of ordinary ethical rules, on his early development (including his gradual rejection of the views of Herbert Spencer), the composition of Time and Free Will (the original version was much more fully developed), Rousseau, duration.


Jean Wahl. “Essai sur le néant d’un problème (Sur les pages 37-84 de L’Être et le Néant de J. P. Sartre).” *Deucalion*, 1 (1946): 41-72. Print. This is a careful, thorough critique of Sartre’s treatment of negation: a treatment which, the author insists, unsatisfactorily negates several important problems. The author argues at several points (pp. 43, 48, 50, 54, 61, 68-69, 71) Sartre’s dependence on Bergson, the unfairness of some of his criticisms. The views of Bergson, Hegel, and Heidegger are presented throughout as “counterpoint” to Sartre’s concept of negation. Eng. trans. “An Essay on the Negation of a Problem (On Pages 37-84 of *Being and Nothingness*).”


1947


________. “Interview with J.-P. Sartre Concerning the Jewish Question.” *La Revue juive* (Geneva), 10 Année, Nos. 6-7, juin-juillet 1947, 212-213. This interview took place in summer, 1939, but was not published until after the war. Sartre states: “My personal experience is that Jewish contributions to philosophy are contradictory. Perhaps the argument we’re always hearing about the restless, critical, and uncreative Jew may apply to Brunschvicg, but not to Bergson or Spinoza.” Quoted in Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka. *The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre*. Vol. I. *A Bibliographical Life*. Trans. R.C. M’Cleary. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974, 174-176.


1948


Henri Gouhier. “Philosophie et religion dans la pensée de Bergson. Cours publique à la Sorbonne 1946-1947.” *Les Etudes Bergsoniennes*, 1, 1948: 186-87. Print. This course, consisting of eleven lectures, follows the development of Bergson’s thought. The author explains how mystical experience can have philosophical value even though it is not part of the philosopher’s experience. Bergson is a philosopher of religion, not (like Kierkegaard and Pascal) a religious philosopher. Eng. trans. “Philosophy and Religion in Bergson’s Thought. Public Course at the Sorbonne, 1946-1947.”


transcendental idealism. 3. A meditation on Aristotelian dynamism. The author also explores the sources of Bergson’s thought in Aristotle and his commentators and provides an outline of Bergson’s basic contentions in his thesis.


Marcel Proust. Letters to a Friend. Trans. Alexander and Elizabeth Henderson. Pref. Georges de Lauris. London: Falcon Press, 1949: 196. Print. See Proust’s letter to Georges de Lauris, 1909: “I am glad you read some Bergson and liked it. It is as if we had been together on a mountaintop. I don’t know L’Evolution Créatrice (and because of the great store I set on your opinion I will read it at once). But I have read a fair amount of Bergson, and the parabola of his thought being sufficiently describable after a single generation no matter what Creative Evolution may follow, I can not fail to understand what you mean when you speak of Bergson. I suppose I have told you in what high esteem I hold him and also – something less interesting, although it does reveal a moral aspect – that he has always been very good to me” (pp. 150-51). Georges de Lauris notes in the preface (p. 12) that the principal works that Marcel Proust read were those of Saint-Simon, Chateaubriand, Sainte-Beuve, Bergson, and Mâle.


1950


S. Baumgarten. “Une Figure soi-disant comique : le snob.” Revue d’Esthétique, 3.3-4 (July-Dec. 1950): 343-48. Print. The author examines “the snob” via several theories of the comic, including Bergson’s. Eng. trans. “A So-called Comic Figure: The Snob.”


David Victoroff. “Le Rire et le rêve.” *Revue d’Esthétique*, 3.2 (1950): 265-73. Print. The author suggests that Freud’s *Wit and Its Relations to the Unconscious* may have been inspired in part by


1951


John Bowditch. “The Concept of élan vital: A Rationalization of Weakness” in E. M. Earle, ed. Modern France: Problem of the Third and Fourth Republics. Princeton: Princeton U Press, 1951: 32-43. Print. The author argues, speaking of the years 1910-1914, that when “. . . French labor leaders of those years, for instance, boasted of the élan révolutionnaire of their fellow workers or French military writers gloried in the furia francesa exhibited by their countrymen on hypothetical battlefields, they were, in effect, fabricating myths as a means of escape from the unpleasant task of coming to grips with the hard realities of their twentieth-century world” (p. 33). The author deals specifically with revolutionary syndicalism, which he describes as the official ideology of the French General Confederation of Labor (CGT) through the outbreak of World War I, and with that part of the French military establishment that gloried in the doctrine of “l’offensive à outrance” (pp. 34-35). The weaknesses of the French labor movement and the French military could not be made up for by a retreat into myth.


G. N. M. Tyrrel. *Homo Faber: A Study in Man’s Mental Evolution.* London: Methuen, 1951: 205. Print. This is a reflection on, and development of, Bergson’s contention that man is best understood as *Homo faber* (man the maker, fabricator), not as *Homo sapiens* (man the “knower”) (see pp. 51-59). Man’s intelligence is adapted, via his evolutionary history, to geometry (see pp. 83-118) and to mechanical concepts. In order to understand the world and ourselves in depth, the, we must transcend our “adaptedness”: we must cease carrying over into philosophical speculation the concepts and attitudes developed in species-specific, pragmatic behavior. In place of Bergson’s *élan vital* the author urges a theory of “emergent evolution.”

1952

Henri Brocher. *Les étapes de la pensée humaine.* Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1952: 147. 1st ed. F. Alcan, 1934. Print. The author finds the first origins of human thought in the “spontaneous activity of the human spirit,” and argues that we must look to the modern era for the most satisfactory attempts to interpret that activity. He insists that Bergson’s theory of the “genesis of the intelligence” furnishes us with a complete and clear account of this genesis (p. 11). On pp. 83-99 he analyzes Bergson’s account of the development of mechanism. Bergson’s critique has great value when applied to modern scientific thought. But Bergson failed to satisfactorily consider the “primitive mentality.”


Alexis Carrel. *Reflections on Life.* Trans. Antonia White. Intro. Anne Carrel. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1952: 205. Print. This book, the author’s last, finds the author in agreement with Bergson on any number of points: instinct and intelligence (pp. 49-51), education and intellect (p. 55), basic tendencies of life (p. 68), the place of mind in evolution (pp. 73-77), the nature of personality (p. 82), and others. One also finds in the author a strange admixture of physiologism and social Darwinism which are, if anything, antibergsonian. This is a translation of Carrel’s *Reflections on the Conduct of Life* (195).


1953


1954


Errol Harris. *Nature, Mind and Modern Science*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1954: xvi, 455. Print. See especially 393-99, “Philosophies of Evolution.” The author argues that in attempting to resolve the “Renaissance dualism” Bergson merely “annihilates” one of its terms. “How are we to conceive, for instance, of a life-force which is at once a force and yet not material, and which presses on against—nothing?” Also: if matter as we manipulate it (i.e., as bodies with sharp outlines) is unreal, how can we act on it? But if matter is the relaxed life force then “the material world must in reality be much as we conceive it in science and intellect need not be impugned as a source of illusion” (the author urges similar criticisms in his *The Reality of Time*, SUNY, 1988, pp. 47-48).


1955


1956


Martin Buber. *Pointing the Way: Collected Essays*. Trans. Maurice Friedman. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957: 239. Print. See “Bergson’s Concept of Intuition,” pp. 81-86. This is the concluding section of an essay published in 1943 as an introduction to the Hebrew translation of Bergson. The author holds that Bergson’s intuition abolishes the distinction between knower and known and alters the characteristics of the known rather than recognizing them. Bergson also fails to understand art, the artist, instinct, and life.


Ernst Cassirer. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. Vol. 3. *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*. Trans. Ralph Mannheim. Intro. Charles W. Hendel. New Haven: Yale U Press, 1957: 501. Print. On pp. 36-41 and 184-90, the author subjects Bergson’s philosophy to a careful analysis and criticism. He asserts that it is the “lasting achievement of the Bergsonian metaphysic that it reversed the ontological relation assumed between being and time (p. 184). However, he concludes that Bergson’s metaphysics and epistemology, good at releasing the mind from spatiality and fragmentation, is impotent at dealing with the active embodiment and persisting fulfillment of intuition. Once achieved, Bergsonian intuition lapses into a “strange romantic quietism” (p. 187). The true self for Bergson is not “the self that reaches and acts outward” (p. 185). (Long passages in *The Two Sources* and elsewhere provide a very different conclusion. [Ed.])

Israel Knox. “Comedy and the Category of Exaggeration.” *Journal of Philosophy*, 54.25 (1957): 801-12. Print. Bergson’s theory of laughter does not explain either the full range of laughable incongruity or the liberation from tension that accompanies laughter.


John Passmore. *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan, 1957: 523. Print. Interesting similarities between Bergson and William James (pp. 105-08); Bergson, Pragmatism and G. Sorel, (p. 121); “Perry took over from James this emphasis on the human organism, and united with it a theory of perception which Bergson had sketched in *Matter and Memory*. A mind’s
“content,” Bergson had argued, consists of that part of its environment to which its attention is momentarily directed. Mind, Perry concluded, is “an interested response by an organism.” Our “consciousness of a table,” for example, consists simply in the fact that our nervous system is interested in the table. No entity, “consciousness,” is here involved, not even in the form of a “mental act” (pp. 263-64). The author relates Bergson and C. Lloyd Morgan (pp. 271-72), Bergson and S. Alexander (p. 273).


1958


Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958: 333. Print. This is a study of labor, work, and action as fundamental forms of the human condition. The author views Bergson’s definition of man as homo faber – man the fabricator – as important to thinking on the subject of labor: “The school of Bergson, like its master, idealizes labor by equating it with work and fabrication” (p. 117n). Included in this “school” are George Sorel, Adriano Tilgher, and Edouard Berth. Jules Vuillemin’s L’Être et le travail (1949) still owes to Bergson its terminology, though its logic is Hegelian (p. 3035n).


**1960**

Hugo Dyserinck. “Die Briefe Henri Bergsons an Graf Hermann Keyserling.” *Deutsche Vierteljarsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 34.2 (1960): 169-88. Print. These letters by Bergson to a German philosopher, Keyserling, are presented in the section of this bibliography devoted to writings by Bergson. A brief English-language annotation is provided for each.


**1961**


John Howell Glass. *Creation and Creativity: An Essay in Philosophical Theology*. Dissertation, Yale University, 1961: 472. Dissertation Abstracts International, 48.7 (1988): 1803A. UMI No. AAC 8721570. Print. This essay examines conflicting claims about the implications of creativity for Christian theology of Creation. Part I examines the meaning and implications of creativity in the thought of Bergson, Whitehead, and Wieman. A consensus among them about creativity is formulated, especially as it bears upon the doctrine of Creation. That bearing consists mainly of negative criticism of the creature as substantial and the Creator as absolute, together with certain methodological presuppositions of these views. Part I concludes with a statement of the critical questions that should be put to classical theology of Creation, if its adequacy to the claims of proponents of creativity is to be determined. The Conclusion states the most basic issues that the foregoing Chapters have joined. It concludes that classical theology of Creation, as formulated by Farrar, meets two decisive conditions. It can sustain itself in the face of criticism in the name of creativity, and it can appropriate the positive contentions of its negative critics.

T. A. Goudge. *The Ascent of Life: A Philosophical Study of the Theory of Evolution*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961: 236. Print. On pp. 82-83, the author argues that Bergson, Driesch, and other vitalists who appeal to empirical considerations in support of their theories are not, in spite of appearances, acting as scientists. See also pp. 102-03.


1962


Jane Ellen Harrison. Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion. 2nd ed. Rpt. Cleveland, OH: World Pub. Co., 1962: 559. Meridian Books, M145. Print. The first edition of this book was published in 1911, the second in 1927. In her introduction to the first edition (included here), the author notes that the two great influences on her thinking are Bergson and Emile Durkheim. From Bergson she derives the idea that “. . . Dionysos, with every other mystery-god, was an instinctive attempt to express what Professor Bergson calls durée, that life which is one, indivisible, and yet ceaselessly changing” (p. xii). The Olympians, by contrast, are a work of “analysis, of reflections and intelligence” (p. xii). From Durkheim she derives the idea that it is group and not individual consciousness that gives rise to the mystery gods.


1963


**1964**


Maurice Merleau-Ponty. “Einstein and the Crisis of Reason” in Signs. Trans. with Intro. Richard C. McCleary. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964: 192-97. Print. In this essay the author opposes Bergson’s attitude toward and interpretation of relativity physics to that of Einstein. Einstein was a “classical” thinker who assumed that the world is rational. He found no way to justify his rationalism, however, and could not explain why his equations should or did correspond perfectly with the universe. This contradiction, the author urges, actually puts reason in jeopardy. Bergson’s position, by contrast, offered Einstein a way of reconciling his seemingly paradoxical physical theory with the ordinary experience of men. For Bergson, as his argument in Duration and Simultaneity shows, “. . . rationality and the universal are founded anew, not on the divine right of dogmatic science, but upon the prescientific evidence that there is one single world . . .” (p. 196). Bergson believed he had provided a basis for Einstein’s theory of multiple times in his concept of duration.


Jean-Jacques Latour. “La Nature dans la pensée de Whitehead” in Idée du monde et philosophie de la nature. Eds., Régis Jolivet, Maurice Nédoncelle, Stanislas Breton, Jean Châtillon, Dominique Dubarle, and Jean-Jacques Latour. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966: 147-207. Print. This is a careful, clear, very well-thought-out commentary on Alfred North Whitehead’s The Concept of Nature (1920). The author makes numerous comparisons of Bergson and Whitehead. See especially “Whitehead, Bergson et Einstein,” pp. 147-52; “Science, philosophie, métaphysique de la nature,” pp. 157-59; and “Nature, Durée, Événements,” pp. 174-79. The author finds Bergson and Whitehead in agreement on the primacy of quality over quantity (pp. 151-52), the primacy of perception (pp. 158-59), the creative evolution of nature (p. 176), the passage of nature (p. 176n), the unreality of instants (p. 178), and the interrelation of the concrete and the abstract (pp. 181-82). They disagree concerning the primacy of (Heraclean) flux over Parmenidean permanence (p. 154), the distinction between philosophy and science (pp. 157-58), and the terms “duration” and “time” (p. 175n). The author nowhere makes an explicit comparison of Bergson’s and Whitehead’s views on relativity theory.


George J. Seidel. The Crisis of Creativity. Notre Dame: Notre Dame U Press, 1966: 182. Print. The author explores the character of creativity, especially in its historical aspects in Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Kant, Freud, Hume, and Bergson, then discusses the influence of modern technology on man as a decisionmaker. See pp. 113, 140-45. The author regards Bergson as the father of most modern theories of creativity.


1967


Hans A. Schmitt. Charles Péguy: The Decline of an Idealist. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U Press, 1967: 211. Print. The author refers several times to Bergson and Péguy, noting that, for example, in the years 1900-1905, though Péguy was to change his mind often, “Bergson alone remained the fixed star in his ideological firmament” (p. 103).


1968


Georges Canguilhem. “Le concept et la vie” in Georges Canguilhem, *Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences*. Paris: Vrin, 1968: 335-64. Print. This essay contains numerous significant insights into Bergson’s treatment of biology. The author distinguishes Bergson’s biology from those of Kant and Hegel. He notes Bergson’s reformulation of his concept of general ideas in *The Creative Mind*. (See pp. 348-53.). He criticizes Bergson (pp. 362-63) for failing to pay sufficient attention to topology and statistics as alternative ways of viewing life. This is a fascinating re-reading and critique of Bergson’s philosophy of biology in the light of the new molecular biology.


1969


Robert Charles Grogin. The French Intellectuals’ Reactions to Henri Bergson, 1900-1914. Diss. New York U, 1969: vii, 277. DAI 30.06 (1969): 2459A. Print. The author states: “This dissertation examines what the French intellectuals were saying about Bergson, and his philosophy, particularly after 1900, and attempts to determine why, given the cultural setting of France in those years, they responded as they did.”


1970


social disintegration”; on p. 77 he states that Bergson, Proust, and Freud have advertised “human possessiveness and male arbitrariness”; on p. 302 he emphasizes Bergson’s treatment of myth.


Michael Wyschogrod. “Memory in the History of Philosophy” in Phenomenology of Memory: The Third Lexington Conference on Pure and Applied Phenomenology. Eds. Erwin W. Strauss and Richard M. Griffith. Pittsburg: Duquesne U Press; Louvain: Editions E. Klawelaerts, 1970: 3-19. Print. The author concludes his study of memory in Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine with a brief analysis (pp. 14-19) of Matter and Memory. The author notes the “relatively experimental temper” of this book (p. 17), cites Bergson’s advance on Aristotle’s concept of memory (p. 18). He concludes that for Bergson memory “… is not a faculty that transports into the consciousness of the present an image of the past, but is a constituent dimension of temporal consciousness itself without which consciousness as we know it would be impossible” (p. 19).


1971


George Mikes. Laughing Matter: Toward a Personal Philosophy of Wit and Humor. New York: The Library Press, 1971: 133. Print. The author pursues an extensive and appreciative discussion of Bergson’s account of laughter, with emphasis on its function as a social corrective. Published in Britain as Humor in Memoriam, 1968.


Jean Piaget. Insights and Illusions of Philosophy. Trans. with Intro. Wolfe Mays. New York: World Pub. Co. Meridian Books, 1971: 232. Print. In this work the author attacks the view (common in European intellectual circles) that there is a philosophical psychology different from and superior to scientific psychology. Among his two chief targets are Bergson and Edmund Husserl. For Piaget’s early immersion in, and reaction against, Bergsonism see pp. 5-7, 8-9, 23, 101. For a thoroughgoing critique of Bergson’s philosophy see pp. 88-102. For an appreciative criticism of memory, action, and the self, see pp. 150-55. For a criticism of Bergson’s critique of relativity physics see pp. 171-77. For Bergson’s influence on Léon Brunschvicg, see p. 101. A full commentary on Piaget’s critiques cannot be attempted within the limits of an annotation. This is a rich collection of provocative but questionable criticisms of Bergson’s philosophy.


1972


Jacques Viard. “Proust et les *Cahiers de la Quinzaine.*” *Amitié Charles Péguy,* 180, 1972: 20-37. Print. The author notes that Proust subscribed to Péguy’s *Cahiers de la Quinzaine* from 1908 through the last series in 1914. (It is hard to believe that he could have done so and not run across many of Bergson’s ideas there. [Ed.]).


1973


Robert S. Brumbaugh and Nathaniel M. Lawrence. *Philosophical Themes in Modern Education*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973: 294. Print. For an account of the manner in which Bergson’s philosophy influenced Jean Piaget’s theory of knowledge, see pp. 212-15, 220, 235. The authors treat Bergson as having “inverted” Kant’s theory of knowledge by treating perception as a prelude to action, not pure knowledge. This emphasis was retained by Piaget throughout his career.


Arthur Koestler. *The Roots of Coincidence: An Excursion into Parapsychology*. New York: Vintage, 1973: 159. Print. On pp. 131 et seq. the author notes that Bergson’s “filter theory,” according to which the senses, the brain and ordinary thought exclude wide ranges of reality, has “been taken up by various writers on extra-sensory perception.” The author then cites works by James S. Hayes and Sir Cyril Burt. He then describes neo-Darwinism as a conceptual “filter.”


self and the world prevents him from dealing with the absolutely fundamental reality of lived space, a reality dealt with effectively by Eugene Minkowski.


Jean-Claude Pariente. Le Langage et l’individuel. Paris: Armand Colin, 1973: 224. Philosophies pour l’âge de la science. Print. See especially Chapter I, “Hésitations bergsoniennes,” pp. 11-29, which develops insights first expressed in the author’s “Bergson et Wittgenstein,” 1969. The author is primarily concerned with the problem of using language to describe “individuals.” This cannot be achieved by describing individuals in their materiality, but requires instead “une caractéristique formelle” (a formal concept of the individual). The author uses Bergson’s treatment of language as a springboard for his investigation. Bergson and Wittgenstein both hold that: (1) All meaningful propositions are images of reality. (2) All efforts to depict states of affairs which are not objects of images are meaningless. (3) All propositions with universal validity are devoid of meaning. Bergson hesitates before the notion of individuality, refusing to define it via its materiality (i.e., its specific attributes), but characterizing it as indefinable hence ineffable. Bergson could, through his “fluid concepts,” have established a formal concept of individuality, but failed to do so. See also pp. 31-36, 224-27. Eng. trans. Language and the Individual.


Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz. Twentieth Century Philosophy (1900-1950). Trans. Chester A. Kisiel. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub., 1973: 260. Print. The author deals with Bergson’s philosophy on pp. 30-42 and throughout. He portrays Bergson as developing both pragmatic and vitalistic theses. Speaking of the revolt of early twentieth-century philosophy against previous philosophical positions, the author states: “The deciding blow, not only in France but in all of Western Europe, was struck by Bergson. One must stress this even if one does not value Bergson’s metaphysics” (p. 13).

1974


Panthea Reid Broughteon. *William Faulkner: The Abstract and the Actual.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U Press, 1974: 222. Print. Of the many philosophers cited in this work, Bergson (who is cited throughout) is the only one which, the author states, has actually influenced Faulkner (p. xiiin).


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1975


Ivor Davies. “Western European Art Forms Influenced by Nietzsche and Bergson, Particularly Italian Futurism and French Orphism.” *Art International*, 19.3 (Mar. 1975): 49-55. Print. The author’s abstract states: “The late 19c writings of Nietzsche and Bergson are analyzed for their influences on such later artistic movements as Italian Futurism, French Orphism, and Russian Futurism. Concepts of simultaneity, movement, and light, presented by the earlier philosophers, are found restated in the manifestos and writings of Umberto Boccioni, Marinetti and Robert Delaunay.” *Bibliography of the History of Art*.

Charlotte Douglas. “The New Russian Art and Italian Futurism.” *Art Journal*, 34.3 (1975): 229-39. Print. The author studies the early Russian avant-garde from 1908 to 1915, arguing that though Italian futurism influences the evolution of Russian modernism, these were superimposed on a prior interest in depicting psychological states and in the philosophy of Bergson.

Robert C. Grogin. “Henri Bergson and the University Community, 1900-1914.” *Historical Reflections*, 2 (1975): 209-22. Print. This is a study of reactions to Bergson, both critical and affirmative, by the French professoriate, especially that of the Sorbonne. Bergson was to have a difficult time distancing himself from the aura of anti-intellectualism associated with his philosophy.


distinguer dans l’appréciation des incidences des mesures et des politiques monétaires couramment utilisées en économique.” [Reflection on the concepts of quantity and quality used in scientific approaches. Distinction between the metaphysical notion of quantity developed in Cartesian philosophy and the metaphysical notion of philosophy of Bergson. Application of these concepts in economic science and the difficulty of distinguishing them in the valuation of incidences of measurements and of monetary policies currently used in economics.] Périodex, vol. 4, A87.


Joel de Rosnay. Le Macroscope. Vers un vision globale. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975: 295. Print. In breaking the vicious circle of perpetual repetition in which Greek thought enclosed itself and in “opposing” the order of biological evolution, thermodynamics indirectly made possible a “philosophy of becoming and of process” represented by Teilhard and Bergson (pp. 137-38). During a brief account of the history of the concept of time, he notes Bergson’s and Teilhard’s notion of an irreversible temporality in evolution, opposed to that of matter (pp. 205-06). Bergson, however, introduces “a second dissymmetry” between creative duration and the time of “reproduction” (i.e., repetition). The author accepts this distinction as fundamental to an understanding of biological evolution, arguing against both mechanism (Monod) and finalism (Teilhard). We must, he argues, escape our inveterate “chronocentrism” (i.e., our fixation on linear time). To maintain the organization of an open system is to retard the velocity of increase of entropy; to create information, organization, machinery is to find the means to “canalize” energy. Life and matter are like two processes of the same velocity, each the inverse of the other (p. 221). (A very Bergsonian approach to evolution and human history.) Eng. trans. The Macroscope: Toward a Global Vision.


1976


Silvano Arieti. Creativity: The Magic Synthesis. New York: Basic Books, 1976: 448. Print. On pp. 91-92 the author notes the popularity of “anticonceptual” philosophers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He cites Bergson as one who “advocated abandoning conceptual thinking” and reverting to “intuitional forms of knowledge.” According to the author this means our endoceptual and paleologic levels of cognition. But even these do not, the author protests,
exclude the conceptual. See pp. 54-55, 66-67 for definitions of endocent and paleologic. Both are primitive modes of thought, according to the author.


Georgi Plekhanov. “Henri Bergson” in Selected Philosophical Works. Vol. 5. Moscow: Progress Pub., 1976: 294-98. Print. This is an analysis of Creative Evolution. The author holds that Bergson comes in this work very close to the doctrines of historical materialism (Marxism). All that is necessary is to apply Bergson’s notions to the development of social thought, which Bergson in part does through his appreciation of the role of technology. Bergson, however, clearly does not know Marxism, or understand the “changing succession of relations of production” in human
history. Bergson jettisons his profoundest insights because of his commitment to idealism. Any attraction French syndicalists might feel toward Bergson, therefore, is absurd.


1977


Anne Freeman. “Raissa Maritain” in *Woman’s Way to God*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977: 200-10. Print. The author describes Bergson’s influence not only on philosophers but on students and high society. She also portrays his effect on Jacques and Raissa Maritain’s conversion and his own [presumed] conversion to Catholicism – which out of loyalty to Judaism he never publicly proclaimed.


the reality of an emerging revolution in late nineteenth-early twentieth century science. He treats the debate over thermodynamics as the wellspring of this revolution and considers Bergson’s metaphysics to be in fact a physics: the physics of W. Ostwald and the “energetists”, of thermodynamic irreversibility and “negentropy.” He states: “Or tout cela est la nouvelle mécanique : Bergson est mécaniste” (p. 132). Eng. trans. Hermes IV. The Distribution.


1978


Henri Atlan. Entre le cristal et la fumée. Essai sur l’organisation du vivant. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979: 288. Print. In a section titled “L’Ecclesiaste et le temps créateur. Idéalisme et matérialisme” (“Ecclesiastes and Creative Time. Idealism and Materialism”), pp. 174-81, the author points out that the new concept of living things as self-organizing, though it is more organic, essentially unconscious, capable of discovering and assimilating novelty, is not an idealism like those of Bergson, Schelling, and Schopenhauer, who oppose “life” to “matter” (or, analogously, “instinct” to “intelligence”). The new biochemical and biophysical ideas, with their concept of “organization through chance” (« hasard organisationnel ») may be presumed to be idealistic in nature, just as, from another viewpoint, they may be taken to be materialistic. The truth is, they are neither. We must rethink our basic concepts in the light of new concepts. Eng. trans. Between Crystal and Smoke: Essay on the Organization of the Living.


Virginia Spate. *Orphism: The Evolution of Non-figurative Painting in Paris 1910-1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979: 409. Oxford Studies in the History of Art and Architecture. Though the author purports to deal with the emergence of “Orphism,” 1910-1914, in fact she deals with the general emergence of antirepresentationalist art in France during these years. Bergson seems to have been the chief – though not the only – philosophical influence on this metamorphosis. Futurism, Unanimism, Simultanism, Cubism, Orphism: virtually all the “isms” emerging at this time in some manner or other felt Bergson’s influence. For Bergson’s influence on Frank Kupka, see pp. 26-27, 87, 103, 113, 123-24; on Fernand Léger, pp. 33, 244-45, 249, 270; on R. Delaunay, pp. 33, 43-44, 185, 189, 200, 225; on M. Duchamp, pp. 33, 330, 338. Bergson’s influence on Kupka was direct.


1980


Eliot B. Gosse, Jr. *The Transformation Process in Joyce's Ulysses*. Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1980: xix, 228. Print. The author’s prologue (pp. xi-xix) examines the influence of Bergson’s *L’évolution créatrice* on the writing of Joyce’s *Ulysses*. He concludes: “Bergson’s emphasis on change as the locus of reality, his insistence on inner and outer process as more vital than fixed forms, and his putting of will ‘into the impulsion it prolongs’ all suggest ‘that reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued without end’ (p. 261). Whether optimistically affirmed by Bruno, or more guardedly advocated by Freud, this insistence became the thoroughly worked-through premise of Joyce’s later fiction” (p. xix). See also pp. 20-23, 61-62, 80-81, and elsewhere.


Jack K. Roth. *The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians*. Berkeley: U California Press, 1980: 359. Print. The author makes more than twenty references both to Bergson’s influence on George Sorel’s syndicalist political philosophy and to the personal relations between these two figures. References to Bergson in the correspondence of Sorel and Benedetto Croce are noted. Throughout, Sorel utilized Bergson’s pragmatic theory of knowledge and his concept of intuition.

Lane Roth. “Bergsonian Comedy and the Human Machines in *Star Wars*” in *Dialog*® file, 1: ERIC. The Dialog Corp., 1980. Print. While analyzing humor is difficult, Henri Bergson’s concept of comedy (a person acting like a machine) outlined in the classic essay, “Le Rire,” in 1900, is probably too narrow a definition. Science fiction film, a genre which has evolved since the publication of Bergson’s essay, has also speculated about man society, often to comment on and to ameliorate the human condition. The archetypal animony of artifact vs. nature, for Bergson the locus of comedy, is for most science fiction the focus of “angst.” Nevertheless, the characters C-3PO and R2-D2 in George Lucas’s *Star Wars* demonstrate Bergsonian comic principles primarily through reversal – a machine acting like a person – and sometimes through double reversal – a machine acting like a person acting like a machine.

Ben-Ami Scharfstein. *The Philosophers: Their Lives and the Nature of Their Thought*. New York: Oxford U Press, 1980: 486 pp. Print. On pp. 63-64 the author notes that Wittgenstein and Bergson, both unusually sensitive to music, commented on the “importance of what may be called the musicality of language.” Thus Wittgenstein asserted “sometimes a sentence can be understood only when one reads it in the correct tempo. My sentences should all be read slowly” (p. 64). “Bergson’s respect for the musicality of language was so great that he insisted that the full understanding of a philosopher was impossible without sensitivity to the philosopher’s rhythms” (p. 64). On p. 83 the author lists Bergson among the poetic philosophers. On p. 103 the author notes the influence of Plotinus on Bergson and A. N. Whitehead. On pp. 103-04 the author notes the similarities of Bergson’s and A. Schopenhauer’s cosmogonies. On pp. 352-53 the author again notes the relations between Bergson’s philosophy and music. See also p. 259.


1981


J.-C. Dumoncel. “Popper et Bergson.” Revue d’Enseignement Philosophique, 32.3 (1982): 37-48. Print. The author attempts a rapprochement between Bergson and Karl Popper. Both oppose Eleaticism and support a metaphysics of becoming. In epistemology both propose: (1) a biological theory of knowledge; (2) an evolutionary concept of life; (3) a concept of evolution as neither mechanistic nor finalistic. Both defend “free will,” though with contrasting arguments. Both use the categories “open” and “closed.” Bergson’s concept of mysticism is not irrationalist, hence neither is his concept of openness. Eng. trans. “Popper and Bergson.”


Abraham Pais. “*Subtle is the Lord…* The Science and the Life of Albert Einstein. Oxford, New York: Oxford U Press, 1982: 552. Print. On pp. 27-28 the author states: “It is true that great men like Hendrik Antoon Lorentz and Henri Poincaré had difficult recognizing that this (special relativity) was a new theory of kinematic principles rather than a constructive dynamic theory (8) and that the theory caused the inevitable confusion in philosophical circles, as witness, for example, the little book on the subject by Henry Bergson written as late as 1922.” Did Lorentz and Poincaré have a direct influence on Bergson, however? (See pp. 169-72.) On p. 510 the author states: “Einstein came to know, like, and respect Bergson. Of Bergson’s philosophy he used to say, ‘Gott verzeih ihm.’ God forgive him.”


Ilya Prigogine. “Dialogue avec Piaget sur l’irréversibilité.” Archives de Psychologie, 50.192 (1982): 7-16. Print. The author explores relationships between the genetic psychology of Jean Piaget and his own theory of dissipative structures, especially with respect to the concept of irreversible time. By developing a genetic psychology, Piaget joins a new idea of the history of science, in which the idea of time plays an increasing role. Time is understood now no longer as simply “spatialized,” however. The idea of a physical trajectory, essential to a spatialized time, no longer appears in the theory of dissipative structures. The author notes that both Piaget and himself were profoundly moved by a reading of Creative Evolution, and by a subsequent effort to “get beyond” Bergson’s philosophy. He ends by suggestion that it is necessary to get beyond both Bergson and his philosophical antipode, A. Einstein. Eng. trans. “Dialogue with Piaget Concerning Irreversibility.”


1983


Clémence Ramnoux. *Etudes présocratiques II, suivies de Études mythologiques ou De la légende à la sagesse*. Paris: Klincksieck, 1983: 238. Print. This work has three parts. In the first the author interprets the philosophy of Anaxagoras. In the second he protests our attempts to translate the intuitions of the ancients into our own conceptual language. In the third he recounts what he owes to Bergson, Lévi-Strauss, and Dumézil. Eng. trans. *Presocratic Studies II, Followed by Mythological Studies or by the Legend of Wisdom*.


“Some Remarks on George Sorel’s Critique of Creative Evolution. Four Unpublished Letters by Bergson to Georges Sorel.”


“Durée as Ontological Principle,” pp. 280-82, and “Bergson in Conjunction,” pp. 282-84. Though critical of Bergson’s standpoint, Schutz never ceased to refer to, and to utilize, Bergson’s ideas.


1984


Edward S. Casey. “Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty.” *Man and World*, 17.3-4 (1984): 279-97. Print. The author argues that Bergson’s revolutionary distinction between two sorts of memory provided Maurice Merleau-Ponty with an entrance to the problem of the “lived body.” Despite Bergson’s belief that habit memory is situated in the body “… he does not tell us just how it is so situated: a task that will be left to Merleau-Ponty” (p. 42).


paradoxes, p. 53; 


Carl R. Hausman. A Discourse on Novelty and Creation. Albany: State U of New York Press, 1984: 159. SUNY Series in Philosophy. Print. On pp. 81-84 the author deals with Bergson’s treatment of intuition and language, and of the limits of discursive analysis. On pp. 141-42n he stresses differences between his own model of creativity and Bergson’s: “Bergsonian intuition alone can not discern these identities as forms as they are presented in tension, nor can intuition alone discriminate the discontinuities of radical change, since these erupt within definite boundaries.”


Max Horkheimer. “La Métaphysique bergsonienne du temps.” L’homme et la société. No. 69-70, juillet/décembre 1984, 9-29. This is a translation, by Philippe Joubert, of Max Horkheimer, Zur Henri Bergson’s Metaphysik der Zeit” (1935). Horkheimer examines an essay in Bergson’s recently published The Creative Mind (La pensée et le mouvant, 1934), “The Possible and the Real.” He concurs with Bergson’s distinction between lived duration and mere abstract mathematical time, but argues that Bergson’s thought belongs to a pre-Hegelian era and therefore neglects negative realities: human suffering, death, emptiness. His notions of “intuition” and “élan vital” are therefore as abstract and as empty as the intellectualist concepts he attacks. (Cf. P. Soulez, L’homme et la société, Nos. 69-70, 1983, 3-8)


Richard Kearney, *Dialogues With Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage: Paul Ricœur, Emmanual Lévinas, Herbert Marcuse, Stanislas Breton, Jacques Derrida*. Manchester, England: Manchester U Press, 1984: 133. Print. On pp. 49-50, Emmanual Lévinas describes Bergson’s influence on his thought, hailing Bergson’s theory of duration as one of the most significant contributions to contemporary philosophy. Heidegger’s reflections on technology as the destiny of Western philosophy of Reason were already present in *Creative Evolution*. Bergson’s importance to contemporary Continental thought has been “obfuscated.”


Ben Lazare Mijuskovic. *Contingent Immaterialism: Meaning, Freedom, Time, and Mind*. Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner Pub Co., 1984: 214. Print. In Chapter 3 the author argues that Hegel’s “paradigm of the freedom of consciousness” influenced Schopenhauer, Bergson, and Sartre. In Chapter 4 (“The Simplicity Argument and Time in Schopenhauer and Bergson”) he argues that Bergson’s intuition of duration was anticipated by Schelling and Schopenhauer. See also Chapter 7 “Time-Consciousness.” In the second section of this study the author argues against materialist concepts of mind.

Ned Noddings and Paul J. Shore. *Awakening the Inner Eye: Intuition in Education*. New York and London: Teachers College, Columbia U, 1984: 236. Print. On p. 2 the authors describe Bergsonian intuition as “a disinterested consciousness that identifies itself with the object.” On p. 8 they note their disagreement with Bergson’s notion of intuition “on several major points.” On pp. 21-22 they examine Bergson’s concept of intuition, concluding: “His emphasis on the power of intuition is nevertheless of some value to educators. This is primarily because of Bergson’s recognition of what might be called acquired intuitions (e.g., tricks or skills, connoisseurship, “knowing” the weather of a certain place, etc.). these acquired intuitions develop after a long acquaintance with their superficial manifestations and are exactly the sort of faculties needed to gain a sense of historical period or literary milieu. They also may aid in the development of mathematical and computer skills in young students, and are of obvious value in physical education and manual arts” (p. 22).


Print. The author finds the origins of Scheler’s philosophy to lie in phenomenology, the “so-called revival of metaphysics,” and Lebensphilosophie (Bergson, Dilthey, and R. Eucken).


Joseph Wayne Smith. “Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?” Eidos, 3 (Dec. 1984): 135-62. Print. “Why is there anything at all? In this paper we survey the major responses made to this question, concluding that all such responses are inadequate and that this problem is therefore cognitively underdetermined by available logical evidence.” Philosopher’s Index, 19.4 (Winter, 1985): 118. Print.


for the light they shed on Bergson’s view of Suarès’ writings, they also contain insights on Bergson’s views of individuals as different as Pascal and Napoleon.


Fernando Vidal. “La Vanité de la nomenclature. Un manuscrit inédit de Jean Piaget.” *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences*, 6.1 (1984): 75-106. Print. In this talk the young Piaget uses Bergson’s philosophy to support a nominalistic critique of biological taxonomy. The categories of taxonomists are abstract, and to that extent artificial, according to the young scientist. The editor correctly points out that though Bergson is not himself a nominalist, his philosophy can be used to support a nominalistic philosophy. Eng. trans. “The Vanity of Nomenclature: An Unedited Manuscript by Jean Piaget.”


**1985**


Louis de Broglie. “Mechanism Demands a Mysticism” in *Quantum Questions*. Ed. Ken Wilbur. Boston: Shambala, 1985: 122-25. Print. This section, taken from Broglie’s *Physics and Microphysics* (1956), concludes in the light of atomic weapons and atomic energy generally, that Bergson was right in stressing that new technological power demands a renewed mysticism as a “supplement.”


Benedetto Croce. *What is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*. 3rd ed. Trans. Douglas Ainslie. Intro. Pete A. Y. Gunter. New York: U Press of America, 1985: xxxv, 217. Print. On pp. 213-15 after an incisive analysis and criticism of Hegel’s philosophy, the author notes the emergence of a new romanticism as one condition for a true understanding of Hegel’s philosophy. He sees the new romantics as setting up the old Schellingian ideal of aesthetic contemplation: “Thus Bergson, one of the writers who have attached themselves to his movement, advocates as a metaphysis of the absolute, an intuitive knowledge ‘qui s’installe dans le mouvement et adopte la vie même des chose.’ But was not this just what Hegel demanded, and the point from which he began – to find a form of mind, which should be mobile as the movement of the real…” (p. 214). The author adds, however, that for Hegel such a view was only a starting point, not a conclusion. “The renunciation of thought would have been asked of Hegel in vain” (p. 214).

Jean-Pierre Changeux. *Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind*. Trans. L. Carey. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985; Oxford: Oxford U Press, 1985: 348. Print. On p. 21 the author quotes Bergson’s denial that the mind is equivalent to the brain as an unfruitful hypothesis. On p. 127 he quotes Bergson’s thesis that the brain does not have a mechanism to “make or even prepare” images and states that the thesis of this chapter (Ch. 5, pp. 126-69) is the exact opposite of Bergson’s view.


David Gross. “Bergson, Proust and the Revaluation of Memory.” *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 25.4 (Dec. 1985): 369-80. Print. “This article discusses the cultural re-thinking of memory and habit which took place in Europe around 1900. Bergson led a philosophical attack on habit, but defended a form of voluntary memory as useful for life. Proust attacked even this and defended a kind of ‘involuntary memory’ instead. Bergson’s analysis of memory and habit was more thorough, but Proust opened up insights which were to be creatively developed later in the 20th century.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 20.2 (1986): 102. print.


Asher Idan. “Bergson’s Philosophy of Language (in Hebrew).” Iyyun, 34.1-2 (Jan.-Apr. 1985): 34-48. Print. “This paper analyzes Bergson’s philosophy of language according to four modern areas: (1) philosophical logic and analytical philosophy; (2) philosophy of action and natural language; (3) psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics; (4) biology and the evolution of language. My contention is that non-canonical Continental philosophy of language (like that of Hegel or Bergson) can throw light on many issues that the canonical philosophy of language (Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Austin, Searle, etc.) deals with. I try to show that Bergson anticipated many recent insights concerning the primacy of action in linguistic affairs, the importance of social considerations in understanding verbal behavior, and the practical origins of semantical and logical paradoxes and antinomies.” Philosopher’s Index, 19.4 (1985): 94. Print.


Jean-Louis Labarrière. “Intelligence et pratique chez Bergson et Piaget.” Cahiers de l’Education: L’Enfant et le Primitif. Paris: U de Paris VIII (Nov. 1985): 45-68. Print. The author asks whether “… la psychologie génétique de Piaget ne ‘traduirait’ pas certains énoncés de Bergson relatifs au rapport entre l’intelligence et l’action, et plus particulièrement à ‘l’histoire’ de ce rapport” (p. 51). He explores the possibility that Piaget’s conquest of objectivity and logic through the subject-object duality translates something of Bergson’s progressive adaptation of intelligence and matter. The author finds several points at which this translation succeeds: theories of the “ages”
of intelligence, logico-biological schemas, the relations of intelligence to action, relations between the “closed” and the “open” in psychological development. Bergson, however, rejects Piaget’s notion of a “prelogical” stage.


Emmanuel Levinas. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Phillip Nemo. Trans. Richard Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne U Press, 1985: ix, 126. Print. On pp. 24-26 the author cites Bergson’s theory of duration (with its destruction of the primacy of clock time) as Bergson’s principle contribution. Without this concept Heidegger could never have ventured “his conception of Dasein as finite temporalization.” On pp. 37-38 he cites Bergson’s Time and Free Will and Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit as among the five or six most important books in the history of philosophy. See Bergson, Heidegger and negation on p. 40.


Valerie Ann Malhotra. “Consciousness and the Social: On Wagner’s Phenomenology of Consciousness and Sociology of the Life-World.” Human studies, 8 (1985): 325-335. Print. “This article summarizes and critiques the major themes of Wagner’s work, which is based primarily upon Alfred Schutz’ phenomenologically based sociology. Wagner integrates the work of Husserl, James, Bergson, G. H. Mead, Cooley and Weber. The concepts of perception, memory, desire, vantage point, horizon, relevance, self and world are keystones in Wagner’s analysis. It is concluded that Wagner’s work is an important contribution to a phenomenologically based sociology and social psychology. Some directions for further work are suggested.” Philosopher’s Index, 20.2 (1986): 116. Print.


Federico Riu. *Vida e Historia en Ortega y Gasset*. Caracas: Monte Ávila Ed., 1985: 199. Rústica, Bs 62. Print. “Propio de la primera etapa filosófica de Ortega es su relación original con la corriente vitalística de Nietzsche y Bergson, definada por un rechazo al irracionalismo y un intento de sustituir la razón pura por un razón vital.” [“Basic to the first step in Ortega’s philosophy is his original relation with the vitalist current of Nietzsche and Bergson, defined through a recourse to irrationalism and the intent to substitute a vital reason for a pure reason.”] E. M. V. in


Juana Sánchez Venegas. “Orígen Filosófico Común y Desarrollo Divergent de los Sistemas de Henri Bergson y José Ortega y Gasset.” *Pensamiento,* 41.161 (Jan.-Mar. 1985): 57-68. Print. “The Kantian Roots of Bergson and Ortega are emphasized to explain the existing connection between both authors. This connection is twofold. First, the identification by Ortega of his thought and Bergson’s: ‘the bon sens is the razón vital.’ Second, both authors criticize the concept of identity as received from classical philosophy. The aim of Bergson and Ortega was to find the true knowledge accounting for life as a dynamic reality. The Kantian setting made this attempt unsuccessful.” *Philosopher’s Index,* 19.3 (1985): 93. Print. Eng. trans. “Common Philosophical Origin and Divergent Development of the Systems of Henri Bergson and José Ortega y Gasset.”


Neven Sesardić. “Time in the Minkowski World” (in Slavic). *Filozofska Istraživanja,* 12 (1985): 41-48. Print. “Many of our intuitions about time can not be accommodated in the picture of the world suggested by contemporary science. Does that prove, as Bergson claimed, that scientific knowledge can not reach the most essential characteristics of that puzzling phenomenon, or should we conclude, on the contrary, that some of our deeply-rooted intuitions are simply false.
and that their incompatibility with science is only a sign that they are to be rejected as knowledge of objective reality? Just this second answer forces itself upon us on the basis of arguments presented in this paper.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 21.2 (1987): 150. Print.


“… Soseki, at this critical juncture of his life and career, altered his stylistic aims and methods in order to depict a more somber and agonized view of human life… The enthusiastic basis for the new mode of narration is found in his enthusiasm at the time of writing for William James’s lectures in *Pluralistic Universe*, particularly those sections which discuss Henri Bergson’s *élan vital.*”


Philippe Soulez. “L’enfant et le primitif chez Bergson et Husserl.” *Cahiers de l’Education. L’Enfant et le Primitif*. Paris: U de Paris-VIII (Nov. 1985): 13-33. Print. The author finds significant contrasts between Bergson’s and Husserl’s treatment of infants, primitives, and post-scientific peoples. Husserl continued to assume a simplistic teleology which treats the end as the whole purpose of the human process and all intermediary positions between the beginning and the conclusion of the process as so many steps. Hence he puts the end-product as more significant than the process, and stresses “le primat de l’éidétique sur le génétique” (p. 20). Bergson denies this general viewpoint, arguing, for example, that the adult is not to be understood as the goal of the child, but as the somewhat imperfect result of the child’s development. (Many possibilities are sacrificed on the way to adulthood.) Similarly, civilized man is not the telos of “uncivilized” man; each is the result of its own distinct evolution. Eng. trans. “The Infant and the Primitive in Bergson and Husserl.”


Gilbert Vincent. “Lettres de Bergson à F. Abauzit.” *Revue d’Histoire de Philosophie Religieuse*, 65.4 (1985): 381-94. Print. “William James and Henri Bergson communicated a great deal, and each mentioned the high opinion he had of the other’s work. Nevertheless, Bergson refused to preface the French translation of James’s *Religious Experience*. Bergson’s letters to F. Abauzit, the translator, reveal clearly the reasons for this refusal, based on respect for style. For Bergson, as for James, the stylistic particulars of a philosophical text cannot be dissociated from the formulation of its thought.” William S. Sailer. *Religious and Theological Abstracts*, 29 (1986): 2631. Print. See the section of this bibliography titled “By Bergson” for Bergson’s letters.


Loretta Wasserman. “The Music of Time: Henri Bergson and Willa Cather.” *American Literature*, 57.2 (May 1985): 226-39. Print. The author states: “My contention, then, is that Bergson was an important influence on Cather’s thinking, and that his philosophical speculations concerning the nature of time and the dynamics of memory are given strikingly parallel expression in Cather’s fiction” (p. 227).


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such richness today that it is not certain that all its consequences have been drawn.” The author uses these two discoveries to analyze motion pictures.


Manuel García Morente. “La filosofía de Bergson” in *Introducción a la Metafísica, La risa* by Henri Bergson. México: Editorial Porrúa, 1986: xi-lxii. Print. This is a reprint of the original edition (1903). In this introduction the author provides a general survey of Bergson’s thought. In the first section he explores Bergson’s “inspiration, object, and method,” in the second his psychology and in the third his metaphysics. Eng. trans. “The Philosophy of Bergson.”

Mary Ann Gillies. “The Influence of Bergson on Early Modern British Literature.” Diss. U of Oxford, 1986: 375. UMI No. AAC D-84936. *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 50.1A (1986): 375. Print. This thesis seeks to explore the influence exerted by the French philosopher Henri Bergson on early modern British literature – from about 1895-1930. That Bergson played a role in the development of the innovations which occurred in the imaginative literature of this period is widely acknowledged. What is less clearly defined is the nature and extent of his influence; this is the problem approached by this study.


William C. Marceau. “La Philosophie spirituelle d’Henri Bergson.” *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, 42.1 (Feb. 1986): 35-55. Résumé p. 35. Print. “Voici un rappel de la philosophie bergsonienne en tant qu’elle s’interroge sur les données spirituelles. Une courte biographie de Bergson nous permet de souligner les noms des philosophes qui l’ont inspiré et influencé ainsi que le thème de la durée qui est au cœur de sa propre recherche sur le monde, l’homme et Dieu. Bergson s’est posé le grand problème de la signification de la vie, de l’existence et du devenir. Il a exposé les réponses à ses questions dans *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion*. Son approfondissement de la religion lui a permis d’arriver à la notion du mysticisme, en passant du mouvement à la durée, de la conscience à la vie et de la vie à la morale et à la religion.” [“Here is an account of Bergsonian philosophy as it examines spiritual ideas. A short biography of Bergson allows us to emphasize the names of philosophers who have inspired and influenced him as well as the theme of duration that is at the heart of his own research on the world, man and God. Bergson posed to himself the great problem of the significance of life, existence and becoming. He presented the responses to his questions in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. His delving into religion permitted him to arrive at the idea of mysticism, in passing from movement to duration, from conscience to life and from life to morality and to religion.”] *Philosopher’s Index*, 20.2 (1986): 116.


in History and the Present. This collection contains an essay by E. Rivera de Ventosa, “Motifs philosophiques de la fraternité chez Bergson et Unamuno.” Eng. trans. “Philosophical Motifs of Fraternity in Bergson and Unamuno.”


Leah M. Poole. “Henri Bergson and William James United Against Rationalism.” Dialogue (Phi Sigma Tau), 28.2 (Apr. 1986): 27-32. Print. “Four instances in which William James[‘s] philosophy and Henri Bergson’s metaphysics converge and validate each other are exhibited. It is shown that these features express the common aim of both philosophers to break from the autonomy of the rationalist tradition. It is argued that interpretation by rationalistic standards fails adequately to grasp or legitimately criticize their doctrines. This may determine in part why James’s pragmatism is widely misunderstood and Bergson’s metaphysics largely unappreciated.” Philosopher’s Index, 20.3 (1986): 117-18. Print.


Jurna Sánchez Venegas. “La Insuficiencia de la Inteligencia en Bergson.” Pensamiento, 42.168 (1986): 443-57. Print. “Bergson considered epistemology to be inseparable from the theory of life. Therefore, it is necessary to place oneself just at the evolution of life in order to understand the nature, limits, and aspirations of the intelligence. Bergson’s criticism shows that reality is moveable and is perceived by common sense rather than philosophers. Thus, as intelligence sees – in a natural way – the stable and conceives the solid, knowledge supplied by this faculty is relative.” Philosopher’s Index, 21.2 (1987): 159. Print. Eng. trans. “The Insufficiency of the Intelligence in Bergson.”


Philippe Soulez. “‘Le dressage, le mot étant pris dans son sens le plus élevé… la mysticité, le terme ayant sa signification la plus modeste…’” Les Amis de Sèvres, 124 (Dec. 1986): 58-63. Print. The author explicates pp. 87-89 of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, which deal with two different sorts of moral education: training (“dressage”), which involves social pressure, and imitation, which involves an appeal, a desire to imitate someone. He notes with regret a recent movement in French education toward “dressage.” This essay ends with an extremely perceptive comparison of Bergson’s and Freud’s theories of sublimation, in which idealization does not by itself provide the means for sublimation. We should not overly idealize the development of the child. Eng. trans. “Training, the word being used in the most elevated sense… mystification, the term having the most modest meaning…”


Reino Virtanen. “Claude Bernard’s Prophecies and the Historical Relation of Science to Literature.” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 47.2 (Apr.-June 1986): 275-86. Print. “The physiologist Claude Bernard (1813-1878) offered two prophecies in essays collected in *La Science expérimentale* in 1865. He predicted that when physiology was sufficiently advanced, the physiologist, the philosopher and the poet would find themselves in agreement. And in 1867 he speculated that science would one day produce new organic species. Here we examine the varied responses to these questions of the philosophers Bergson and Sartre, the poets Valéry and Saint John Perse, and the novelists Georges Duhamel and Jules Romain.”

*Philosopher’s Index*, 20.3 (1986): 130. Print.


E.C. Whipple. “Events as Fundamental Entities.” *Il Nuovo Cimento A*, 92, No. 3, April, 1986, 309-327. Citing Bergson and Whitehead, the author proposes that events rather than particles are the fundamental entities of physics. “Different kinds of fundamental events are to be distinguished by rules of interaction. Examples of simple rules of interaction are given which lead to propagating patterns of events that can be interpreted as particles.”

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Edward A. Aiken. “I Saw the Figure Five in Gold: Charles Demuth’s Emblematic Portrait of William Carlos Williams.” *Art Journal* (U.S.A.), 46.3 (Fall 1987): 178-84. Print. The author explores Demuth’s “portrait” of the poet William Carlos Williams, noting Demuth’s understanding of the shared intellectual debt of Williams and the Futurists to the ideas of Bergson.


Frederick Schuyler Coate. “Alexandr Konstantinovich Voronskii’s Literary Criticism.” Diss. Stanford U, 1987: 368. UMI No. ACC 8729978. *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 48.8 (1988): 2074A. Print. This is a study of the literary criticism of the Marxist literary critic Voronskii, concentrating on the period 1923-1928. Voronskii played an enormous role in guiding the development of Russian literature in this period. He insisted on the role of intuition and the unconscious in literature, however, defying the oversimplified rationalism of his critics. Soon he was accused of adhering to the views of Bergson, Kant and Freud. He was arrested in 1938, died in 1943.


Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet. Dialogues. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Columbia U Press, 1987: 157. Print. The author (Deleuze) states of his early career: “… I liked writers who seemed to be part of the history of philosophy, but one who escaped from it in one respect, or altogether: Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson… Bergson, of course, was also caught up in French-style history of philosophy, and yet in him there is something which cannot be assimilated, which enabled him to provide a shock, to be a rallying point for all the opposition, the object of so many hatreds: and this is not so much because of the theme of duration, as of the theory and practice of becomings of all kinds, of coexistent multiplicities” (pp. 14-15).


distinction between intuition and intelligence may reconcile his analysis of temporal personal identity with that of Whitehead. Bergson’s affirmation of the unity of durée seems in conflict with Whitehead’s description of a historic route of ontically distinct event-atoms (‘actual occasions’), but as the product of two different functions of the mind the results can be seen as complementary rather than antithetical. This suggests both the feasibility of some kind of metaphysics of enduring beings, and an intrinsic but overlooked limitation of any speculative philosophy that relies too heavily on purely conceptual thinking.” Philosophers’ Index, 23.1 (1989): 86.


Lewis S. Feuer. “Recollections of Alfred North Whitehead in the Harvard Setting (1931-1937).” Yale Review, 76.4 (Sept. 1987): 530-50. Print. On p. 532 the author notes Whitehead’s opinion that Bertrand Russell’s philosophy is very “thin.” Henri Bergson and Samuel Alexander were considered by Whitehead to be “genuine philosophers.” On p. 544 he states: “The French philosopher, Henri Bergson, also of Jewish birth, was perhaps Whitehead’s chief philosophic inspiration – although he would say mischievously that Bergson doubtless owed his originality to his English mother and that French scholars mainly had a penchant for making dictionaries.” See also pp. 546-47.


Bachelard and Bergson express two great modes of thought: the grandiose majesty of the \textit{élan vital}; on the other, the dialectic of yes and of no, which rhythm the fantastic operation of dynamism and of work. Bachelard and Bergson: the one … the other…”


Pete A. Y. Gunter. “The Dialectic of Intuition and Intellect” in \textit{Bergson and Modern Thought}. Eds. A. C. Papanicolaou and Pete A. Y. Gunter. New York: Harwood, 1987: 3-18. Print. “Bergson’s philosophy has often been interpreted as antiscientific. This essay undercuts such interpretations by analyzing his philosophical method, the key to which lies in his treatment of intuition and intellect. Bergson’s intuition is not, as has been claimed, vacuous. It contains noetic content capable of creating new symbol systems, both mathematical and physical, which can be tested (verified/falsified). Bergson’s nonstandard ‘positivism’ anticipated major features of quantum physics and directly sparked researches into biological and sociological time.” \textit{Philosopher’s Index}, 23.1 (1989): 91.

Charles Hartshorne. “Bergson’s Aesthetic Creationism Compared to Whitehead’s” in \textit{Bergson and Modern Thought}. Eds. A. C. Papanicolaou and Pete A. Y. Gunter. New York: Harwood, 1987: 369-82. Print. This is a summation of the author’s view of Bergson’s philosophy. Bergson’s major flaw was the use of a term denoting symmetrical relationships (“interpenetration”) to describe a term (“Duration”) which is asymmetrical as regards past, present and future.


Lawrence Westerby Howe. “The Process of Endosmosis in the Bergsonian Critique.” \textit{Modern Schoolman}, 65.1 (Nov. 1987): 29-45. Print. “This paper defends the thesis that the etiology of conceptual error is developed by Bergson through the morphology of endosmosis and that endosmosis is the methodological key to his critical philosophy. This thesis is developed in three parts: Bergson’s idea of endosmosis and its contribution to the genesis of error, the process of endosmosis in the formation of the concept of time as a hybrid of duration and space, and the genetic approach to Bergson’s critique.” \textit{Philosopher’s Index}, 22.2 (1988): 126. Print.

Maria Elosegui Itxaso. “Lo Físico y lo mental en Henri Bergson.” Diss. U of Navarra, 1987: 178. Print. Abstract: This thesis outlines the actualness of Bergsonian thought in its consideration of the ontological statute of matter in relation to the psychical. A new interpretation of this author is proposed, reconciling some apparent contradictions. The role of matter according to the present thermodynamics is also outlined. The relationship between matter and memory, especially the mind-brain problem, is studied. For Bergson, the mental is not reduced to the brain; besides he criticizes parallelistic dualism. A careful study of the problem of the brain locations during the 19th and the 20th centuries is made. Lastly, the notion of the “ego” as duration and synthesis of matter and spirit is analyzed together with the development of the personality as a creative effort which is the fruit of the dialectic of desire that reaches its highest point in the image of the “surhomme” or the Bergsonian superman. Dissertation Abstracts International, 50.2 (1989): 178. Print. Eng. trans. “The Physical and the Mental in Henri Bergson.”

Robert G. Jahn and Brenda J. Dunne. “Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, and Random Physical Processes” in Bergson and Modern Thought. Eds. A. C. Papanicolaou and Pete A. Y. Gunter. New York: Harwood, 1987: 271-303. Print. “Bergson’s proposal for an intuitive philosophy integrating science and metaphysics is addressed in the context of a program of controlled laboratory experiments at Princeton University’s Engineering Anomalies Research Laboratory, which has produced a body of data indicating that human consciousness has the ability to influence the output of random physical processes and to acquire information about spatially and temporally remote geographical locations. Theoretical accommodation of these phenomena is proposed via a model invoking quantum mechanical metaphors to represent reality as the product of a wave mechanical information exchange between consciousness and its environment.” Philosopher’s Index, 23.1 (1989): 95. Print.


philosopher of the Kyoto school, used Bergson’s philosophy to try to find bridges between Oriental and Western thought.


William Marceau. Henri Bergson et Joseph Malègue. La convergence de deux pensées. Stanford: Stanford U Press, 1987: x, 132. Stanford French and Italian Studies, Vol. 50. Print. “A study of Bergsonian philosophy dealing with spiritual concepts, this book underlines that the theme of duration is at the heart of Bergson’s research concerning the world, man, and God. A young reader of Bergson was Joseph Malègue. In the writings of Malègue we notice real relationships which are established between these two French authors at the end of the 19th century. This study reveals a metaphysical Malègue inspired by Bergson.” Philosopher’s Index, 22.3 (Fall 1988): 136. Print. Eng. trans. Henri Bergson and Joseph Malègue: The Convergence of Two Thoughts.


Becky Patterson-Turner. “Intuition and Adult Learners: A Qualitative Study.” Diss. Fielding Institute, 1987: 233. UMI no. AAC 8729838. Print. The author states: “The extensive literature reviewed showed considerations of intuition by philosophers (Spinoza, Bergson, Suzuki) and psychologists (gestaltists, Jungians, Reik and Berne). An analysis of the current research into the thinking process by cognitive psychologists (e.g., Perkins), cognitive philosophers (e.g., Ennis), and creative problem solvers (e.g., Osborn) was presented. The framework of this study was the theory of intuition in education developed by Noddings and Shore (1984).” *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 40B.10 (1988): 3102.


Otto Pöggeler. “Time and Hermeneutics.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60.4 (Mar. 1987): 792. Print. The author notes Bergson’s and Einstein’s debate over the nature of time and argues that today “… the controversy between Einstein and Bergson must be discussed again (See Ilya Prigogine).” Insofar as phenomenology is hermeneutical it can not be concerned with understanding alone but must be concerned also with explanation.

Karl H. Pribram. “Bergson and the Brain: Bio-Logical Analysis of Certain Intuitions” in Bergson and Modern Thought. Eds. A. C. Papanicolaou and Pete A. Y. Gunter. New York: Harwood, 1987: 149-74. Print. “In keeping with the Zeitgeist of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Henri Bergson was convinced that understanding the mental and spiritual nature of mankind depended to a large extent on understanding the relationship between man’s conscious experience and his brain. What puzzled the intellects of the nineteenth century was that experience, introspectively analyzed, had so little in common with the physical and biological processes which contemporary science was then describing. Bergson did, however, attempt an analysis of the relation between conscious and unconscious processes, between intuition and intellect, between the arrow of time and the experience of duration, and the relationship between memory and matter. This essay shows that a systems analysis of brain function gives substance to many of Bergson’s philosophical queries and provides a scientific and mathematical rationale for many of his conjectures.” Philosopher’s Index, 23.1 (1989): 113. Print.


Charles R. Schmidtke. “Bergson and a Pulsational-Wave Model of Temporality” in *Bergson and Modern Thought*. Eds. A. C. Papanicolaou and Pete A. Y. Gunter. New York: Harwood, 1987: 223-49. Print. “The pulsational-wave model is an attempt to represent Bergson’s meaning of durée in such a way as to clarify his intent and illustrate his epistemological and metaphysical distinctions. This article proceeds to illustrate the use of this model by applying it to issues in gerontology. This application includes a critique and demonstration of the limits of the concept of chronological age in understanding the reality of human aging. This model also illustrates the need for developing a view for aging successfully that integrates all the temporal modalities.” *Philosopher's Index*, 23.1 (1989): 118. Print.


Hermann Weyl. *The Continuum: A Critical Examination of the Foundation of Analysts*. Trans. Stephen Pollard adn Thomas Bole. Kirksville, MO: Thomas Jefferson Press, 1987: 130. Print. Hermann Weyl, who took David Hilbert’s chair at Göttinger and was a friend of Einstein’s at the Institute for Advanced Research at Princeton, was one of the leading mathematicians of the twentieth century. It is thus especially interesting that he should (on p. 90) have commended Bergson for clearly distinguishing between “… the world of mathematical concepts and the immediately experienced continuity of phenomenal time (‘la durée’).” The view of a flow “consisting of points and, therefore, also dissolving into points turns out to be false” (p. 92). Though a deep chasm is fixed between the intuitive and the mathematical continuum, we have rational motives which impel us to pass from one into the other. Weyl speculates (p. 122, n11), “Who knows what the future and quantum mechanics have in store for the physical domain?” (This work was originally published in 1912.)


1988


Hervé Barreau. “Temps et Devenir.” Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 86: Quatrième Série no. 69 (Feb. 1988): 5-36. Print. “The characterization of time vis-à-vis becoming has always been taken to be a task for philosophy, and the solutions of the problem have varied. Those of Kant and Hegel, which in turn responded to that of Newton, led by various paths to the negation of the reality of becoming. A third solution inspired by the doctrines of Aristotle, Leibniz and Bergson is possible, and sees in time the abstract concept of becoming which in turn follows from a causality which occurs in the present.” Abstract. Trans. J. Dudley, p. 36.

Martial Joseph Basolonjatoivo. “L’Expérience mystique chrétienne comme voie de connaissance de Dieu chez H. Bergson.” Diss. Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana (Vatican), 1988: 410. Print. Abstract: “Selon H. Bergson, la mystique chrétienne est la plus complète, parce que son Absolu est expérimentable, et, parce que l’activité de ses mystiques continue ‘l’effort créateur que manifeste la vie’. ‘Cet effort est de Dieu, si ce n’est pas Dieu lui-même.’ La présente dissertation est une évaluation critique de la manière dont H. Bergson a perçu la spécificité de la mystique chrétienne et – à la lumière des mystiques chrétiens, comme Saint Jean de la Croix et Sainte Thérèse d’Avila – un examen de la question de savoir si l’expérience mystique chrétienne, telle qu’on la rencontre dans Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932) et telle qu’elle se vit de fait, est la voie de connaissance de Dieu.” [“The Christian mystical experience is for Bergson the most complete because its Absolute is experimentable and because the activity of its mystics continues ‘the creative effort which manifests life.’ ‘This effort is of God, if it is not God himself.’ This dissertation is a critical examination of the way in which Bergson views the specificity of Christian mysticism – in the light of Christian mystics like Jean de la Croix and Saint Theresa of Avila – an examination of the question whether knowledge of the Christian mystical experience as this is developed in The Two Sources (1932) is the way to the knowledge of God.”] Dissertation Abstracts International, 50.2C (1989): 190. Eng. trans. “Christian Mystical Experience as a Way to the Knowledge of God in H. Bergson.”


T. Bejarano Fernández. “Las Expectativas del Receptor y lo que Produce la Risa.” Pensamiento, 44 (Oct.-Dec. 1988): 455-63. Print. “Someone tries to predict the immediately following event (what, when or where), and his expectations fail: laughter is caused by such failures, we propose after revisiting Bergson and Kant. Thanks to the laugh, predictive activity is not inhibited by its numerous failures. This question – the function – is confronted with Bergson, Freud, and Minsky. Jokes and creativity share the ‘Aha!’ or unpredictability, but whereas in creative text it generates an extra, one-contextual significance, in joke it is ‘for nothing.’” Philosopher’s Index, 23.2 (Summer 1989): 113. Print. Eng. trans. “The Expectations of the Recipient and What Laughter Produces.”

relativity and quantum physics on French philosophy by exploring the thought of Paul Langevin. Langevin’s treatment of relativity theory is explained with reference to Bergson’s *Duration and Simultaneity*. Errors in popular expositions may have led to Bergson’s critique of relativity.


Yvon Brès. *L’Etre et la faute. Essais psychoanalytico-philosophiques*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988: 221. Perspectives critiques. Print. See especially “Bergson et Freud. La remémoration comme expérience métaphysique,” pp. 152-73. The author argues that in spite of Freud’s tendencies toward scientific materialism, his view of memory and the recovery of memories remains central to his psychoanalytical theory and is consistent with Bergson’s view of forgetting and of remembering. Though Bergson ignores repression and neurotic defense mechanisms, the idea that the actualization of repressed ideas can take purely behavioral and emotional forms is consistent with his basic theory. The study of “transfer” confirms, in a particular way, Bergson’s point of view. This study is a sequel to P. Soulez (1976, 1977). The author neglects, surprisingly, Bergson’s letters to Jean de la Harpe (1943) on Freud, and on R. Dalbiez’s critique of Freudianism (1936, 1948).


Michel Canivet. “Le Rire et le Bon Sens.” *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 86.71 (Aug. 1988): 354-77. Print. “Laughter is a visible pleasure which involves a social aspect. Bergson saw in it a common sense reaction bound to a formulation of the comic and a regulatory phenomenon due to society. This view was criticized by Dupréel in the name of sociological plurality and by Jeanson in the name of individual existence. The continuation of the consideration can be supported to a considerable extent from Kant. A paragraph in the *Critique of Judgement* contains the essential elements of a theory of laughter (bodily pleasure, slightly disinterested, the effect of absurdity). These elements have to be understood in the light of the general contribution of the third *Critique* to intersubjective communication and its transcendental condition, namely common sense. It then becomes likely that laughter is the bodily manifestation of common sense without which laughter fails to communicate.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 23.1 (1989): 78. Print. Eng. trans. “Laughter and Good Sense.”


Rachel Gotlieb. “Vitality in British Art Pottery and Studio Pottery.” Apollo, N.S. 127 (Mar. 1988): 163-67. Print. The author sums up her essay as follows: “Bergson’s idea of the élan vital and Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious were assimilated into the aesthetics of pottery during the 1920s and 1930s, enabling it to become one of the few crafts to be accepted as a fine art by the Modern movement. The repercussions of this have continued to the present day” (p. 163).

R. C. Grogan. The Bergsonian Controversy in France, 1900-1914. Calgary: U of Calgary Press, 1988: 222. Print. “This book demonstrates that Bergsonism was a major subject of intellectual controversy, and that key debates in this period about science, religion, and politics took Bergsonian theory as their starting point. Moreover, the author argues that one cannot understand Bergson and his ideas apart from the occult revival of pre-1914 France. The occult revival coincided with Bergson’s work and helped shape it, and it is the understanding of his ideas in terms of the occult which has heretofore been neglected by intellectual historians. Finally, the author provides a solution to the ‘Bergson problem’ – i.e., an explanation of why, in the cultural setting of that period, Bergson and his ideas enjoyed such tremendous popularity.” Philosopher's Index, 23.1 (1989): 91. Print.


Mercedes Miquel. “Descartes: La Ciencia y Su Fondamentación en el ‘Cogito’.” Pensamiento, 44 (Apr.-July 1988): 211-32. Print. “Debido a la actualización que el fenomenismo está teniendo en la ciencias, sobre todo a partir de la menica cúitica, se pretende considerar el alcance y las consecuencias del primer intento de fundamentar la ciencia en el sujeto y no en las materia, presentando una crítica de los argumentos cartesianos inspirado en la consideraciones hechas por Husserl y Bergson [Owing to the realization that phenomenalism is holding in the sciences, especially as part of the basic medium of exchange, it pretends to consider the goal and the consequences of the first attempt to found science on the subject and not on the object, presenting a criticism of the Cartesian inspired in the considerations made by Husserl and Bergson].” Philosopher’s Index, 22.3 (Fall 1988): 139. Print. The author critiques Cartesian efforts to found science on the subject and not the object. Eng. trans. “Descartes: Science and Its Foundation in the ‘Cogito’.”


Gunther Pflüg. “Bergson und Schopenhauer.” *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch*, 69 (1988): 537-48. Print. “The article discusses Bergson’s interpretation of free will in his lecture 1906/07. There the voluntary philosophy of Schopenhauer is regarded as one of the two extreme positions antagonistic to the positivistic philosophy, represented by Ribot. Schopenhauer explains the free will as a phenomenon from the inner acting to the external world. The positivists refuse free will in favor of a strong causality. Bergson explains that some psychological and psychopathological facts conduct to a theory lying between these two extreme positions. Before having developed his own theory Bergson prefers in this respect the position of William James.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 22.3 (Fall 1988): 147. Print.


Pany Johannes Rajala. “The Origins of Silja. F.E. Sillanpaa From 1923-1931.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Helsingin Yliopisto (Finland), 1988, 323. This is the second part of a biography of the Nobel-Prize winning author Sillanpaa. The author notes: ‘Sillanpaa outlines his personal philosophy in an autobiographical essay ‘About My Family and To My Family’ (1923) in which he confesses his belief in science and evolution. his most important authorities were Darwin, Einstein, Ostwald, Bergson and Spengler.” (*Dissertations Abstracts International*, C50, No. 2, 1989, 323.)


menschlichen Spezies. Verherrlichung von Subjekt-Object-Spaltungen, Abstraktion, Fragmentierung, Quantifizierung etc., als Werte abendländischer Kultur. [Henri Bergson (1859-1941), member of the Académie française and winner of the Nobel Prize today enjoying, along with his philosophy of life, a renaissance. As a basis Romanos describes the alienating categories of modernity: the increasing repression of man’s inner nature, which goes along with the purposeful control of outer nature; the granting of independence to technological potentialities to the degree that they become a danger of the human race. The glorification of the subject-object schism, abstraction, fragmentations, quantifications as the basic values of Western culture. ]” (Staff) Philosopher’s Index, 22.2 (1988): 150. Print. Eng. trans. Homeward: Henri Bergson’s Life – Philosophical Starting-Point Toward the Healing of Benumbed Life.


Philippe Soulez. “Les missions de Bergson ou les paradoxes du philosophe véridique et trompeur” in Les Philosophes et la guerre de 14. Ed. P. Soulez. Saint-Denis: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1988: 65-81. Print. The author examines Bergson’s two diplomatic missions to the United States in 1917. In the first Bergson was used by the French government to make clear to President Woodrow Wilson the terms which France would concede (including the creation of a League of Nations) for American entrance into World War I. Bergson’s status as a “philosopher” allowed him to succeed in this case. This was not true of his second mission (which aimed to bring American troops to Europe still more quickly than planned, after the withdrawal of Russia from the war) in which Wilson was able to play the “philosopher” (homme de vérité) to Bergson, reversing the relations of Bergson’s first mission. Was there, in Bergson’s willingness to use the methods of Protagoras, a sin against Plato . . . and philosophy? Eng. trans. “The Missions of Bergson or the Paradoxes of the Truthful and Deceitful Philosopher.”
Philippe Soulez. “Présentation” in Octave Hamelin, Henri Bergson: Fichte. Eds. Fernand Turlot and Philippe Soulez. Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1988: 147-51. Print. This is an introductory essay to class notes of a course by Bergson (notes taken by Desiré Roustan) in 1889 on Fichte’s Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The Destiny of Man). The author states that Bergson took the notion of Destiny (Bestimmung) from Fichte but criticized Fichte’s attempt to “construct” nature a priori and his “pseudoevolutionism.” Bergson’s use of Fichte’s term Trieb (“impulsion”) and his concept of intuition may be indebted more to Fichte than to Schelling.

Philippe Soulez. “Présentation. Les Philosophes devant la fracture de l’espace public européen” in Les Philosophes et la guerre de 14. Ed. Philippe Soulez. Saint-Denis: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1988: 9-23. Print. The author notes the rupture of relations between Bergson and his former friends Max Scheler and Rudolph Eucken during the First World War. He evaluates the relations between Bergson and Woodrow Wilson as the “political” encounter of two scholars (pp. 15-16). On pp. 18-19 he notes that Bergson was discredited in the eyes of the French post-World War I generation for the positions which he took during that war, but in Les Deux Sources and elsewhere showed a superior political and philosophical acumen than those who had denounced him (e.g., Sartre).

T. L. S. Sprigge. “Schopenhauer and Bergson on Laughter.” Comparative Criticism, 10 (1988): 39-65. Print. The author states that the two major philosophers with the most fully developed theories of laughter are Arthur Schopenhauer and Bergson. He examines the ideas of both, concluding that each fails to cover certain forms of the comic.


Eric Vernon Szendrei. “Time, Space, and Consciousness: A Study of Bergsonian Kantian, and Hegelian Insights.” Diss. Emory U, 1988: 211. UMI no. AAC 8816969. Print. Abstract: Bergson’s earlier works, especially Time and Free Will and Matter and memory offer a theory of space which entails a novel theory of time. If these theories are examined apart from the works of earlier philosophers who have contributed to the study of time and space, many points of his theories may appear unjustified, or to depend wholly upon certain peculiarities of the biological and psychological sciences of Bergson’s era. Yet his frequent references to Kant and his thorough treatment of Aristotle’s theory of place in aim destroys Whitehead’s intent. Pols’ essentialist reductionism overlooked the centrality of concrescence. Nobo’s two stage occasion misinterprets Whitehead’s objectification, initial aim. In spite of their continuist systems, both Bergson and Alexander employ suspense and simplification when confronting concrete problems. Conclusion: viable process thought requires suspense/simplification. To mediate, the present must suspend the determinations of the past, so as to contribute its simplified emphasis of the past to the future. Dissertation Abstracts International, 49.6A (1988): 1479. Print.


semble inspiré de art, et que l’art et la philosophie se rejoignent chez Bergson dans l’intuition qui est leur base commune. [Bergson didn’t write his aesthetic, but we can reconstitute the Bergsonian aesthetic in terms of intuition, because Bergsonism seems to us inspired from art, and art and philosophy combine in Bergson in the intuition that is their common foundation.]" 


1989


Sarah Virginia Bell. “William Faulkner’s Creative Evolution: The Influence of Henri Bergson’s Philosophy upon Three Major Novels.” Diss. U Georgia, 1989: 255. UMI no. ACC 900757. Abstract: “This study attempts to show how Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution “helped” William Faulkner, as Faulkner claimed. Though Bergson’s influence pervades most aspects of the novels from characterization to plot structure, the concepts of _la durée_, the _élan vital_, and _l’évolution créatrice_ influence particularly Faulkner’s symbolic technique. The general doctrine of “creative evolution” involves for both Bergson and Faulkner the concept of motion. Movement signifies life, and stasis indicates death. Man’s movement through time and space, in thinking and in emotional development, indicates health: creative evolution. Faulkner’s attraction to Bergsonian concepts reveals important aspects of his beliefs about art. In considering _The Sound
and the Fury, Light in August, and Absalom, Absalom!, this study focuses on three characteristic works that show Faulkner’s consistent translating of Bergson’s ideas into art.” Dissertation Abstracts International, 50.11A (1990): 3585. Print.


Marguerite Bistis. “Bergsonism in the Belle Epoque (France).” Diss. Brown U, 1989: 155. UMI no. ACC 9002198. Print. Abstract: “The analysis is organized into three parts. The first deals with Henri Bergson and traces the development of his philosophy. Such key Bergsonian concepts as duration, or the ever-rolling stream of time, are discussed as historicist philosophy that is distinguished by its very radicalism. By breaking with ancient metaphysics of totality, Bergson offered a genuinely modernist perspective on the nature of truth and reality. The second part extends this philosophic discussion to the lives and thought of a group of four Bergsonian intellectuals. For Georges Sorel, Edouard Le Roy, Charles Péguy, and Jacques Maritain, Bergsonism helped shape their creative endeavors and determine their spiritual destinies. A cross-sectional look at their social, religious, and literary agendas reveals an inner structure to the modernist movement which was constituted around Bergson’s concept of duration. The third part examines Bergson’s popular appeal among the general educated public of his day. In its most diffuse state, Bergsonism emerges as a species of what the French call ‘la culture generale.’ A reading of the popular literature, newspaper and magazine articles, cartoons and fashion advertisements, shows Bergson personifying the universalist ideals of this tradition. His popularity stemmed from his unique ability to give coherence and intelligibility to the experience of modernity and to articulate a common ambivalence toward it. Bergsonism was thus constituted at the crossroads of philosophy, culture, and sensibility. It represented an age in which the rapidity of historical change became the nature of life. Bergson attempted to explain the inner dynamics of change. The widespread appropriation and public reception of his philosophy stands in testimony to his success.” Dissertation Abstracts International, 50.8A (1990): 2614. Print. The author pursues a striking and highly perceptive analysis of Bergson’s “dualistic” character. (Ed.)


Bernard D’Espagnat. *Reality and the Physicist: Knowledge, Duration and the Quantum World*. Trans. J. C. Whitehouse and Bernard D’Espagnat. New York: Cambridge U Press, 1989: 280. Print. On p. 131 the author notes, in the context of a discussion of the interpretation of non-equilibrium thermodynamics: “Ultimately what is important is simply that there is a sense of the word ‘reality’ in which irreversibility – and in particular the constructive irreversibility of the *élan vital* – is not an illusion . . .” (p. 131). On pp. 140-43 the author discusses Bergson’s philosophy and non-equilibrium thermodynamics, roughly equating “duration” and the thermodynamic concept of “age.” He argues against the claim that in the new thermodynamics Bergson’s philosophy is defeated by being absorbed into mathematical (hence intellectual) physical science: “Indeed, though scientific intelligence can now, after considerable effort, assimilate *some* features of the notion of duration . . .” (p. 143) it has not yet grasped all such features. Inversely, scientific intelligence has now become interested in factors heretofore thought to be “intuitive” or “emotional.”

Margareta Hedwig Dubois. “Algot Ruhe: Kulturförmedlare och Europeisk Visionär.” Diss. Lunds Universitet (Sweden), 1989: 328. Print. The author treats Algot Ruhe (born in Lund, Sweden, in 1867) as a cultural intermediary: one who brings individuals in contact with each other and connects cultural phenomena across borders of language, geography, time and tradition. The author’s abstract states: “In addition to his intellectual work he had a strong interest in the human being. While he had the privilege of knowing personally many of the most important persons of his time – Brandes, Strindberg, Bergson and Proust – he had a genuine interest for the workers he


Jacques Etienne. “Bergson et l’idée de causalité.” *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 87.76 (1989): 589-611. Print. Abstract: “From his *Time and Free Will* to *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* via *Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution*, the idea of causality reveals some of Bergson’s great preoccupations: the irreducibility of psychic to physical phenomena, of duration to homogeneous space, of freedom to its prerequisites, of an event to that which precedes it, finally, of personal creativity open to that which is universally human to passivity in which impersonal and particular social pressure triumphs” (p. 611). Trans. J. Dudley.


Jean Guitton. *L'Existence temporelle*. Bégédis: Editions Universitaires, 1989: 176. Collection de Philosophie européenne dirigée par Henri Hude. Print. This study was first published in 1949. The present edition contains a brief dialogue ("Réttraction," pp. 5-11) between the author and the series editor Henri Hude. He notes that his book was written in German prisoner-of-war camps, 1940-1945. It is a study in ontology. On pp. 21-22 the author states that his work concerns the dynamic of being, that it studies movement, variation and development according to their scale, from simple transfer to that of destiny. He pays particular attention to transitions. Eng. trans. *Temporal Existence*.


Henry Hude. *Bergson I*. Paris and Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1989: 191. Philosophie Européenne. Print. This, and its second volume (*Bergson II*, 1990), constitute a new interpretation of Bergson based on a study of Bergson’s courses at Clermont-Ferrand and the Collège de France. See Henry Hude, ed., 1990. The author’s new interpretation, he insists, undercuts previous widely accepted views according to which Bergson is a sort of Spinozist, that he proposes a radically new and confused concept of creation, and that his philosophy, very near to art, is antisystematic, “plaçant l’image au-dessus du concept et l’émotion au-dessus de l’évidence” [“placing image above concept and emotion above evidence”] (p. 12). This study, the author states, accomplishes six things: 1. It shows that Bergson is not antisystematic. 2. It enables us to follow the progressive development of his thought. 3. It makes possible a new reading of Bergson’s books, especially *Matter and Memory*, whose meaning can now be made clear. 4. It makes it possible to follow with precision the history of Bergson’s thought. (Bergson was always “theistic” and “creationist”.) 5. It makes it possible to cite with a very high degree of probability Bergson’s intellectual sources (especially his teacher, L. Ollé-Laprune). 6. It makes much clearer Bergson’s relations to the great philosophers (especially Plotinus, to whom Bergson is less indebted than at first appears. See the author’s introduction, pp. 11-15.) Of the three chapters of this book, the first spells out Bergson’s “systematic” and its development, the second Bergson’s teachers, the third examines his “Cartesian” standpoint in *Time and Free Will*. See *Bergson II* (1990) for the author’s rereading of *Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution, and The Two Sources*.


Josu Rekalde Izagirre. “Una Experimentación en el Campo del Vídeo-Arte Fundamentada en la Noción de Transformación Temporal.” Diss. U del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea (Spain), 1989: 470. Print. The author’s abstract states: “The main objectives of this study are: (1) To propose a valid theory for the study of temporal phenomena in the scope of the video; and (2) Test the validity of this theoretical analysis applied to experimental practice. Starting from the semiotic study proposed by Christian Metz and from the contribution of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, we build up a method that will structure the different temporal variables that are involved in audiovisual sequence.” Dissertation Abstracts International, 50.03C (1989): 402. Print. Eng. trans. “An Experiment in the Field of Video Art Founded on the Notion of Temporal Transformation.”


Messay Kebede. “Ways Leading to Bergson’s Notion of the ‘Perpetual Present’.” Philosophy Today, 33.3 (fall 1989): 275-87. Print. “Why and how does something start to exist? Hegel conceived time as unfolding particularities originate from and return to the universal. This logic fails to grasp time as creation. For Nietzsche, mobility has no given goal; this finite and changing world can only be will to power. Its secret is to change its own recurrence into novelty. Bergson conceives it as perpetual present or duration. Time is not unrolling as an after and a before, it returns upon itself to accomplish its alteration (self-creation). Being is time, not in time.” Philosopher’s Index, 24.2 (1990): 126. Print.


Alan Robert Lacey. Bergson. New York: Routledge, 1989: x, 241. Arguments of the Philosophers. Print. “The book aims to give a critical survey of Bergson’s thought from the broadly ‘analytical’ standpoint prevalent in current English-speaking philosophy. This is not Bergson’s own standpoint, but the book tries to steer between unsympathetic rejection and uncritical overestimation; it does not go into the history of ideas, or trace influences on or of Bergson. The topics cover space and time (including Durée, and a brief note on Bergson’s debate with Einstein), free well, change and substance, perception and memory, instinct and intelligence and intuition, biology (including the élan vital), the cosmic, and morality and religion.” Philosopher’s Index, 24.3 (fall 1990): 122. Print.

abstract: “Williams’s project is seen as the ‘redemption’ of the modern fragmented society, and of linguistic ‘divorce’ from the thing, rejoining words to things and facts to values through metaphor. In the third chapter this redemptive project is traced through the writing of history in Williams, focusing on the historical work, In the American Grain, and the long poem Patterson. The historical presence of Bergson is registered in the text as the primary intellectual source for Williams’s rhetoric of force.” DAI 53.7 (1993): 2371. Print.


François Léger. La Pensée de Georg Simmel. Contributions à l’histoire des idées en Allemagne au début du XXe siècle. Paris: Kimé, 1989: 374. Print. See “Note III – Simmel et Bergson” (pp. 324-28). The author suggests that, R. Aron’s opinions to the contrary, Bergson’s influence on Simmel is profound. Nonetheless, he concentrates on significant differences which Simmel perceives between himself and Bergson: 1. Bergson, Simmel believes, cannot explain how practical thought, which is said to misconstrue reality, can be so efficacious. 2. Bergson fails to see the tragedy in life, which must become narrowed and quasimechanical in order to exist. 3. Bergson explains the reality of time through its continuity, Simmel through its transcendence. The author notes that the subject of the relations between Bergson and Simmel could be the result of a lengthy study.


James H. Neely. “Experimental Dissociations and the Episodic/Semantic Memory Distinction” in Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of Endel Tulving. Eds. Henry L. Roediger, III, and Fergus I. M. Craik. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 1989: 229-64. Print. On p. 264 the author states: Although the episodic/semantic memory distinction has been around in some form or another since at least Bergson (1911), it has been the object of direct empirical enquiry for fewer than the 15 years since Tulving (1972) resurrected it.” The reference here is to the English translation of Matter and memory (1911). (Ed.)


Frank C. Papanicolaou. Emotion: A Reconsideration of the Somatic Theory. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1989: 142 pp. Print. The author uses Bergson’s psychomotor theory on pp. 89-93 to explain the “microgenesis of aesthetic feelings.” Aesthetic feelings involve either overt or covert contractions of the voluntary muscles, and cannot be understood apart from them. This is particularly clear in the case of music, in which “ . . . the stimulus object is no longer perceived passively as a pure auditory event; its attentive processing includes its transformation into neuromotor plans which may materialize into subtle muscular contractions.”


affrontato è la morale della pressione. Contestualizzata la riflessione di Bergson nel dibattito riguardante la possibilità di dare dignità scientifico all’etica, si sono evidenziate la modalità con cui viene corretta l’impostazione positivistica. Il suo tentativo di fondare metafisicamente l’etica della pressione e di procedere verso una progressiva abolizione del valore dell’obbligazione morale a favore di un’etica di stampo vitalistico pone molteplici interrogativi. [This essay is the first part of an inquiry into Bergson’s ethics. Its aim will be to deal with the morality of pressure. Concerning Bergson’s reflections on the possibility of giving a scientific status to ethics, there is made evident a way of arriving at a corrected positivistic basis. Bergson’s attempt to metaphysically establish the ethics of (social) pressure and to move toward the progressive abolition of the value of moral obligation in favor of an ethics of a vitalistic sort raises many questions.]


Ilya Prigogine and Isabel Stengers. Entre le temps et l’éternité. Paris: Fayard, 1989: 222. Print. This work includes studies of quantum physics and physical cosmology in terms of the new physics of dissipative systems, with irreversible time. The authors approach parallels Bergson’s, but where he begins with a personal and subjective time, the authors begin with evidence from physics (p. 11). The first chapter of this study begins with an appreciation of Bergson’s Creative Evolution, which raised the question of temporality in a striking and historically important manner (pp. 19-20). Bergson, however, proposed that science can never deal with the irreversible duration of reality, which can only be approached by philosophy. See pp. 192-93, 202 for a suggested rapprochement between Bergson and Einstein. The authors believe that for Bergson physics had already reached its final form in Newtonianism. On this point see M. Čapek, 1953 and 1969; Gunter, 1969. Eng. trans. Between Time and Eternity.


Sanford Noah Quinter. “Immanence and Event in Early Modernist Culture (Franz Kafka, Antonio Sant’elia, Henri Bergson, Austria, Italy, France.” Diss. Columbia U, 1989: 255. UMI no. AAC 9232037. Print. The author deals with “certain vitalist and immanenst models” and the philosophical, scientific and aesthetic modernisms: of Einsteinian relativity, Umberto Boccioni, Antonio Sant’Elia, Henri Bergson, Franz Kafka. In the second part of the dissertation he uses the model of “Bergsonian durée or virtuality” to reveal the fundamental character of Franz Kafka’s works. “Kafka’s works, despite appearances, manifest a quite coherent cosmology, yet this cosmology can be understood only in relation to a certain type of movement that underlies it.” DAI, 53.6A (1992): 1902. Print.


María Carmen Sánchez Rey. “La Crítica de Bergson al pensar por conceptos.” *Pensamiento*, 45.177 (Jan.-Mar. 1989): 27-41. “El artículo quiere poner de manifiesto el sentido que tiene la constante denuncia de la deficiencia del conocimiento intelectual para captar la realidad como duración. El filósofo lleva a cabo esta crítica, no para rechazar la inteligencia, sino para señalar los límites del conocimiento intelectual e indicar el camino recto que nos libraría de caer en los pseudoproblemas de la filosofía intelectualista. Se trata de buscar otras formas de intelección que den razón del ser concreto, subrayando la necesidad de la experiencia directa en el problema del conocimiento. [The article tries to demonstrate the sense that has the constant complaint of the deficiency of intellectual knowledge for capturing reality as duration. The philosopher carries out this criticism, not for rejecting intelligence, but to signal the limits of intellectual knowledge and to indicate the right road that will liberate us from falling in the pseudoproblems of intellectualist philosophy. One tries to look for other forms of intellect that give reason to the concrete being, underlining the necessity of direct experience in the problem of knowledge.]” *Philosopher’s Index*, 23.2 (summer 1989): 181. Print. Eng. trans. “Bergson’s Criticism of Thinking in Concepts.”


Philippe Soulez. *Bergson politique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989: 416. Philosophie d’ajourd’hui. This is a remarkable analysis both of Bergson’s political philosophy (which the author finds to be an almost perfect example of the *via media* in things political) and of Bergson’s political and diplomatic activities. A restatement of the position taken in the author’s doctoral dissertation (1998), it is a necessary adjunct to the Bergson Biography (Soulez and Worms, 2000).


de celle de l’inconscience. Seule cette dernière notion concerne réellement la métaphysique de la représentation. L’inconscient de Bergson et celui de Freud n’ont pas la même fonction. Est inconscient ce qui échappe à toute introspection et ne revient que par transfert. Concernant la réference de Freud à Schopenhauer on ne peut pas négliger son aspect stratégique. Jung est un successeur plus authentique de Schopenhauer. [The author criticizes Michel Henry’s Genealogy of Psychoanalysis (Paris 1985). He reproaches him for not distinguishing the problematic of the unconscious from that of unconsciousness. Only the latter really concerns the metaphysics of representation. Bergson’s unconscious and Freud’s do not have the same function. The unconscious is that which escapes all introspection and returns only through transfer. Concerning Freud’s reference to Schopenhauer, one should not neglect its strategic aspect. Jung is a more authentic successor Schopenhauer.]“ Philosopher’s Index, 24.2 (1990): 160. Print. Eng. trans. “Psychoanalytic Genealogy or Archeology?”


Raymond Julius Steiner. “The Concept of Community in Bergson’s Philosophy of Religion.” Diss. U Hawaii, 1989: 232. UMI no. AAC 8926394. Print. Abstract: “This thesis involves a rigorous examination of Henri Bergson’s concept of community. I argue that the problem of the individual in society, first as an integral part of a static, closed society and then as a spiritually evolved participant in the dynamic, open society, is the essential topic of Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. In the Two Sources Bergson offered a vision of what he called the “open society” – a global community of all mankind founded and sustained by mystical love. Bergson argued for the establishment of the open society as the necessary resolution of the inter-societal tension which threatens the survival of mankind. Bergson believed that it is only by means of the spiritual love generated by “complete,” socially active mystics that the arresting powers of closed societies can be overcome. Thus, in Chapter Four, the final task of the dissertation will be to critique Bergson’s understanding of the nature and role of mysticism and its suitability for the purpose he assigns it.” DAI, 50.7A (1990): 2091. Print.


Eric V. Szendrei. “Bergson, Prigogine, and the Rediscovery of Time.” Process Studies, 18.3 (fall 1989): 181-93. Print. “My concern in this article is to challenge Prigogine’s suggestions that Bergson’s criticism of science is now obsolete, and that scientists are discovering time itself in their recognition of irreversibility in objective processes. I first show how Bergson’s view of the
limitations of science may be derived from his practical/speculative discussion (which I defend). I argue that temporal reversibility is not only a physical impossibility, as Prigogine suggests, but a logical impossibility.” Philosophers Index, 24.3 (fall 1990): 152. Print.


Endel Tulving. “Remembering and Knowing the Past.” American Scientist, 77.4 (July-Aug. 1989): 361-67. Print. The author revives Bergson’s distinction between spontaneous and habit memory, terming them episodic memory and semantic memory respectively. He also, like Bergson, puts the emphasis in the study of memory on the “retrieval” of memory rather than its “storage.” One thus has episodic retrieval and semantic retrieval (both based on memory “cues”). The author uses the case of an amnesic patient with semantic memory but no episodic memory and studies of cerebral blood flow patterns during semantic and during episodic memory to substantiate his claims. Semantic memory appears to involve the anterior cortex, episodic memory the posterior cortex.


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opposed, I elucidate their shared aesthetic roots and the profound impact of Bergson on early modernism in Europe, in its philosophical and, more surprisingly, social implications. Chapter one illustrates the degree to which Gleizes’s and Metzinger’s *Du Cubisme* (1912) represented the definitive formulation of a Bergsonian theory of Cubism, grounded in the interpretation of Bergson developed by the Symbolist writer Tancrede de Visan. Chapters two and three bring to light a group of Paris-based British Fauvists who called themselves Rhythmists and founded the magazine *Rhythm* (1911-13) to promote their Bergsonian interpretation of Fauvism. I chart the Rhythm group’s attempts to measure themselves against the Puteaux Cubists, and the shared Bergsonian principles underpinning the aesthetic views of both circles. Chapters four and five discuss the Cubist- and Rhythmist-related criticism found principally in the journals *l’Art Libre*, *Montjoie!, Poème et Drame*, and *Cahiers des poètes*. Those writings are considered in the context of a widely political debate between Bergson’s Symbolist apologists and members of the right-wing Action Française. By relating this criticism to the propagation of Gallic nationalism within Cubist and Fauve circles, I am able to show how both groups countered the racial nationalism of the Action Française with an equally reactionary racial theory. To a great extent, that criticism is couched in Bergsonian terms, in the guise of an opposition between an organic (intuitive) and geometrical (intellectual) order, with aesthetic as well as political implications (p. 3).” See the author’s *Inventing Bergson* (1993). (Ed.)


Henri Bergson. *Henri Bergson. Cours I. Leçons de psychologie et de métaphysique. Clermont-Ferrand, 1887-1888*. Eds. Henri Hude with Jean-Louis Dumas. Avant-propos Henri Gouhier. Intro. Henri Hude. Postface: La création du bergsonism[e] by Henri Hude. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990: 445. Epiméthée. This is a collection of student class notes from Bergson’s courses, 1887-1888. It consists of 44 lectures on psychology and 25 lectures on metaphysics. Each set of lectures is followed by identifying and explanatory notes supplied by the editors. The psychology course was given at a time when psychology and philosophy were much more closely connected than they now are. This is a broad survey course dealing with among other subjects: the definition of psychology, the method of psychology, the classification of psychological facts, an examination of 1. pleasure and pain. 2. sensation and sentiment. 3. inclination and passion. 4. intellectual operations. 5. consciousness . . . memory, association of ideas, imagination, abstraction, language. 6. volition, liberty, the ‘physical’ and the moral. 7. comparative psychology. The lectures on metaphysics also constitution a survey course. These begin with discussions of alternative concepts of the nature of knowledge, possible metaphysical positions (idealism, dogmatism, vitalism, animism, “spiritualism,” pantheism), the existence and attributes of God, the problem of evil, optimism and pessimism, the immortality of the soul, the definition of metaphysics.

These sets of lectures are extremely important for the light they shed both on the sources and the basic concepts of Bergson’s philosophy. It is striking, for example, that the most cited philosopher in these pages is Leibniz (31 citations), followed by Descartes (22), Kant and Mill (21 each), and Darwin (10). As a minimum, sections on liberty, memory and theories of brain localization, biology, and theology should be read for their implications for *Time and Free Will,
Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution and The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, respectively.


David Michael Brottman. “The Value(s) of Extravagance: Towards a Phenomenology of the Comic Imagination by Way of the American Comic Novel, 1960-1980.” Diss. U Iowa, 1990: 482. DAI 52.3 (1991): item no. AAC 9122043. Print. The author states in his abstract: “The diagnostic/therapeutic inclinations of the comic disclosed by Bergson (the encrustation of spontaneous being by reifying mechanisms) and Bakhtin (the recuperations topologized by inversion of the lower bodily stratum) are coordinated with Bachelard’s description of Reverie as an imaginal concentration of Being ramified into a cosmos of valorized elemental attributes” (p. 914).


Jean-Pierre Barou. “Bergson-Jankélévitch : les secrets d’une amitié.” Figaro Littéraire, 2 Jan. 1990: 24. Print. This article concerns personal relations between Bergson and the philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch, beginning in 1933 and continuing until Bergson’s death. Several excerpts from Bergson’s letters to Jankélévitch are quoted here. These include references to Plotinus (1923), Georg Simmel (1925), Jankélévitch’s first article on Bergson, including a discussion of Bergson’s concept of philosophical method (1938), Bergson’s opinion of Jankélévitch’s work (1929), his appreciation of a translation of Sigmund Freud by Jankélévitch’s father (1936), Jankélévitch’s treatment of ennui (1938), and the coming war (1939). These letters were in the possession of Mrs. Jankélévitch at the time of the publication of this article. Eng. trans. “Bergson-Jankélévitch: Secrets of a Friendship.”


Rosa Conde Hernández. “Las Influencias Dinámicas de la Obra de Boccioni.” Diss. U de Sevilla (Spain), 1990: 465. Print. The author’s abstract states: “This author gives a living testimony showing us an interdisciplinary work of his era’s great artists. Boccioni has a strong philosophical basis and his poetry is related with the thinkers of the time such as Nietzsche, Bergson and others. He establishes a new study of nature based on dynamism and simultaneity that introduces a new vision of observing and studying nature, and also originates other esthetic manifestations dominated by color that will determine the author’s post-Impressionist and symbolist basis.” DAI, 54.4 (1993): 957. Eng. trans. “The Dynamic Influences of the Work of Boccioni.”

Olivier Costa de Beauregard. “Etude critique. Relativité et quanta : leurs mutuelles exigences, et les corrélations d’Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 95.4 (1990): 547-59. Print. Unlike various interpretations of quantum mechanics based upon the phenomenology of macroscopic experimentation, this study rests entirely upon the formalism of relativistic quantum mechanics per se. The concept of causality is likened to that of a conditional probability endowed with two specific features: “non-separability” of occurrences in the sense of the quantal calculus of probabilities (Jordan, 1926); invariance under rotations (Lorentz and Poincaré, 1905) and reversals of axes (Lüders, 1952) of the spatiotemporal Cartesian reference frame, entailing cause-effect reversibility” (author’s abstract). The author finds a Bergsonian moral in this vision of a deterministic world composed of reversible processes. Eng. trans. “Critical Study. Relativity and Quantum: Their Mutual Existences, and the Correlations of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.”


not only critique the Hegelian foundation but also outline an alternative terrain and alternative lineages for theory. In this dissertation, we trace their development of this terrain through their readings of canonical figures such as Spinoza, Nietzsche, Marx, Lenin and Bergson” (p. 531).


André Hella. “A la recherche de Bergson dans Proust.” *Revue générale*, Feb. 1990: 49-66. Print. The author makes a general comparison of the “text” of Bergson and of Proust, arguing that the two are in agreement over the nature of duration, memory, and perception. Though he claims not to be concerned with the question of Bergson’s influence on Proust, the author approaches this question at several points, implying a strong influence. Eng. trans. “The Search for Bergson in Proust.”


Messay Kebede. “Ways Leading to Bergson’s Notion of ‘Perpetual Present’.” Diogenes, 149 (spring 1990): 22-40. Print. This essay compares Bergson’s philosophy with those of both Hegel and Nietzsche. Bergson’s notion of ‘duration’ is incompatible with Hegel’s metaphysics and conception of history, but compatible with Nietzsche’s: “For Nietzsche and Bergson, the original opposition is never overcome; it becomes the permanent source of unpredictable creations that are projected from the depth of being to its surface” (p. 39). These two thinkers force us to a rethinking of the doctrine of progress.

Young-min Kim. “Time Phenomenologically Considered: A Critical and Comparative Study (Husserl).” Diss. Drew U, 1990: 173. UMI no. AAC 9032122. DAI, 51.6 (1990). The author states in his abstract: “Comparative studies of Augustine, Kant, James, and Bergson in Chapter 3 are done in order to illustrate and help vindicate Husserl in his phenomenological insight into time-consciousness in the preceding chapters” (p. 2042).


Ran Lahar. “Bergson and the Hegemony of Language.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 28.3 (fall 1990): 329-42. Print. “I argue that Henri Bergson’s views on the nature of experience constitute a fundamental metaphilosophical criticism of traditional mainstream philosophical methodologies. According to Bergson, our experience constitutes a flux of qualities that escapes analysis and description. I argue that at bottom this is a metaphysical claim about the attitude from which the world is to be investigated philosophically. Bergson can be seen as exposing and questioning the traditional suppositions that the proper philosophical attitude which grants us an epistemic access to reality is analytic and descriptive.” Philosopher’s Index, 24.4 (winter 1990): 157. Print. See abstract of this work by George Nordgulen, Process Studies, 20.1 (fall 1991): 188. Print.

Franklin Leopoldo e Silva. “A constituição das existências lógicas (Bergson leitor de Aristóteles).” Discurso, 18 (1990): 143-60. Resumo, 143; Abstract, 159. Print. “Este texto procura explicitar alguns aspectos da interpretação bergsoniana de Aristóteles, sobretudo aqueles que fazem de Aristóteles um eminente representante do que Bergson denomina Filosofia das formas. A leitura bergsoniana procura mostrar que não há diferença significativa entre Aristóteles e Plano, na medida em que ambos comprometem-se com a fundação do conhecimento apartar de ontologia imobilista de Parmêides. Desta maneira, o quadro categorial aristotêico e o princípio ontológico da Forma das Formas, ou Forma Pura, tentam solucionar a aporia parmenêcia remetendo a imobilidade ao estranho lógico do conhecimento, ou a objetividade ao conhecimento das existências em seu caráter lógico [This text attempts to explain some aspects of Bergsonian interpretation of Aristotle, especially those that made Aristotle an eminent representative of what Bergson calls philosophy of forms. A Bergsonian reading tries to show that there is no significant difference between Aristotle and Plato, insofar as both are involved with the foundation of knowledge [as it] comes from the immobile ontology of Parmenides. In this manner, the Aristotelian categorical frame and the ontological principle of the Form of Forms, or Pure Form, have to solve the Parmenidic aporia stemming from the immobility of a strange logic of
knowledge, or the objectivity of knowledge of the existence of knowledge in its logical character],” Philosopher’s Index 26.3 (fall 1992): 111. Print. The author examines Bergson’s interpretation of Aristotle as a representative, along with Plato, of the “philosophy of forms” whose roots are in the “immobilism” of Parmenides. Eng. trans. “The Constitution of Logical Existence (Bergson, Reader of Aristotle).”


Noor Giovanni Mazhar. “Catholic Attitudes to Evolution in Nineteenth-Century Italian Literature.” Diss. U of Liverpool, 1990: 263. DAJ, 53.09 (1990): 3235. Print. In Ch. 5 of this dissertation the author attempts an “original comparison between Fogazzaro and Bergson, and a more detailed one, than heretofore, between the Italian modernist and Teilhard de Chardin.”


Mark S. Muldoon. “Henri Bergson and Postmodernism.” Philosophy Today, 34.2 (summer 1990): 179-90. Print. “One aspect that philosophically characterizes the present moment is the radical critique of what modern philosophers understand as the ‘knowing aspect.’ Paul Ricœur’s discussion of the ‘narrative self,’ in Time and Narrative, is a particular example of a postmodern alternative to the older Cartesian notion of the Cogito. Remarkably, Henri Bergson (1859-1941), a philosopher often dismissed in contemporary circles, holds a similar notion of the self understood narratively. This is especially true of his last work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Only prematurely, therefore, would one exclude Bergson from the present plethora of postmodern conversations.” Philosopher’s Index, 25.1 (spring 1991): 146. Print.


consiste nel superamento dell’impostazione positivistica ma la sua impostazione non riesce a raggiungere quell’evidenza a cui aspira. Il presunto ‘empirismo’ Bergsoniano è in realtà un’ermeneutica che Kantiene sullo sfondo una metafisica ma che, nel rifiuto del procedimento deduttivo, si condanna a manzerenere in se ampi strati di aporeticità. [Eng. trans. Creative Emotion: The Significance of Morality from Bergson’s Perspective. Bergson’s contribution consists in the overcoming of the positivistic standpoint, but his own standpoint does not succeed in establishing itself. Bergson’s supposed ‘empiricism’ is in reality a hermeneutics like Kant’s (che Kantiene) on which a metaphysics is founded, but one which, in refuting the process of deduction, condemns itself to doubts on many levels.]” Philosophers Index, 25.3 (fall 1991): 139. Print.


Georges Poulet. La Pensée indéterminée. III. De Bergson à nos jours. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990: 290. Ecriture. Print. The author derives his concept of “indeterminate thought” from Bergson’s duration, whose qualities interpenetrate “without precise contours.” His investigation of indeterminate thought includes sections on such writers as Bergson, Péguy, Sartre, Bachelard, Kafka, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Musil, Rilke . . . In each instance the author attempts “… de remonter dans l’intériorité des œuvres qu’il étudie, jusqu’à la source, ou plutôt jusqu’à la réalité mentale originelle, en elle-même, le plus souvent, voilée, profonde, secrète et assez trouble, d’où, chez les auteurs et de ces œuvres, l’élan créateur a dû… [to put new life into the internalization of the works that he studies, as far as the source, or rather as far as the original mental reality, in itself, the most often, veiled, profound, secret and rather troubled, to which, according to the authors and these works, the creative life is indebted]” (p. 287).


Martin E. Rosenberg. “Being and Becoming: Physics, Hegemony, Art and the Nomad in the Works of Ezra Pound, Marcel Duchamp, Samuel Beckett, John Cage and Thomas Pynchon.” Diss. U Michigan, 1990: 368. DAI, 51.9, 1991. Print. The author states, in his abstract: “This study of twentieth-century physics, hegemony theory and art seeks in tropes derived from physics symptoms of how the ‘field concept’ remains divided internally between time-reversible and time-bound interpretive models exemplified by the dynamics of Newton, Maxwell, Einstein and Feynman and the thermodynamics of Boltzmann, Bergson, and Prigogine. Ilya Prigogine calls these warring interpretive models the physics of ‘being’ and the physics of ‘becoming’ respectively, and we may find traces of these terms within aesthetic and social philosophy as well. Nietzsche, Adams, Spengler, Bakhtin, Bergson and Gramsci all explore the field of culture through a similar opposition in ways that prepare for the cultural critiques of Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari, and their work will help us to critique the same opposition in the artists addressed” (p. 3086).


Milan Vladislav Vancura. “The Architecture of Czech Cubism.” Diss. Georgia Institute of Technology, 1990: 569. UMI no. AAC 9105468. *DAI*, 51.10 (1991). Print. The author states in his abstract: “The phenomenon of Cubism in architecture remained limited, from all of Europe, only to Prague around W.W.I. There some students of Otto Wagner rejected his modernity as non-artistic, separated from direct creativity by its own submission to temporal needs as the only criteria for evaluation. Cubists, as they later became called, based their concept of architecture on the teachings of Wilhelm Worringer and Aloys Riegle and were influenced by the philosophy of Henri Bergson” (p. 3259).


Alain Vinson. “La fausse reconnaissance, le pressentiment et l’inquiétante étrangeté. Réflexions sur les conceptions respectives de Freud et de Bergson.” *Etudes philosophiques*, 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1990): 471-89. Print. The author’s abstract (here translated by the editor) concludes: “Finally, if we think that premonition is a form of false recognition, we equally think that it (and the premonition also) is not unrelated to what Freud terms ‘disturbing strangeness’ (Das Unheimliche) and Bergson ‘surprise at finding oneself here.’” Eng. trans. “False Recognition, Foreboding, and Disturbing Strangeness. Reflections on the Ideas of Freud and Bergson.”

Alain Vinson. “Paramnésie et katamnèse.” *Archives de Philosophie*, 53.1 (Jan.-Mar. 1990): 3-29. Print. “According to Bergson memory of the present is not at all active and makes him who experiences it take present perceptions as being the simple repetition of a former perception. We describe this experience as eventually connected with an effort both of memory and of imagination through which we are able to discover what is always new in the present.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 24.2 (1990): 168. Print. See also the author’s abstract, p. 3. Eng. trans. “Paramnesia and Katamnesia.”


Richard Alan Whitmore. “The Neutral Actor: From Copeau to Grotowsky, and Beyond.” Diss. U Kansas, 1990: 221. UMI no. AAC 9110934. *DAI*, 52.1 (1991). Print. The author states in his abstract: “This dissertation studies the acting theory of French theater artist Jacques Copeau to establish the paradigm of the Neutral Actor who relies on five principles for the creation of the performance: intuition, ensemble, rhythm, movement and improvisation. Copeau used his close associations with the founding members of *Nouvelle revue française* (heavily influenced by Bergson’s philosophy) to formulate his concept of ensemble. For Copeau, the actor, starting without pre-conceived ideological interpretations, from a neutral place, encounters the text as an expression of the *élan vital*” (p. 25).


Sergio C. Blumen and Nava Blumen. “Neuroscience and the Philosophical Work of Henri Bergson (Abstract).” *Neurology*, 41.3, Supplement 1, March, 1991, 350-351. The author finds Bergson’s description of functional neuroanatomy in *Matter and Memory* to be accurate. Bergson stresses the modern concept of the synapse as a “site of existential decisions.” Another study on “false recognition” (‘déjà vu’) explains such phenomena through “decreasing alertness”, exactly as in the most up to date definition of partial seizure. Bergson engages in a Promethean attempt to soften the frontier between the material and the organic.


Maria del Carmen Sanchez Rey. “El cuerpo como educador del espíritu en la Filosofía de Bergson.” Themata, 8, 1991, 69-85. “This study, centered in Matter and Memory, puts us on our guard against a frequent interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy as spiritualist, which means opening the way for a positive consideration of the body. To do this I have examined Bergson’s psychological investigations, underlined his metaphysical perspective and demonstrated the function of the body in mental life. Finally, I have shown how the body educates the spirit.” Philosopher’s Index, 27.3, Fall, 1993, 182. An English translation of the title of this essay is “The Body as the Educator of the Spirit in Bergson’s Philosophy.”


Robert Cornell Covel. “The Metaphysics of Experience: Philosophy in the Works of James Dickey.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgia State University, 1991, 308. (UMI order number AAC 913426) The author states, at the beginning of her abstract: “The poetry and fiction of James Dickey reflect his quest for philosophical order and meaning in the fragmentation and chaos of modern life. As a result of his studies in philosophy at Vanderbilt University, Dickey had been influenced by the philosophical idealists, including the pre-Socratic thinkers, Plato, Kant, Nietzsche and Bergson. These thinkers provide Dickey a paradigm to resolve the dualities that he observed in World War II, his family and personal relationships, in nature, and in the universe at large.” (Dissertation Abstracts International, A52, No. 6, 1991, 308)


Georges East. “L’Interliaison des concepts de durée et de l’élans vital dans l’œuvre métaphysique de Henri Bergson.” Mater’s Thesis, Université Laval (Canada), 1991, viii, 120, (UMI order number AAC MM68564) An English translation of the title of this item is: “The Interrelation of the Concepts of Duration and of Élan Vital in the Metaphysical Work of Henri Bergson.” The author’s abstract states: “Les difficultés métaphysiques soulevées par le dualisme d’une réalité présentant deux aspects : spirituel et matériel, de même que le problème de l’Evolution universelle qui implique l’existence d’une force créatrice et d’une mémoire, trouvant dans la philosophie d’Henri Bergson des Solutions qui s’élaboront à partir du concept fondamental de cette philosophie à savoir, l’intuition de la durée. C’est en effet par ce regard métaphysique de la durée que nous sommes en mesure d’établir la modalité des rapports entre l’intuition et l’analyse ; entre l’âme et le corps ; et enfin entre l’évolution et ses phénomènes dans la nature.” (*Masters Abstracts International*, 31.1, 1993, 94) If we begin with the intuition of duration we will be able to establish the modality in Bergson between intuition and analysis, soul and body, evolution and evolutionary phenomena in nature.


Nanette Hope Graf. “The Evolution of Willa Cather’s Judgment of the Machine and the Machine Age in her Fiction.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Nebraska at Lincoln, 1991, 222. (UMI order number AAC 9129551) The author states in her abstract: “Cather did not imitate her forbears, but she drew from those who proceeded her; in particular, her fiction demonstrates the influence of two British writers of the nineteenth century—Thomas Carlyle and John Ruskin—as well as the twentieth-century philosopher, Henri Bergson. These literary influences are reflected especially in Cather’s handling of vitalistic and mechanistic forces as they affect her characters and their environments in the fiction through 1925.” Dissertation Abstracts International, A52, No. 5, 1991, 1747.

Pete A.Y. Gunter. “Bergson and Nonlinear Nonequilibrium Thermodynamics: An Application of Method.” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 43.177, 1991, 108-212. “Bergson’s philosophical method, with its critiques of spatialization and its exploration of ‘duration’ at all levels, was intended to engender new insights in all aspects of human thought, including the sciences. This paper examines Bergson’s contributions to the new science of nonlinear nonequilibrium thermodynamics, with its depiction of holism, irreversibility, and objective indeterminism.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 26.1, 1992, 89.

Daniel J. Herman. “La Phénoménologie de l’intensité.” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 43.177, 1991, 122-129. “This article purports to show Bergson as fullfledged phenomenologist in a number of his writings. Thus in the first pages of his first published work, *Time and Free Will*, Bergson clearly shows that the intensity of a psychic state consists entirely in a qualitative change and not in an intensive magnitude which always brings to mind the relation of container to contained. The source of the confusion between quantity and quality is primarily due to the lack of vocabulary of common people on one hand and the reductionist tendency of the physical sciences on the other. By means of the phenomenological reduction, which suspends or brackets both of these attitudes, Bergson is able to show that sensations, emotions, and feelings fully constitute an object for a subject in the *Lebenswelt*.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 26.1, 1991, 91. An English translation of the title of this item is: ‘The Phenomenology of Intensity.”


Sarah Andrews Johnson. “‘Life’s a Beach’: The Shore-Lyric from Arnold to Ammons (Matthew Arnold A.R. Ammons, T.S. Eliot, Robert Frost, Wallace Stevens).” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1991, 192. (UMI order number AAC 9135275) The author states at the conclusion of her abstract: “Another issue in the relation of this limited setting to modern society is, as Lyndall Gordon expresses it in Eliot’s Early Years, the prestige given to ‘half-glimpsed, half-articulated meaning, whose only lay in the emotions” by the generation including Freud, Henri Bergson, and William James—a mood of growing interest in consciousness which this poetry asserts.” (Dissertation Abstracts International, 52.7, 1992, p. 192)


S. V. Keeling. *Time and Duration: A Philosophical Study by S. V. Keeling*. Ed. Gerald Rochelle. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991: 116. Print. The author argues that our conventional view of time is mistaken. What we misperceive as temporality is really to be found only in the nature of change. Our common views of time are satisfactory enough in our everyday lives but will not do as philosophical criteria. The present, as the domain of change, is the only reality and the only place where action can occur.


Slavomir Kotowicz. *Intuicja Bergsona jako rozum I doswiadczenie*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo SGGW-AR, 1991: 155. Rozprawy Naukowe I Monografie. Print. The author states in his summary: “*Bergson’s intuition as intellect and experience*. The work describes and analyzes the complex phenomenon of intuition in Bergson’s philosophy as the synchronous form of intellect and experience. This fundamental and paradoxical thesis is motivated by consideration of basic features of intuition arranged in pairs of antagonisms, which as *coincidentia oppositorum* display the true meaning of this cognitive capacity and of philosophical method. (These opposites are) 1. unselfish contemplation, 2. intellectual attraction, 3. creation, 4. realized instinct, 5. a method aware of itself, 6. direct, 7. comprehensive, 8. substantial, 9. inconstant, 10. extroversive, 11. introversive, 12. constant…” (p. 156).

Angèle Kremer-Marietti. “Physique et Métaphysique du Rythme comme Mimesis.” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 43.177 (1991): 137-50. Print. “Exactly as in the use of the word ‘image’, for Bergson the use of the word ‘rhythm’ implies the same common denominator between the diverse human and natural characteristics, and also the possibility of a communication between the diverse movements of the universe. Then, rythmics is but a dynamical organization between time and form, that are only differentiated by a distinctive insistency. Bergson’s physics and metaphysics refer to an originary [sic] perception of which the artist is conscious; the way of mimesis products [sic] the effects of rhythm, that efficient in the universe” *Philosopher’s Index*, 26.1 (1992): 98. Print.


Ran Lahar. “Between Pre-Determination and Arbitrariness: A Bergsonian Approach to Free Will.” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 29.4 (winter 1991): 487-99. Print. “Free actions cannot be brought about probabilistically, but according to incompatibilism they can be pre-determined either. The question arises what kind of action can possibly count as free. This paper uses a hint in Henri Bergson’s writings to offer a possible solution: A free action can be subsumed under strict deterministic laws, but only retroactively, after the action has already been performed. Hus, the action is deterministic but not pre-determined, and as such satisfies the incompatibilist intuitions.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 26.1 (1992): 99. Print.


Mark S. Muldoon. “Time, Self, and Meaning in the Works of Henri Bergson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Paul Ricœur.” *Philosophy Today*, 35.3 (fall 1991): 254-68. Print. “Bergson, Merleau-Ponty and Ricœur represent approximately one hundred years of French Continental philosophical thought. Each of these authors has a decisively different definition of self and meaning that stems, as argued, from their equally different definitions of human time. Under close inspection, it seems that the common thesis that ties all three philosophers together is that a particular notion of the temporal present begets a particular notion of self that begets, in turn, a particular form of meaning that authenticates that self.” *Philosopher’s Index*, 26.1 (1992): 108. Print.


Annie Petit. “La Philosophie bergsonienne, aide ou entrave pour la pensée biologique contemporaine.” *Uroboros*, 1.2 (1991): 177-99. Print. Currently Bergson’s philosophy is secular. Obsolete. Nevertheless Bergson interests, or better yet, still fascinates many thinkers, and specifically those who think or rethink contemporary biology. Among some he produces criticisms and violent rejections, where the degree of violence reflects the importance they give him. I cite the examples of Jacques Monod and Jean-Pierre Changeux. For others, Bergson had a critical keenness about the science of his time; he made an effort to think of time and the complexity of nature. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers follow his line of thought. One also finds these or themes
consonant with Bergsonian thought in the works underlining “self-organization” as a characteristic of the living or inviting methodological reconversions (Henri Atlan, Joël de Rosnay…). We will try to state precisely procedural terms and points of agreement, and see how the reference to Bergson helps contemporary thinkers to better situate themselves. And we will show that from our point of view, Bergson is less important for his very dated theories and conceptions, than for a way of closely linking science and philosophy and therefore of inviting dialogue. Eng. trans. “Bergsonian Philosophy: Aid or Snare for Contemporary Biological Thought.”


Christopher Ray. Time, Space and Philosophy. London and New York: Routledge, 1991: 268. Philosophical Issues in Science. Print. See pp. 25-26 and 44-45 for a refutation of Bergson’s critique of relativity physics based on (1) a denial that telescopes or other observational devices are relevant to Bergson’s argument; (2) experiments involving clocks on passenger jets and, also, the lifetimes of Mumesons.


André Robinet. “Bergson et l’Indien Sioux.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 43.177 (1991): 97-108. Print. The author provides a brief survey of Bergson’s use of the terms “all” and of “negation” and of “nothing.” He treats Bergson’s conception of life as “pre-cybernetic” and briefly notes the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss’s description of Bergson’s philosophy as being similar to that of the Sioux Indians. He also briefly discusses Bergson’s philosophy of language.


Michael Scott Ruse. “Images Between Matter and Mind: The Philosophy of Henri Bergson.” Diss. U New York at Stony Brook, 1991: 234. *DAI*, 53.02 (1991): 524. Print. Bergson hoped to solve both the problem of the relations between our bodies and our minds and between our minds and the world by introducing his concept of the “image”: an entity which is more than a “representation” and less than a “thing.” “The image is both self-generating and self-perpetuating, existing entirely as movement.”


Hiroshi Uemura. “Aesthetic Perception in Bergson.” *Bigaku*, 42.3 (Winter 1991): 16-27. Print. This article is in Japanese. “Nous abordons le problème de l’esthétique de Bergson, en considérant les divers niveaux de la réalité et de la perception. La perception ordinaire n’est autre chose qu’un bas degré de contraction de la réalité, qui se répète. Mais, en dilatant la perception, nous pouvons atteindre un plus haut degré de tension, qui nous apparaît comme individualité. Or pour élargir notre faculté de percevoir, il faut converger la direction de l’attention. Ce n’est pas seulement par notre volonté mais aussi par l’hypnotisme de l’œuvre d’art que le détachement de l’attention à la
vie s’achève. [We approach the problem of aesthetics in Bergson by considering the diverse levels of reality and perception. Ordinary perception is merely a low-level contraction of reality, which is repetitive. But, in expanding perception we can achieve a higher degree of tension, which appears to us as individuality. To enlarge our faculty of perception, it is necessary to focus (converger) the direction of attention. It is not only through our will but also through the hypnotism of art that we can detach ourselves from attention to life.]” Philosopher’s Index, 263 (1992): 137 Print.


Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. Bergson. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991: 126. Que sais-je? No. 2596. Print. This is a brief general survey of Bergson’s thought, directed at assessing its importance and meaning. The author concludes that the recent evolution of physics and astrophysics supports Bergson’s thought. “En tous ces domaines, Bergson a témoigné plus qu’aucun autre pour la liberté de l’esprit [In all these areas, Bergson testified more than any other for liberty of the spirit]” (p. 123).


Romuald Waszkinel. “L’inspiration aristotélicienne de Bergson.” Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 89 (May 1991): 211-42. Quatrième série, no. 82. Print. “The ‘durée réelle’, a central point of Bergson’s positive metaphysics, brings the answer to the question: ‘What is time?’ ‘… La durée réelle est ce que l’on a toujours appelé le temps, mais le temps perçu comme indivisible’ [The real existence is that which has always been called time, but perceived as indivisible] (PM, p. 166, 1384). The present paper aims at showing that an appropriate reading of this answer is impossible without considering Bergson’s work Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit. Aristotelism interpretation of movement and substance, as well as its impact on philosophy, these are a few of the very important ideas of Aristotle’s thought which converted the advocate (‘convinced admirer’) of Spencer’s doctrine into the founder of positive metaphysics.” Philosopher’s Index, 25.4 (1991): 230. Print. The English translation for this item is: “Bergson’s Aristotelian Inspiration.”

